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This dissertation examines international dumping trade
in hazardous and toxic wastes and its impact on the trading
countries in West Africa, relying on available and fairly
limited information on transboundary movement of “unwanted
wastes” shipped more often illegally for dumping from
industrialized to poor West African countries between 1980
1988. The drive for this trade in “unwanted wastes” from
West African countries has been the seeming attraction for
easy cash, while the drive from the industrialized countries
has been the huge profit margin for the unsavory waste
brokers, and the desperate need for cheap source of
disposal. Given these motivations and the attendant health
and environmental problems with inexplicable outcomes
associated with this type of trade, the study takes off from
the premise that proper economic development in this poor
region of West Africa is not properly served by
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international trade in TTunwanted wastes.” This postulation,
the paper explains, adopts two methods of analysis--a
theoretical approach and an empirical approach. The
theoretical approach analyzes the realists, radical/marxists
and dependency theorists arguments which favor
protectionismi in contrast with the liberal theorists
arguments which favor laissez-faire capitalism. In the
empirical approach, analysis is made by developing and
testing a hypothesis in five West African countries involved
in the international wastes dumping trade. One major
finding is that at least two of the five tested cases
confirm the hypothesis--that the hazardous and toxic wastes
dumping trade in West Africa follows the path of the poor,
the corrupt or uninformed and it is exploitative.
Conclusion derived from the analyses is that the
international trade in ~Tunwanted wastes” does not serve
proper economic development in West Africa and should be
banned. The study recommends the elimination or
minimization of more toxic wastes production through
prevention and adoption of Al Gore’s new initiative of
phasing out dirty production practices with sophisticated
technology.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Africa’s role in the world economy, conditioned by the
legacies of slavery and the colonial experience, and present
day lack or inadequate technology and unstable political
environment for proper growth renders the countries,
especially the West African countries, gullible and
vulnerable in international trade. Heavily dependent on
international finance for their capital formation, faced
with domestic economic crisis, heavy external debt and
repayment burden, and social pressures, some West African
countries especially the national bourgeoisie have been
known to desperately adopted development paths dictated by
international agencies and foreign governments that do not
often serve the interest of the masses. For example,
engaging in international trade of dumping hazardous and
toxic wastes on impoverished masses for token cash. This
study shows the deepening economic dependence of some West
African countries to be a corollary to the continued
political and economic manipulations of these countries by
their national bourgeoisie who collaborate with foreign
agents.
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In West Africa, as in other Third World countries,
environmental awareness is still lacking among most policy
makers; as there are hardly any laws regulating waste
disposal, and very little action in place by governments to
monitor, let alone act against, the storage and disposal of
hazardous and toxic wastes. Environmental issues have only
recently begun to receive some attention and concerns from
African governments following reported cases of deaths and
environmental pollution and damage by hazardous and toxic
wastes dumping.
Since the late 1980s, national, continental, and global
environmental concerns posed by international trade in
hazardous and toxic wastes have emerged in West Africa as a
significant international issue. This deadly trade has come
about primarily as a result of excessive hazardous and toxic
wastes production and the attendant problems of managing
these wastes in the industrialized nations. The United
States, for example, is leading in the production of
millions of tons of hazardous and toxic wastes every year.
And almost all the industrialized nations are faced with
increased hazardous and toxic wastes production, limited
disposal options, high public environmental awareness and
stringent environmental regulations that force them to look
elsewhere for alternative cheap sources of disposal. High
cost of wastes disposal and lack of land space are also
major factors for waste generators and handlers turning to
3
dump on the cash-poor and easily accessible countries in the
Third World like West Africa. Hazardous and toxic wastes
that cannot be easily disposed of or recycled are exported
to West Africa and other Third World countries which are
considered cheap disposal avenues. This cheap and evasive
approach of dumping environmentally destructive and health
threatening hazards on the poor and/or the least informed
countries for a token price raises objective questions of
exploitative intent.
The political economy study of the international trade
in hazardous and toxic wastes in West Africa addresses the
roles of producers and exporters or handlers of wastes--the
West, and the role of recipients or importing states in West
Africa. Because the investigative analysis between
economics and politics in this study is extended to the
international sphere, the approach is the international
political economy (IPE) . Professor Susan Strange, who
helped establish the modern study of IPE at the London
School of Economics and Politics, writes that IPE,
concerns the social, political, and economic
arrangements affecting the global systems of
production, exchange, and distribution and the mix
values reflected therein. Those arrangements are
not divinely ordained, nor are they the fortuitous
outcomes of blind chance. Rather, they are the
result of human decisions taken in the context of
4
man-made institutions and sets of self-rule and
customs 1
In short, IPE is a multidimensional study of not just
institutions or organizations, but also of the values the
institutions reflect. IPE is also “a network of bargains
between and among states (that deal in power) and markets
(that deal in wealth).”2 This study also addresses the
process of development in West Africa that encourages this
type of unbalanced trade relationship between the
industrialized countries’ and the West African countries.
The industrial countries environmental management and
hazardous and toxic wastes trade export have largely been
based on the liberal or orthodox policies that rely on the
logic of capitalism. The industrial countries favor Adam
Smith’s liberal philosophy of laissez-faire where the
“invisible hand” determines the supply and demand mechanisms
of the market. This liberal perspective which favors the
economics of free trade is compared with other perspectives
of the international political economy that favor
protectionism.
The realist perspective analyses the waste trade from a
state-centered view point. Realists assume that states are
‘Susan Strange, States and Markets: An Introduction to
International Political Economy (New York: Basil Blackwell,
1988) , 18.
2David N. Balaam and Michael Veseth, Introduction to
International Political Economy (New Jersey: Prentice Hall,
1996), 13.
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rational and self-interested actors in the waste trade and
as such states in West Africa should be making and
implementing decisions that further and protect states
interest.
Two perspectives, the dependency approach and the
radical/marxist approach, appear to address the problems of
the waste trade with reference to the developing countries
particularly West Africa. The two approaches address the
problems of exploitation and underdevelopment in the West
African states which have greatly helped to enhance this
unbalanced trade relationship between the developed
countries and West African countries.
The radical/marxist and the dependency approaches also
explain why West African states are made gullible and
vulnerable in the international trade in hazardous and toxic
wastes. The dependency approach explores the roles of some
African countries in the business of importing or accepting
hazardous and toxic wastes for cash.
In a comparative theoretical analysis of how the
approaches explain the international trade in hazardous and
toxic wastes, this study assesses how the various
theoretical perspectives of international political economy
explain the waste trade problems and how their arguments
agree or disagree with the growing international concerns
and resolutions to ban this trade.
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The case studies of some countries in West Africa will
test the hypothesis that hazardous and toxic wastes dumping
tend to follow the path of the poor and the corrupt or
improperly informed and that it is exploitative by
addressing the following questions: a] How is the recipient
country performing economically? b] What are the financial
stakes like for the West African countries engaged in
hazardous and toxic wastes trade? ci Is the existing
hazardous and toxic wastes trade based on informed or
uninformed decisions as the recipient countries tend to be
unaware of the risks involved? dl What have been the
consequences of this hazardous and toxic wastes trade in
West Africa?
The conclusion looks at what would likely be the
possibilities or outcomes of this international trade in
hazardous and toxic wastes. Is it possible to control and
regulate the risks involved in this hazardous and toxic
wastes trade or should it be banned?
In studying cases of hazardous and toxic wastes dumping
in West Africa, it is fairly difficult to come by complete
data for all countries involved in this trade as this type
of trade is usually carried out illegally and more often in
secret. Information on the hazardous and toxic wastes
dumping trade are scarcely available except in explosive
instances where the consequences of the hazardous and toxic
wastes dumping are obviously manifesting--claiming several
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lives and the environment damaged with trees dying out, the
air fouled or drinking water is badly polluted that its
claiming innocent lives. The fact being that by the
clandestine nature of dumping, many cases are not usually
reported or documented. Five countries, Guinea, Nigeria,
Benin, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone, provide some
information that are examined in this study. (Figs. 1 and 2)
Statement of the Problems
The hazardous and toxic wastes dumping trade in Africa
is an added burden on a continent that has always had its
share of environmental problems. Geologically, Africa is an
old continent which makes it more susceptible to natural
processes such as erosion, degradation, deforestation and
infertility with diminishing ability to sustain human
activity. This is why Africa is often described as
‘underpopulated’ because of the fact that its population
density is relatively low. Compared with Asia or America,
Africa seems uncrowded with vast land space that can hardly
sustain its population. It is most likely that this type of
picture is one which tempts the industrialized countries to
see Africa as a dumping ground.
About 80 percent of Africa is not arable. This means
that only about 20 percent is arable. Half of the likely
arable land is made up of laterites that make the land
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Only 7 percent of the arable land has rich alluvial soils.3
This means that Africa has limited natural sustainable land.
West Africa in tropical Africa adds to this picture with
about 50 percent land mass made up of arid and semi-arid
soil. West Africa will have aggravated environmental
problems permitting the dumping of hazardous and toxic
wastes on its proportionately limited life-sustainable land.
Apart from imported pollution and from the
international trade in hazardous and toxic wastes, West
Africa, in embracing some industrialization, has been
generating its wastes and polluting its land, water and air.
While it is difficult to quantify how much wastes and
pollution are generated directly by industrialization in
West Africa, there are a number of outstanding examples of
severe economic disruptions and public health problems in
many parts of the sub-region. For example, the oil industry
in Nigeria is presented here to illustrate how widespread
environmental problems are associated with development.
Oil revenues generated by the drilling and selling of
oil naturally have given rise to growing regional
inequalities, impoverishment, underdevelopment and
3Roger Revell, “The Resources Available for
Agriculture” Scientific America 235 (September 1976)
165-178.
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degradation of the Nigerian environment.4 Hutchful makes
the point that oil-industry activities--exploration,
production, refining, and transportation--have caused
widespread disruption of the natural terrain from
construction of oil-related infrastructures and facilities.
The areas most affected are the three major oil-producing
states: Rivers, Delta and Akwa Ibom.5 Hutchful attributes
inaction in the development of a comprehensive anti
pollution policy to the enormous influence foreign oil
companies have on the government. He contends that:
the problem of the oil pollution in Nigeria has
been exacerbated by the absence of effective
regulations and the predatory attitudes of the oil
companies. Clearly, as long as the [major oil
companies] can maximize the availability of
[economic] supplies from oil, the Nigerian state
has had little interest in regulating their
activities, particularly where such control may
threaten the expansion of production. After many
years of widespread exploration and production
activities, Nigeria still does not possess a
comprehensive or coherent set of anti-pollution
legislation. Existing legislation is scattered
through a number of statutes limited to specific
types of pollution and environment and lacking the
backing of detailed regulations. The tendency is
to leave considerable discretionary power in the
hands of enforcement agencies and corresponding
opportunity for the oil companies to evade
regulations 6
4Eboe Hutchful, ‘Oil Companies and Environmental
Pollution in Nigeria,” in Claude Ake (ed.), Political




HutchfUl however, did not mention that discretionary power
in the hands of Nigerian bureaucrats gives rise to
corruption as the culprit companies can always resort to
buying off their offenses.
The international trade in hazardous and toxic wastes
also has the problem of accountability. The production and
disposal of hazardous and toxic wastes have hardly been
properly accounted for in the industrial states. As a
result, the amount of waste disposed in the developing
countries, especially the West African region, would hardly
be accurate. In the United States, for example, despite
government efforts to regulate the disposal of hazardous
waste by law with the enactment of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976, it has been difficult to
account for all the hazardous waste produced which explains
why it is more difficult to be precise about the amount
disposed. The passage of the RCRA, at least in theory,
should have improved greatly the availability of data as
generators of hazardous waste are required to create written
documentation--the manifest--of the amount and content of
every shipment of hazardous waste signed over to outside
haulers and disposers. This manifest would be forwarded to
state agencies upon final disposition of each waste
shipment. However, the actual quality of the data produced
was compromised for several reasons. One reason being that
firms generating less than one metric ton (2,200 lbs.) of
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hazardous waste per month are exempt from RCRA regulation.7
There are over four million privately owned industrial sites
in the nation. The ‘small generators” exemption leaves all
but a few tens of thousands of this sites out of RCRA’s
regulation and manifest system. Another reason is that some
firms that generate significant amounts of hazardous waste
have either failed to cooperate with EPA requests for data8
or have failed to identify themselves to EPA as regulable
generators. Another reason is that those firms that appear
to comply with reporting may not be reporting accurately the
types of hazardous waste they generate.’ As a consequence,
the amount and content of hazardous waste generation is
still imprecise. Estimates like the historical accumulation
amount of hazardous waste have been rising. In 1974, the
EPA was estimating hazardous waste generation at 10 million
7U.S. House of Representatives, 1983, Hazardous Waste
Disposal Hearings. Hearings held by Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations. Committee on Science and
Technology, March 30 and May 4, pp. 56, 60.
8Bruce A. William and Albert R. Matheny, “Testing
Theories of Social Regulations: Hazardous Waste Regulation
in the American States, “ Journal of Politics 46 (1984)
436—437.
9U.S. General Accounting Office, Illegal Disposal of
Hazardous Waste: Difficult to Detect or Deter. Comptroller
General’s Report to the Subcommittee on Investigations and
Oversight, Committee on Public Works and Transportation,
House Representatives, 1985, pp. 14-20.
‘0lbid., 20—23.
14
metric tons per year.’1 In 1980, the EPA estimate had risen
to 40 million metric tons. In 1983, new research by the EPA
gave an estimate of 150 million metric tons,12 while the
Office of Technology Assessment was estimating 250 million
metric tons per year.’3 Of the approximate total amount of
hazardous waste actually generated, about 10-20 percent are
treated by incineration.’4 The remaining 80-90 percent is
either landfilled or disposed of illegally. It is very
likely that some of the percentage that is disposed of
illegally is shipped across the borders.
Since the amount of hazardous and toxic wastes produced
and the amount traded between the industrialized nations and
West Africa for disposal are hardly or accurately accounted
for, the degree of the problem caused by this international
trade in hazardous and toxic wastes dumping in West Africa
to lives and the environment can only be an approximation.
The large population of local dwellers all across West
Africa are faced with serious health threats and possible
deaths from living with hazardous and toxic wastes dumped
“U.S. Senate, The Need for a National Materials Policy.
Hearings held by the Subcormnittee on Environmental
Pollution, Committee on Public Works, June 11-13, July 9-11,
15—18, p. 70.
12Alan A. Block and Frank R. Scarpitti, Poisonin~ for
Profit: The Mafia and Toxic Waste in America (New York:
William Morrow, 1985), 46.
‘3U.S. House of Representatives, 1983, p. 1.
‘4lbid., 5-6.
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carelessly that foul and pollute their air and drinking
water. More often these people have no way of knowing the
effects of these toxic alien substances except when there is
an epidemic, as there are hardly health care facilities to
monitor health problems. One can only imagine what happens
in these West African countries where there is hardly any
government regulation, environmental awareness/education,
environmental movements and health care facilities.
There is also the problem of improper disposal of the
hazardous and toxic wastes as a common practice of dumping.
Since the schemes of dumping are clandestine in nature,
usually carried out desperately and mindlessly without
proper disposal techniques and information, the surrounding
population more often pay the high cost with their health
and lives. Compounding the problem of illegal disposal is
the issue of organized crime entry into the hazardous waste
disposal industry. For example, according to U.S.
congressional hearing reports, many landfills were owned
wholly or in part by organized crime figures, a legacy of
past mob involvement in the garbage business in the United
States.’5 What possibly needs to be investigated in a
further study is a possible connection of the type of waste
15Andrew Szasz, “Corporations, Organized Crime, and the
Disposal of Hazardous Waste: An Examination of the Making of
a Criminogeflic Regulatory Structure” in Delos H. Kelly
(ed.), Deviant Behavior (New York: St. Martins Press. 1993),
513.
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trade brokers with unsavory characters who get involved in
these waste dumping schemes and operate on the margin of the
law, devoid of ethical considerations, who are connected
with organized crime in the hazardous waste disposal
business.
Also, the international trade in hazardous and t xic
wastes adds to the already impoverished conditions of the
West African region. The West African countries are poor
countries that serve at the peripheral end of the world
capitalist system. Being over-dependent on the World Bank
and Western countries’ financial assistance, some of these
West African countries are tempted to see the hazardous and
toxic wastes trade as an opportunity to earn foreign
exchange that possibly could help them settle some of their
outstanding debts. Though the attraction for the hazardous
and toxic wastes trade may be the cash, more often West
Africans settle for less money or nothing compared to what
the Western waste disposal companies would otherwise have
paid in the industrial countries to dispose of the wastes.
Also, given the wide publicity since 1988 on hazardous
waste traffic from developed countries to the developing
countries with all its attendant problems, calling attention
to the lack of legally binding international instruments to
control such traffic, an evolution of global convention for
negotiations has emerged under the auspices of the United
Nations Environment Program (UNEP) . These developments have
17
also given cause for theorists to postulate many arguments
on this trade. Some theorists perceive this trade in
hazardous and toxic wastes as normal business, while many
perceive this trade as dangerous to the human and the
environment and advocate an outright ban. This study
analyzes the liberal, the realists, the radical/marxists and
dependency theorists’ arguments on this international trade
in hazardous and toxic wastes. It also attempts to ascertain
which argument(s) better posit the problems and the growing
perceptions of this international trade in hazardous and
toxic wastes dumping.
Definition of Hazardous and Toxic Wastes
Waste as a common household term can be referred to as
an unwanted by-product of consumption and industrialization.
In this study, the emphasis is on toxic and hazardous wastes
and deadly radioactive materials that are exported from the
industrial Western countries primarily to West Africa.
These kinds of waste are known to pose serious and
challenging management problems and are poisonous and
capable of causing death or serious injury to humans and
animals, as well as damage to the environment.
The terms “toxic” and “hazardous” wastes are used often
j~terchangeablY though there is recognized difference. Toxic
commonly refers to a narrow group of substances that are
poisonous which could cause death by interfering with normal
body physiology. Hazardous ~S a broader term that refers to
18
all wastes that are dangerous, includ~ing those that are
toxic, and capable of posing an immediate and long-term risk
to human health or risk to the environment due to their
“quantity, concentration, physical, chemical, or infectious
characteristics. “16
Nuclear waste, of all the hazardous waste, is the most
deadly and dangerous, as it is highly toxic. The nuclear-
weapons program and nuclear power plants for generating
electricity are the two main sources of radioactive waste.
The U.S. federal facilities, for example, are involved
in nuclear production. Some of these high-level wastes are
so toxic that they must be stored for 500,000 years. It is
estimated that approximately 3 million cubic feet of low-
level radioactive wastes are produced yearly in the United
States. These low-level wastes require safe storage for
hundreds of years.17
Nuclear energy has a major problem of how to dispose of
spent fuel. Roughly one third of the nuclear fuel is
replaced yearly. A 1000-MV reactor, for example, produces
about 33 metric tons of highly radioactive material (approx.
‘6Environmental Science Technoloav 26, no.9 (1992):
1686.
‘~Ini G. Inyang, “The Politics and Dilemma of Waste
Disposal and Dumping in The U.S. and The Incidence of Trans
Boundary Shipment or Export of Hazardous and Toxic Waste to
Africa,” (Masters Thesis, Clark Atlanta Univ., 1993), 18.
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5xlOc) which is capable of causing environmental and health
hazard for as long as 10,000 years.’8
Studies indicate that in the United States hazardous or
toxic wastes are seldom disposed of in safe manner; as a
result toxic chemicals buried or dumped underground usually
end up contaminating subsurface waters by a process known as
leaching. If in the United States, with all the available
technology, waste disposal is not always done safely, what
safety is there in poor West African countries with no
technology for handling the disposal of toxic and hazardous
wastes?
Historical Background of Wastes Dumping Trade in West Africa
Toxic and hazardous wastes trade and dumping in West
Africa is believed to have started in the mid-1970s.
Available transboundary wastes trade flow data by
Greenpeace, the U.S. EPA, and other agencies show a fair
account of monitoring efforts on hazardous and toxic wastes
trade flow between the industrialized countries and a dismal
account of hazardous and toxic wastes trade or dumping
between the industrialized countries and West Africa.
There is also the failure to make the distinction between
hazardous and toxic wastes exchange trade data and hazardous
and toxic wastes dumping trade data. Because of the general
l8J Wilson, Chemical Enaineerina News, September 12
1988, p. 81.
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lapse or difficulty in accounting accurately for ~he
hazardous and toxic wastes trade flow in Africa, there is
the tendency to draw conclusions that most of the
transboundary hazardous and toxic wastes transfers take
place among industrial countries and very little hazardous
and toxic wastes transfers take place with developing
countries, particularly West African countries. The fact
is, hazardous and toxic wastes trade between industrialized
countries and Africa, by its more often clandestine nature
of operation, is hardly reported or documented. The
hazardous and toxic wastes trade between industrialized
countries is well documented and is more of hazardous and
toxic wastes exchange trade on the basis of informed
decisions, recycling technology exchange and on fair or
equal cash exchange. Hazardous and toxic wastes dumping
trade is mainly what goes on between industrialized
countries and most of the developing countries, particularly
West African countries. This type of waste trade is mostly
based on uninformed decisions, unscientific or illegal
disposal method and it is exploitative.
Although documentation of the hazardous and toxic
wastes trade between the developed countries and West Africa
has been sparse, the French were among the early culprits,
exploiting their special relationship with francophone
Africa as a means of transferring their unwanted wastes. It
was also revealed in 1979 that an American company, the
21
Colorado-based Nedlog Technology Group Inc., had offered
Sierra Leone $25 million to use its territory for waste
disposal. The then-President Siaka Stevens was forced to
backtrack on the deal under mounting pressure.’9
Since the summer of 1987, the following were the main
waste disposal networks negotiating deals with Guinea
Bissau, Djibouti, and Senegal; the nebulous Italo-Swiss
Intercontract-Jelly Wax group, the Gibral-tar-registered
Sesco Ltd., the Liechtenstein-registered Bawerk, the New
jersey-based Waste Export Management Co., and Norway’s Bulk
Handling Inc.20
Djibouti in September 1987, turned down 2,100 tons of
chemical waste that was shipped from the Italian port of
Carrara under jelly Wax’s aegis. Intercontract signed a
mega waste disposal deal with Guinea-Bissau that started the
alarm of the waste trade in Africa. The Brussels-based
lobbying group, LEntente Europeenne pour L’Environment
(EEE), blew the whistle that really got the attention of
African states. Under the terms of the contract, Guinea
Bissau was to receive up to 500,000 tons of pharmaceutical
and industrial waste from Switzerland at a price of $40 per
ton.21




For poor Guinea-Bissau, the prospects of earning up to
$20 million was like a windfall. But, the big winner in
this deal was really Intercontract because it would have
cost the company up to $1000 to first incinerate and then
recycle the waste in accordance with Common Market norms.
Instead, the waste was to be dumped near the town of Farim
in the northwestern part of the country close to the
Senegalese border-and rumors had it that the land belonged
to a close relative of President Vieira.
The supposed dump site is close to an EEC-funded
fishing and agricultural project and threatened to pollute
the entire region. According to a French expert:
the site soil is extremely porous and marshy
and it rains a lot too, so the drums of waste
would have quickly leaked with their contents
seeping into the water table.22
The Guinean authorities, alarmed by the uproar that
developed, canceled the deal as well as a second, smaller
agreement with British and American waste disposal firms.
In another report in May 1988 entitled, “Toxic Waste
Secretly Dumped in Africa’,” Richard Dowden informs about
illegal export of toxic waste by British companies to Guinea
Bissau. Richard states:
Euro-MP5 from across the political spectrum are
expected to condemn the large-scale sales of
dangerous waste to Guinea Bissau. Allegations made
by Belgian Green, Francis Roelants Du Vivier,
state that Guinea Bissau has agreed to receive
from one to three million tons of chemical waste a
22Ibid
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year for five years from Hobday Limited, based on
the Isle of Man, and Empresa Bis Import Export
Limited, based in London.
Mr. Roelants Du Vivier claims that as much as
10 percent of EC’s production of toxic waste in
bound for Guinea Bissau, flouting a 1988 EC
directive on the export of dangerous waste.23
In Guinea-ConakrY, an official investigation was
provoked by complaints that vegetation on the island of
Kassa, just opposite the capital, Conakry, was turning brown
and fetid fumes were making the air unbreatheable. The
result was shocking as it was learned that 85,000 tons of
incinerator ash from Philadelphia was dumped in abandoned
mines on the island, after having been rejected by Panama
and Haiti.24
Benin was also reported to have signed a contract with
the Gibraltar-registered Sesco Ltd. to take between 1 and 5
million tons of diverse waste a year, albeit non-nuclear.
The dumping site was to be near the historical center of the
Fon Empire at Abomey, about 60 miles north of the capital,
Cotonou. From a financial viewpoint, Benin got a raw deal,
receiving under contract terms of mere $2.50 per ton.25
politically, the deal sparked uproar. Abomey was
traditionally a hotbed of dissent against the Benin supremo.
Dumping the waste there sparked opposition protests which
23Richard Dowden, The IndeDendent (London, England:
September 1988)
24Africa Report, August 1988, p. 48.
25Ibid 49.
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followed army officers from Abomey being arrested and
accused of plotting a coup. Of all the African states
involved in the toxic waste trade, Benin undoubtedly has the
most equivocal attitude.
According to a newspaper report, the Organization of
African Unity accuses the Benin government of taking a
shipment of French radioactive waste.26 Nigeria’s case
developed amidst shock by the news that toxic waste from
Italy had been surreptitiously brought into the country for
stockage at the port of Koko in Bendel state. The waste was
shipped by the Livorno based companies. When the story
broke in Italy, the Nigerian embassy in Rome did not take
heed of this caveat to inform the Federal government in
Lagos of the scam. It was Nigerian students in Italy who
phoned the Lagos daily, The Guardian, who then published and
triggered of f a reaction by President Babangida’s regime.
Upon investigation, it was discovered that the waste
haphazardly stocked under the hot tropical sun was extremely
deadly. Not only was there PCB, but also asbestos fiber and
perhaps dioxin. The Federal government ordered these drums
of toxic products to be shipped back to Italy. This
incident before it was fairly arrested took many Nigerian
lives. A more detailed case account of the Nigerian
incident will be further discussed.
26worldoaper/Journal of Commerce, Aug/Sep 1988, p. 6
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The London-based newsletter, Africa Analysis, also
carried the news of a British firm stockpiling up to 10
million tons of assorted waste products on the tiny
Equatorial Guinean island of Pagalu, some 280 miles off
Libreville in the heart of the fish-rich Gulf of Guinea.
This development triggered an alarm. The island is of
volcanic origin and its soil is like a sponge. It is not
hard to imagine that the effects of sun, rain, and salt
water would cause leaks in the drums, with the waste
materials soaking into the ground and eventually reaching
the sea where strong currents would send it all over the
West African coastline causing ecological disaster.27
In Sierra Leone, residents complained of choking fumes
from more than 600 bags of hazardous waste containing
ammonia formaldehyde. The waste was imported form Great
Britain and buried in a local garbage dump.28
The above incident of international shipments or
exports of hazardous and toxic wastes to the various
countries of West Africa according to environmental experts
could well be the tip of the iceberg as several illegal
dumping cases are hardly reported but imagined.
27Africa Report, August 1988, p. 48
28Worldpaper/Journal of Commerce, Aug/Sep 1988, p. 6
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Methodoloov
The study is both theoretical and empirical. The
empirical approach or case by case study analysis approach
involves testing of the hypothesis in five West African
countries. The countries will be sorted into two categories
for the purpose of analysis - countries that import
hazardous and toxic wastes and those that do not. It is
important to draw a distinction here between hazardous and
toxic wastes dumping trade and hazardous and toxic wastes
import trade As some of the countries (cases) studied
show, the hazardous and toxic wastes dumping trade category
involves states that are not directly involved in the
hazardous and toxic wastes trade transaction or importation
and/or cases where the states were misinformed and had no
prior knowledge of any waste shipment(s), but later
discovered hazardous and toxic wastes illegally imported
into their countries. Several countries are listed under
this category, but since information is scarce, some of
these cases are listed as unclear in Fig. 3, and for this
study unclear cases will be presumed to be dumping cases.
However, the study has been able to find some valuable
information on three countries. These countries are Guinea,
Nigeria and Sierra Leone.
On the other hand, hazardous and toxic wastes import
trade category reflect cases where the state was involved in
the importation or transaction and at least was aware or
27
given prior knowledge of the hazardous and/or toxic wastes
shipment(s). Two countries have been identified in this
category. These countries are Guinea-Bissau and Benin. The
two cases will provide interesting accounts of similarities
and differences in the range of state behavior.
This study expects to find unique correlations from the
case studies that fairly support the hypothesis that the
international dumping trade in hazardous and toxic wastes
follow the path of the poor, the corrupt or the uninformed
and it is exploitative. For example, the social indicators
of development of each country will rightly tell how rich or
how poor the country is. Also, questions like: Was the
waste trade based on informed or uninformed decisions?, will
help clarify how informed the recipient or importing country
was before making decisions to accept waste for cash. The
study will explain exploitation by answering the question:
Was the financial compensation for disposing the hazardous
or toxic wastes in the recipient country fair or unfair?
Fair and unfair in this context will be quantified as cash
amount equal to or greater than or less than what it would
otherwise cost to dispose such waste in the exporting
country respectively. It. is possible to make this
determination by comparing how much was paid to the
recipient country or agent and how much it could have cost
in the exporting country to dispose of the same waste.
Also, to ascertain the exploitative nature of this type of
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trade, the study will address questions like: Was the
country a victim of nefarious hazardous and toxic wastes
trade brokers?
A theoretical study approach involves analysis of the
international trade in hazardous and toxic wastes using the
realist, radical/marxist, liberal and dependency approaches.
The study conclusion gives the summary of the analyses of
the five case studies--whether the hypothesis tested in all
the cases has been fairly justified or not and posits which
of the theoretical approach(es) paradigm--protectionism or
liberalism vis-a-vis the international trade in hazardous
and toxic wastes actually promotes proper economic
development in the West African region.
Hy~othes is
In working terms, this research hypothesizes that the
hazardous and toxic wastes dumping trade in West Africa
follow the path of the poor, the corrupt or uninformed and
it is exploitative. It is exploitative because the
hazardous and toxic wastes trade in West Africa is based
largely on uninformed or corrupt decisions and the exchange
is done for token amounts compared to what it would cost to
dispose in the exporting countries. In genuine trading
relationships, the calculation of risk should be done by
both exporting and importing or recipient countries,
especially by the recipient countries to determine if the
risks outweigh the benefits. In the event that the
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importing or recipient countries determine that the benefits
exceed the risks, then hazardous and toxic wastes import may
be allowed. But where the recipient or importing countries
are uninformed and unable to play the role of assessing or
determining the risks involved, then the onus is on the
exporting countries to fully explain the risks involved in
the exchange. This is why the exporting countries and their
agents must accept more responsibility for all the problems
of the waste trade. Too often, as illustrated in this trade
of dumping (see Fig. 3), exporting countries and/or their
agencies do not promote proper exchange of information and
procedures of waste handling in this trade. Rather, the
exporting countries have the tendency to misinform the
recipient or importing countries by knowingly mislabelling
their products or shipment. It is this kind of behavior by
the exporting countries or their agents that makes this
trade in hazardous and toxic wastes even more dangerous and
easily explained as exploitative.
Significance of Research
It is hoped that the exposition from this research will
add to existing literature on global environmental issues
and trade in hazardous and toxic wastes. It will provide
the much needed information to alert West African
Governments to address the issue of implementing effective
regulations to control or combat the deadly trade. Possibly
too, by exposing the business aspect of the hazardous and
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toxic wastes trade as this research will seek to accomplish,
the African masses may begin to be informed and come to know
more of the dangers involved in allowing their communities
to be used as dumping ground for deadly waste. In so doing,
engender awareness for environmental groups formation that
may form the basis to help address the exploitation by
government officials who see hazardous and toxic wastes
deals as a means of amassing wealth.
The research will also bring to focus the political
science perspective or contribution to the study of global
environmental issues, in this case international political
economy, as it relates to international relations and
international trade.
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework for this study is the
political economy which by extension focuses on the
international political economy since the investigative
analysis on toxic and hazardous wastes trade encompasses the
international sphere. This study analyzes the international
trade in toxic and hazardous wastes in West Africa using the
four theoretical perspectives on international political
economy: liberalism, realism (mercantilism), radical/marxism
and dependency. The dependency and radical/marxist are
considered radical approaches in this study. The two
approaches though fairly identical are however analyzed
separately. These theoretical perspectives serve as lenses
for viewing and interpreting the international political
economy.
Review of the Literature
Before analyzing the international trade in wastes
adopting the international political economy approaches and
testing this study hypothesis through case-study of some
West African countries, it is essential to review previous
or related literature in the fields of international
political economy, international trade, international
relations, transboundary movements of hazardous wastes, and
environmental protection and control. Examination of
literature reveals non-availiability of publication in the
specific area of the study subject but few in the related
fields. This is one major reason that has prompted this
study.
Available literature on international trade tends to
focus more on East-West trade and very little on trade
between the industrialized countries and West Africa. In a
book titled, The Politics of International Economic
Relations, Joan Edelman Spero discusses the North-South
System in comparison with the Western system. Sparo
contends that the North-South relations are controlled by
the North as a subsidiary of the Western system and this
structure is perceived by the North as legitimate, whereas
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the South perceives such structure as illegitimate.29 The
South here representing developing countries and the North,
developed market economies. Spero also raises the central
question, which is debatable, whether it is possible to
achieve growth and development in the South within the
prevailing international economic system that is controlled
by the developed market economies of the North. The same
question, this study will attempt to answer in respect of
international trade in hazardous and toxic wastes between
the developed industrial countries and West African
countries.
In a different argument, Norman Bailey writing on
“Foreign Direct Investment and Environmental Protection in
the Third World,” contends that contrary to the widespread
assumptions of the 1970s, detailed emperical studies during
the 1980s have demonstrated that the environmental
deterioration in the Third World is caused primarily by
local, low-technology economic activities and by low per
capita incomes, but not by advanced-sector direct
investments in those regions.30 This contention, though
29Joan Edelman Spero, The Politics of International
Economic Relations (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990),
147.
30Norman Bailey, “Foreign Direct Investment and
Environmental Protection in the Third World, in Durwood
Zaelke, Paul Orbuch and Robert F. Housmen (eds.), Trade and
the Environment, Law, Economics, and Policy (Washington
D.C.: Island Press Publishers, 1993), 133—142.
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debatable, advances the argument on international trade,
investment and the effects on environment which also applies
to the waste trade.
In another book titled, Overcomincr National Barriers to
International Waste Trade: A New Perspective on the
International Movements of Hazardous and Radioactive Wastes,
Elli Louka takes a look at the waste trade issue adopting a
legal-policy approach of prescribing minimum standards
fortified with liability rules as a means of formulating a
transnational waste management. Louka’s premise of
contention is that: 1. The combination of existing
international legal instruments and public opposition has
harmed waste management, and has spurred illegal waste
transfers to even more unstable and fragile developing
countries. 2. That the current prohibitory atmosphere has
undermined what he describes as the dynamic dimension of
wastes--wastes substances that can be recycled or reused and
can save natural resources. To counter what the next
question of how this transnational waste management will be
enforced differently from the existing international legal
instruments, Louka emphasizes on self-enforcement rather
than enforcement. According to Louka, shortage of
conventional forms of enforcement at the international level
34
and the scarcity of resources dictate more reliance on self-
enforcement 31
In another literature by Barbara Kwiatkowska and Alfred
H. A. Soons, titled, Transboundary Movements and the
Disposal of Hazardous Wastes in International Law, the
authors examine the legal perspective and implications of
the waste trade.32 The book discusses international
conventions and resolutions that address the global concerns
about the hazardous and toxic wastes trade.
On international political economy, David Balaam and
Michael Veseth, in their book titled Introduction to
International Political Economy, discuss the meanings of
political economy and international political economy (IPE)
and the theoretical perspectives of IPE which is the main
instrument of analysis in this study. Political economy is
defined as the intellectual discipline that investigates the
rich interface between economics and politics.
International political economy is the extension of that
investigation to the international level.33 On the
3’Elli Louka, Overcomincr National Barriers to
International Waste Trade: A New Perspective on the
International Movements of Hazardous and Radioactive Wastes
(Boston: Kiuwer Academic Publishers, 1994) , xiv-xvi.
32Barbara Kwiatkowska and Alfred H. A. Soons,
Transboundary Movements and Disposal of Hazardous Wastes in
International Law (Boston: Kiuwer Academics Publishers,
1993)
33Balaam and Veseth, 12.
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theoretical perspectives of IPE, Balaam and Veseth agree
that there are a variety of theories that attempt to
explain how the states and the nations should interact
(normative theories) or how they really behave (positive
theories) . The authors also agree that different people
give different names to the main IPE theories--a problem
that is also the strength of IPE given its openness. Balaam
assert that the three main IPE theories are; mercantilism,
liberalism and structuralism or marxism.34 However, they
encourage the consideration of many perspectives as examined
below.
The Liberal Perspective
From the liberal perspective of international political
economy, four elements are crucial in the context of
international trade in hazardous wastes. First, this
approach assumes that individuals, or by extension,
companies, are the principal actors in the international
system. Secondly, it conceives individuals as rational,
self-interested beings who seek to maximize their own
economic welfare by always seeking the lowest possible cost
for themselves.35 Thirdly, it presumes that economics drives
34Ibid., 15—16.
35Robert Gilpin, TlThree Ideologies of political Economy’
in Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, The Global
Acienda: Issues and Perspectives, Fourth Ed. (New York:
McGraw-Hill, Inc.), 243.
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human interaction, and the laws of supply and demand, price
and income order the market place in which welfare is most
efficiently determined and distributed. And lastly, that
government has a limited role in the liberal economic world.
Adam Smith supports this notion when he maintains that “the
uniform, constant, and uninterrupted efforts of every man to
better his condition, the principle from which public and
national interest, as well as private opulence is originally
derived, is frequently powerful enough to maintain the
natural progress of things toward improvement, inspite of
both extravagance of government, and the greatest errors of
administratiOn. “36
Liberals maintain that certain imperfections may exist
in the market place mainly due to misguided policy by some
individuals to subvert the market. Government, according to
the liberals, should regulate the market. But in a more
modern concept, liberals see government’s role as that of
intervening in markets only when there is a “market
failure”37 or to provide a “public good” that cannot be
provided by economics.38 An additional liberal assumption is
36Adam Smith, Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the
Wealth of Nations (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1976
[1776]), vol. 1., 343.
37Francis M. Bator, “ The Anatomy of a Market Failure,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 72 (August 1958) : 351-37.
38For an introduction to international public goods and
the problems of international cooperation in providing them,
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that under free exchange, society as a whole will be more
wealthy, but individuals will be rewarded in terms of their
productivity and relative contribution to the overall
product of the society.39
Liberals in essence believe that economics tend to
unite people, and that trade and economic exchange are a
source of peaceful relations among nations as the mutual
benefits of trade and the expanding interdependence among
national economies tend to bring about cooperative
relations. A liberal international economy is therefore
presumed to have a moderating influence on international
politics as it is capable of creating bonds of mutual
interests and a commitment to the status quo.4°
CritiQue of Liberal Perspective
Liberalism can be described as a set of analytical
tools and policy directives that is capable of helping a
society to maximize its return from scarce resources. Its
strength is very much in its commitment to efficiency and
the ability to maximize the total wealth. Liberals from
Adam Smith have been seeking to discover the laws governing
the wealth of nations.
see Bruno S. Grey, International Political Economy (New




The major criticism made against the liberal approach
is that its basic assumptions, such as the existence of
rational economic actors, competitive markets, and the like,
are unrealistic. Liberal economics as a means of
understanding society, and especially its dynamics, is
limited and therefore cannot serve as a comprehensive
approach to political economy. Liberal economists have
tended to forget this inherent limitation, to regard
economics as the master social science and allow economics
to become imperialistic.
One of these limitations is that economics artificially
separates the economy from other aspects of society. The
liberal frame of reference is one of homogeneous, rational,
and equal individuals living in a world free from political
boundaries and social constraints. Its “laws” prescribe a
set of maximizing rules for economic actors regardless of
where and with what they start; but in real life, one’s
starting point most frequently determines where one
finishes.4’ There is some truth in the marxist criticism of
the liberal approach as a tool kit for managing a capitalist
or market economy.
The liberal approach is limited by its assumption that
exchange is always free and occurs in a competitive market
between equals who have full information and are therefore
able to gain mutually if they choose to exchange one value
41Ibid., 41.
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for another. This fact is proven in the uneven waste trade
exchange between the developed countries and the West
African countries. Although liberals argue that exchange is
seldom free and equal, unfortunately, the terms of an
exchange can be seriously affected by coercion, differences
in bargaining power and some political factors. Also, the
liberal approach is limited by the fact that its analysis
tends to be static with the array of consumer demands, the
institutional framework, and the technological environment
accepted as constant on the short run. As the marxists
contend, liberalism lacks a theory of the dynamics of
international political economy and therefore tends to
assume the stability and the virtues of the economic status
quo. The liberal approach with its laws for maximizing
behavior, is based on a set of highly restrictive
assumptions.
MercantiliSm
Mercantilism was the first international political
economy perspective that developed with the rise of nation-
states in Europe in about the seventeenth century. It is
defined in terms of states efforts to promote exports and
limit imports, thereby generating trade surpluses to create
wealth and power. In the 16th through mid-l9th century,
mercantilism meant the practice of states seeking to pursue
supremacy over one another by accumulating gold and silver
bullion, colonizing developing regions of the world, and
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trying to produce trade surpluses.42 Since the emergence of
competing nation-state system of Western and Central Europe,
governments or states have added to their accumulation of
military arsenals a variety of economic means and policies
to protect themselves and groups within their sphere of
authority. Several terms or variants have become synonymous
with mercantilism; like economic nationalism, realism, and
neomercantilism. Each of these variants connotes the
different ways states use wealth and power to protect their
industries and other national interest.
Economic Nationalism
Mercantilism was popular for some states that tried to
overcome economic condition to make themselves more
competitive with Great Britain from the late 18th to mid-
19th century. Many states during this period adopted a
variety of protectionist measures to improve citizen
welfare. For example, in the United States, Alexander
Hamilton views on a strong central government were popular
with those who looked for employment opportunities in
manufacturing, with businesses that wanted to attract
foreign capital and with public officials who wanted more
security and independent nation.43 However, Hamilton is
42Balaam and Veseth, 22.
43Ibid., 26.
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remembered for favoring, reluctantly, the use of tariff to
limit imports.
Economic nationalism had much in common with the ideas
of the German Friedrich List. List disagreed with Smith’s
and Ricardo’s liberal view that all nations could gain from
trade if governments did not regulate it excessively and
industries produced goods for which the nations had a
comparative advantage. List convincingly argued that
liberals wrongly assume there was a “cosmopolitical” world
made up of relatively equally powerful nations that were in
agreement with each other to share the benefits of trade.44
List rather contended that the real world situation was that
as the economy shifted from an agricultural to industrial
base, states had to protect domestic industries in order to
level up with lead states.
The central idea of economic nationalism is that
economic activities are and should be subordinate to the
goal of state building and the interest of the state. All
nationalists ascribe to the primacy of the state, national
security, and the military power in the organization and
functioning of the international system. Economic
nationalists stress the role of power in the rise of a
market and the conflictual nature of international economic
relations; they argue that economic interdependence must
have a political foundation and that it creates yet another
44Ibid., 27.
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arena of interstate conflict; increases national
vulnerability, and constitutes a mechanism that one society
can employ to dominate another. Political factors do, or at
least should, determine economic relations.
Critique of Economic Nationalism
The foremost strength of economic nationalism is its
focus on the state as the predominant actor in international
relations and the instrument of economic development. The
second strength of economic nationalism is its stress on the
importance of security and political interests in the
conduct of international economic relations. The third
strength of the economic nationalism is its emphasis on the
political framework of economic activities, its recognition
that markets must function in a world of competitive groups
and states. One weakness of economic nationalism is its
tendency to believe that international economic relations is
dependent at all times on a zero-sum game, that is, that one
state’s gain must of necessity be another’s loss. Another
weakness of the economic nationalists is due to the fact
that the pursuit of power and the pursuit of wealth usually
do conflict, at least in the short term.
Neomerc ant iii sm
NeomercantiliSm is an upgraded form of post World War
II mercantilism that accounts for a qualitative change in
the international political economy generated by
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international economic interdependence. Under
neomercantilism, states have again found it necessary to
develop and employ even more sophisticated protectionists
trade, monetary, investment, and other economic policies
that were not overtly, but nonetheless mercantilist and
economic nationalist in nature. As more nations saw the
protection of their domestic industries in terms of their
security interest, they tried newer and more sophisticated
but less intensive economic ways. For example, the economic
recovery and increasing power of Japan, was one of the
developments that set the tone for the kind of protectionist
policies that were to become synonymous with
neomercantilism. After the war, Japan adopted a carefully
thought-out, mercantilistic strategy of running a trade
surplus to finance its industrial recovery and development.
The state worked closely with corporate officials and
Liberal Democratic Party members to direct the development
of Japan economy. Government subsidies and other forms of
support were readily made available to some chosen
industries to make them more competitive with United States
and European firms. Japan’s export-led industrial economic
growth strategy was adopted by a number of other Asian Newly
Industrialized Countries. The most successful among them
were Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea. Hong Kong had
similar policies set by the British imperial government.
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NeomercantiliSm in the postwar era was also driven by
the globalization of multinational corporate activity. Many
states found it in their best interest to adopt policies
that link multinational corporation investment to national
economic obj ectives.
CritiQue of Neomercantilism
Liberal critics believe that neomercantilism works to
the detriment of all nations, that it generates more
protectionism and makes it hard for market forces to
properly influence prices as well as consumer and government
decisions. Another version of neomercantilism is the pratice
of “industrial espionage.”45
Many states and/or national industries have been
involved in the practice to acquire information and
technology through clandestine activities. Neomercantilism
has yet to address itself to global environmental issues.
Realism
The ideas of mercantilists and realists have often been
lumped together and in many ways these two approaches have
the same assumptions, though in some ways they differ. In
analyzing the international trade in wastes, the realist




Realism has origin or history starting with
ThucydideS’s writings in 400 B.C. and includes Niccolo
Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, and the mercantilists Jean
Baptise Colbert and Friedrich List. Though discredited for
the rise of Liberalism in the nineteenth century, realism
reemerged in the aftermath of the Great Depression of the
l930s as an important international political economy
approach. Unlike liberals and radical/marxists, realists
perceive that politics determines economics.
There are three primary assumptions of realism. One,
realists see nation-states as the dominant actors in the
international system and the proper unit of analysis.
According to realists, the international system is
anarchical, a condition under which nation-states are
sovereign, the highest authority. Realists recognize that
other actors operate in the international system, like,
multinational corporations, international organizations, and
non-governmental organizations. Since nation-states are the
predominant actors, other actors are given as much freedom
of operation as nation-states permit.
The second assumption is that realists reason that
nation-states are rational, self-interested actors competing
with each other in the international system. Realists have
a Hobbesian conception of reason as a means to achieve an
end. This means that one should not expect all nation
states to have the same objective. Nation-states too are
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egoistic. Nation-states behave in ways that further their
self-interest. Nation-states according to realists have
their interest quite apart from those of other actors in the
domestic and international sphere. In short, states are
conceived as unitary actors in ways that support and further
their interest.46
Thirdly, realists assume that politics takes precedence
over economics. Indeed, economics is a function of
politics. Realists reason that in a world of zero-sum game,
self-interested nation-states would rather win than lose.
Realists assume the nation-states are power maximizers.
Nation-states are assumed to perform cost-benefit analyses
and choose the option which yields the greatest value, in
this case, the one that maximizes power. This assumption of
power maximization gives realism its distinctive perspective
to international political economy. In the pursuit of
power, nation-states shape the international economy to best
serve their desired ends.
Realist political economy, given all its assumptions,
is primarily concerned with how changes in the international
power affect the form and type of international economy.
46Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1954), 288.
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CritiQue of Realism
The realists state-centric and power assumptions appear
to ignore the role of international organizations in global
environmental protection. Because of the failure to give
consideration to non-state actors, realism appears therefore
too simplistic a theory. Critics claim the system is a
deterministic notion, too ITHobbesianhi in its underlying
philosophy and is a self-fulfilling prophecy. Other
critics think this theory is based on unrealistic
assumptions. There is also a failure to consider other
motivating concerns apart from national interest. The
theory is considered ahistorical.
Mercantilism and Realism: Complementary Philosophies
Many of the tenets of mercantilism necessarily
complement those of realism as mercantilism accounts for
some of the ways that politics, power, and the state affect
the economy and the markets. Realists as well as
mercantilists assume the nation-state as the primary actor
in an international system because it is the highest
sovereign political authority. For most modern
neomercantilists, the ability of the nation-state to
generate wealth is as important as its capacity to produce
military weapons. Both realists and neomercantilists agree
that state competition and the unequal distribution of the
world’s resources generate dependence of states on other
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states. One slight difference though between realists and
modern neomercantilists is the emphasis realists put on
military instruments and similar state abilities to make the
state secure.
The Radical/Marxist Persoective
This theoretical framework has a marxist underpinning
and serves as a critique of the liberal approach. The
marxists emphasize the role of capitalist imperialism in the
creation of a world market economy. These marxists are
divided between the followers of V. I. Lenin, who argued
that relations among market economies are by nature
conflictual, and those of Karl Kautsky (Lenin’s chief
protagonist), who believe that market economies (at least
the dominant ones) cooperate in the joint exploitation of
the weaker economies of the globe.
The radical/marxist perspective focuses also on the
moral consequences of the society organized on the principle
of self-interest. The radical/marxist perspective here
appears to serve as a critique of the liberal perspective.
For example, radicals/marxists view reason and self-interest
as unnatural and negative human and social attributes while
the liberals consider them natural and positive. The
radicals/marxists perceive that the majority of humans are
rendered miserable by the liberal conception of limited
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government and their market economics.47 Radicals/marxists
believe that by allowing humans to pursue their own selfish
interests, the world does not grow and develop and become
more peaceful and congruous; rather the pursuit of one’s
individual self-interest leads to gross inequalities of
condition and the exploitation of the majority by the
minority.48 Radicals/marxists believe the liberal pursuit of
self-interest leads to morally unjust social outcomes.
Radicals/marxists construct of society is that it is
made up of socio-economic classes which serve as the basic
unit of analysis since class transcends all strata of social
formation. The division of society along class lines that
radicals believe is a consequence of liberal establishment,
makes individuals not to see the common interest that all
humans share. For example, liberals concept of competition,
differentiation and specialization in society create the
divisions among individuals. Radicals/marxists see history
replete with the struggles between capital and labor,
between rich and poor, between majority and minority.49
Radicals/marxists, therefore, contend that in order to
47Mark A. Montgomery, “Want Not, Waste Not: A Realist
Theory of the International Trade in Hazardous Waste,
(Ph.D diss., The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,




eradicate conflict, class differentiation must be done away
with by the state.
The radicals/marxists conceptualization of government
institution is that, it reflects the interest of the
capitalist, market oriented class.50 And for the state to
take on the role as the provider of social and economic
equity, radicals see a problem, since, to them state
reflects the class that controls the instrument of power.51
Radicals/marxists therefore recommend that in order to
create a world of social justice and economic equity, power
must be transferred to the economically disadvantaged and
the politically impoverished class, and the political and
economic system should be revolutionized. To the
radicals/marxists, politics is defined by economic
relationship. Furthermore, politics ought to serve the
interests of social justice and equity within and among
states.52 This perspective contends too that economics drive
politics.
Critique of the Radical/Marxist Perspective
50Joan Robinson, “Trade in Primary Commodities” in
Jef fry A. Frieden and David A. Lake (eds.), International
political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987), 371-381.
51Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote about the state
in “The German Ideology,” in Robert C. Tucker (ed.), ffl~




The radical perspective is in itself very much a
critique of the liberal political economy. The marxist
perspective or marxism as a defining theory properly orders
the economic problem--the production and the distribution of
material wealth where it should be--at or near the center of
political life. Unlike liberals that tend to ignore the
issue of distribution, the marxists focus on both the
domestic and the international effects of market economy on
the distribution of wealth. Another contribution of marxism
is its emphasis on the nature and structure of the division
of labor at both the domestic and the international levels.
The marxist theory of international political economy is
also useful in its focus on international political change.
Whereas liberalism has no comprehensive theory of social
change, marxism emphasizes the role of economic and
technological developments in explaining the dynamics of
international system. The marxist theory of international
political economy is therefore a useful focus on
international political change. As emphasized in Lenin~s
argument of uneven development, the different growth of
power among states explain the underlying cause of
international political change.
In spite of its proper focus on political change,
critics share that the principal weakness of marxism as a
theory of international political economy lies in its
failure to appreciate the role of political and strategic
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factors in international relations. Marxism also suffers
from ideological differences among protagonists. The next
section reviews the dependency approach that also favors
protectionism.
The Structuralists Perspective
The basic ideas of the structuralist approach were
developed simultaneously in the l950s by several economists
and by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin
America (ECLA), but did not gain international prominence
until the 1964 publication of the report “Towards a New
Trade Policy for Development.” This report was written by
Raul Prebisch, then the newly appointed Secretary—General of
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), which brought about the structuralist argument
that the world economy was biased against the development
efforts of the less developed countries.53
The structuralist argument contends that the world
economy is composed of a core or the center of highly
industrialized countries and a large underdeveloped
periphery. Secondly, that technical progress which leads to
increasing productivity and economic development is the
driving force in the system, whereas technical advance has
different effect for the industrialized center and the
53Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International
Relations (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987)
274—275.
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nonindustrialized periphery due to past inherited structural
features of the less developed economies and to the
international division of labor.54
The structuralist argument falls between liberalism and
Marxism.55 Like marxist analysis, structuralist analysis
contends that the international market structure perpetuates
backwardness and dependency in the South and encourages
dominance in the North. Following this view, the market
tends to favor the rich and undermine the less developed.
Too, that unregulated international trade and capital
movements will accentuate, not diminish, international
inequalities.
The structural bias of the international market,
according to this approach, rest at large on the
inequalities of the international trading system. In short,
trade does not serve as an engine of growth but indeed
widens the North- South gap. The system creates declining
terms of trade for the South. The inflexible demand for
primary product exports of the less-developed countries and
the existence of competitive international markets for those
54Ibid.
55For examples of structuralist theory, see Gunner
Myrdal, Rich Lands and Poor: The Road to World Prosperity
(New York: Harper & Row, 1957); Raul Prebisch, The Economic
Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems (New
York: United Nations,1950); Johan Galtung, Structural
Theory of Imperialism,” Journal of Peace Research, 8 (1971)
81—117.
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products result in lower prices for Third World exports.
Also, the monopoly structure of the Northern markets and the
rising demand for manufactured goods lead to higher prices
for the industrial products of the North. International
trade under these conditions, transfers income from the
South to the North.
Structuralists argue too that international trade
creates an undesirable dual economy. Specialization and
concentration on backward export industries by the Southern
economies do not fuel the economy as supposedly alleged by
the liberals. Rather, trade creates an advanced export
sector that has little or no effect on the rest of the
economy and drains resources from the rest of the economy.
This situation creates a developed and isolated export
sector together with an underdeveloped economy.
According to the structuralists, another area of bias
is in foreign investment which more often are designed to
bypass the South where profits and security are lower than
in the developed market economies. The structuralists
contend too that whenever investment does flow to the South,
it tends to concentrate in export sectors which help in
aggravating a dual economy and negative effects of trade.
Also, foreign investment leads to a flow of profits and
interests to the developed, capital-exporting North.
Structuralists have advocated several policies to deal
with these problems. One policy is the creation of
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international organizations like UNCTAD to promote the
interest of the less developed countries especially the
exporting of manufactured goods to the developed countries
of the North thereby break the cycle of circular causation.
Secondly, the enactment of international policies and
regulations, such as a commodity stabilization program that
protect earnings of less developed countries of the South.
Thirdly, the rapid industrialization to overcome the South’s
declining terms of trade and absorb its labor surplus. The
South should pursue an “import-substitution strategy”
through policies of economic protectionism, encouragement of
foreign investment in manufacturing, and creation of common
markets among the less developed countries of the South.
CritiQue of the Structuralist Persoective
The first critique of the structuralists arguments is
their concept of “the terms of trade” is itself confused,
difficult to measure, and highly indeterminant over the long
term. Secondly, the terms of trade between South and North
can be of less importance than other considerations such as
the overall volume of trade and benefit of trade in
modernizing the South. Thirdly, the causes of the disparity
between the North and South or between the periphery and
core are to be found primarily within the less developed
economies.
Whatever the merits of the structuralists arguments,
their views and solutions had fallen into disrepute by the
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mid-1960s. The dependence of most of the less developed
countries(LDC) on commodity exports continued, the LDC need
for manufactured imports increased and led to severe
balance-of-payments problems, and the strategy of import
substitution encouraged the manufacturing multinationals of
the North to expand into the South markets raising fears of
capitalist imperialism.56 Given the above stated outcomes of
this approach in the 1960s and the fact that the approach
falls between liberalism and marxism, a radical dependency
approach that will be reviewed in the next section appears a
more appropriate approach for this study model.
Dependency Perspective
A central component part in dependency theory is the
marxist critique of capitalism developed by Lenin and
others. This theory explains the expansion of the core into
the less developed periphery of the world economy. The core
is driven by under consumption due to over production and
the falling rate of profit at home to expand and dominate
and exploit the less developed countries. This situation
leads to a hierarchical structure of domination by great
powers of the industrial core.57 Dependency theory, however,
differ in many aspects from the traditional marxist analysis
561an Roxborough, Theories of Underdevelopment (New
Jersey: Humanities Press, 1979), 33-35.
57Gilpin, xiii.
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of capital imperialism. Dependency substitutes economic for
political means of subordination. In short, dependency
theory replaces formal political colonialism with economic
neocolonialism and indirect control.58 Although marxist
capitalist development theory agrees with the existence of
an “external” dependence, it fails to acknowledge
underdevelopment in the way dependency sees it, as a
consequence and part of the process of the world capitalist
expansion.59 The thrust of the dependency theory, therefore,
is that the world capitalist expansion is responsible for
underdevelopmeflt at the periphery.
Dependency theory is a model of economic and social
development that seeks to explain West African (indeed
global) poverty in terms of the historical exploitation of
poor societies by rich societies. According to Theotonio
dos Santos as quoted by Daniel A. Off iong, dependency is:
a situation in which a certain group of countries
have their economy conditioned by the development
and expansion of another economy, to which the
former is subject. The relation of inter
dependence between two or more economies, and
between these and the world trade, assumes the
form of dependence when some countries (the
dominant) can expand and give impulse to their own
development, while other countries (the dependent)
can only develop as a reflection of this
expansion.... In all cases the basic situation of
dependence leads to global situations in dependent
58Gilpin, 284.
59Theotonio Dos Santos, “The Structure of Dependence” in
eligson and Smith (eds.), Development and Underdevelo~meflt
Boulder: Lynne Rienner publishers, 1993), 194.
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countries that situate them in backwardness and
under the exploitation of the dominant countries.
The dominant countries have technological,
commercial, capital resource, and social—political
predominance over the dependent countries (with
pre-dominance of some of these aspects in various
historical moments) . This permit them to impose
conditions of exploitation and extract part of the
domestically produced surplus.6°
Santos notes too that dependency has a historical form
and a contemporary form. The historical form included
colonial experience and slavery, especially for Africa. The
contemporary form is the process of development conditioned
by the exigencies of the international commodity and capital
markets. For examples, a) International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and Debt Crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa. b) trade relations
which take place in a highly monopolized international
market, which tends to lower the price of raw materials and
raise the prices of industrial products.6’
Though the theorists of dependency differ in their
definitions of main causes of underdevelopment brought about
as a result of the relationship of the advanced capitalist
to less developed economies, two concepts discussed in this
study appear common--the exploitation concept and the
concept of dependent development.
60Daniel A. Off long, Imperialism and Dependency (Enugu,
igeria: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co., 1980), 74.
61Dos Santos, 197.
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The ‘exploitation” concept holds that the Third World
is poor because it has been systematically exploited.62
According to Robert Gilpin, the underdevelopment of the
Third World is functionally related to development at the
core and the periphery by the modern world system. The
developed core is permitted by the world system to drain the
periphery of its economic surplus, sucking wealth from the
less developed to the developed capitalist economy through
trade and investment.63
The other concept, the “dependent or associated
development,” is the most recent interpretation of the
dependency theory.64 This concept argues that, although in
some circumstances, dependency relations could lead to rapid
economic growth like the cases of Brazil, South Korea and
Taiwan, this type of growth is not true development as it
does not lead to national independence.
Dependency theorists agree that continued economic
dependency is very much a limiting condition on economic
development and the consequences are many for developing
countries. Some of the obvious consequences include: a)
over-dependence upon raw materials exports with fluctuating
prices, which causes economic instability; b) a mal
Amin, 1976 referenced by Robert Gilpin in his 1987 ~
Political Economy of International Relations, 284.
63Gilpin, 1987, 285.
64Evans, 1979, referenced by Ibid., 285.
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distribution of national income, which creates in the elite
inappropriate tastes for foreign luxury goods and neglects
the true needs of the masses, which reinforces social
inequalities and external domination; c) an international
division of labor created between high technology of the
core and the low technology of the periphery; and d)
reliance on foreign capital, which generally encourages
authoritarian-type governments that cooperate with and give
foreign corporations the political stability they need.65
Another important component of dependency theory is the
assertion that a dependent country is fastened to the world
economy by transnational class linkage. A common interest
or alliance of convenience exists between core and the
clientele class or the national bourgeoisie in power in the
dependent economy. This parasitic alliance is made up of
agrarian interests, the military, the national bourgeoisie.66
At issue here is that the national bourgeois elites more
often pursue the interest of their own class rather than
being true patriots and defenders of the society against
international capitalism.
Critique of De~endencv k~proach
Dependency theory is correct in emphasizing the




accurate too in emphasizing that the historical linkage is
important in understanding the present poverty and wealth of
nations. It treats wealth as a zero-sum commodity.
Dependency predicts that nations with the strongest ties to
the West should be the poorest,but, this is not always true.
Dependency ignores the role of traditional culture in
maintaining poverty. Critics argue that the policy
implication of the theory is unclear.
Apart from the solutions offered by the different
theoretical approaches to the problems of international
trade in toxic and hazardous wastes that exacerbates global
environmental pollution, two literature have advanced
investment in clean technology as environmental or
transboundary pollution control solution. Frederick Van Der
Ploeg and Aart J. IDe Zeeuw in an article titled, “Investment
in Clean Technology and Transboundary Pollution Control,”
have advanced a mathematical model on transboundary
pollution that illustrates how a government can effectively
deal with the pollution externality within a country by
means of emission charges and how government can jointly
deal with the pollution externality between countries by
means of coordinating emission charges.67 This framework
67Frederick Van Der Ploeg and Aart J. IDe Zeeuw,
“Investment in Clean Technology and Transboundary Pollution
Control” in Carlo Carraro (ed.), Trade, Innovation,
Environment (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), 229-
240.
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permits the analysis of elements of the environmental debate
between optimists who favor growth in order to have
resources to invest in clean technology, and the pessimists
who advocate the banning of production and the by-product
pollution.
In another book titled, Earth in the Balance, Al Gore
in his second strategic goal of the Global Marshall Plan,
proposes a worldwide development of a Strategic Environment
Initiative (SEI)68 that would discourage and phase out older,
inappropriate technologies and replace them with
sophisticated and environmentally sensitive technologies
that reduce or eliminate the production of polluting wastes.
68Senator Al Gore, Earth in the Balance (New York:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1992), 317-334.
CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
From the reviewed literature provided in the
preceding chapter, this study prefers a radical treatment
adopting the radical/marxist perspective and the dependency
approach. These approaches, though they have much in
common, will be treated as separate. The choice of a
radical approach is primarily to properly address the
problems involved with the waste trade as it focuses more
on the moral consequences of the society organized on the
principle of self-interest. Also, the realist approach is
preferred over mercantilism, economic nationalism and
neomercantilism given the similarities of these approaches.
In all, four theoretical perspectives arguments are analyzed
in this study--the liberal, the realist, radical/marxist,
and dependency in respect of the international trade in
hazardous and toxic wastes.
Liberal Perspective and the Waste Trade in West Africa
Experts of liberalism or liberal theoretical
underpinnings seem to see this trade as normal business and
refute the fact that developing countries, particularly
African countries, are made dumping grounds. Rather, they
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assert that the overwhelming majority of the transboundary
transfer of toxic and hazardous wastes take place among
industrialized countries. The liberals contend too that
very little waste transfers take place with developing
countries, particularly African countries. This contention
is very debatable given, for example, that the United States
EPA account of the amount of hazardous waste generation and
disposal have been very much imprecise estimates.
The central logic of liberalism supports dumping on the
poor in the Third World. This perspective appears to serve
as the basis of Western policies that drives the
international trade in hazardous and toxic wastes dumping in
the Third World, particularly West African countries. The
liberals’ reasoning is condemned because of the utter
contempt it displays both for the world’s poor and the
world’s environment. The liberals’ arguments that stand
opposed to the general international perception about the
international trade in hazardous and toxic waste trade has
prompted the need for this study. There has been a tendency
by the liberals to overtly ignore the growing global concern
on transboundary trade in hazardous wastes in their pursuit
to justify this dumping trade on the poor and the uninformed
as good business.
In general, liberals support the international trade in
hazardous and toxic waste in West Africa because they argue
that this trade promotes the efficient allocation of
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resources. According to the liberals, industries generate
hazardous wastes, and in their pursuit of self-interest,
they seek the lowest disposal price. Also, individual
brokers enter the market, more often in violation of legal
or ethical standards to make profits at every risk. The
contention therefore by liberals is that waste trade is
driven by economics.
Some experts agree too with this notion by the liberals
that waste trade is fueled by economics. The editors of
Global Durnoina Ground contend that a powerful economic
equation drives the global trade in poisons: mounting piles
of hazardous waste, shrinking supply of disposal sites and
exorbitant profits for people who can get rid of it--legally
or illegally.’ Strobrn agrees too that “waste trading is
revenue-driven, taking advantage of dramatic new profit
opportunities. 112
Critharis in support too explains that:
successful waste trade schemes continue to bring
thousands of tons of hazardous waste to the Third
World. The economic incentives offered by
international waste trading is attractive to the
waste generators, trade brokers, and government
officials. Moreover, if the price is right,
destitute individuals and countries may be tempted
1B. Moyers Center for Investigative Reporting, Global
DurnpincT Ground (Washington: Seven Locks Press, 1990), 3.
2Laura A. Strohm, “The Environmental Politics of the
International Waste Trade,” (Ph.D. dissertation, The
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University,
1991), 212.
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to allow their territories to become dumping
grounds for the industrialized world.3
Price to the liberals appears to dictate the flow and
movements of transboundary waste. Price also, is dependent
upon a number of factors that include, land, labor and
capital cost. The liberals start by outlining market
factors that influence the price of hazardous waste
disposal. For example, Strohm lists some geographical and
geological factors that influence the cost of land used for
hazardous waste sites as:
easily accessible to transportation, located in
the areas of low population density, have low
alternative land value, [are] on poorly permeable,
high-clay soils, on flat terrain, not over
fractured bedrock, away from high water tables,
and in the area of low rainfall and high
evaporation.4
To meet these conditions, liberals argue, is rare and these
land-based criteria are scarce. As a result of scarcity of
supply, the price of hazardous waste disposal is driven up.
Liberals argue too that labor factors drive up the
price of hazardous waste disposal. A 1989 World Bank report
states that waste management has become an interdisciplinary
field, requiring expertise in a number of technical
specialties, including civil, chemical, mechanical, and
electrical engineering, the biological science, chemistry
3Mary Critharis, ‘Third World Nations Are Down in the
Dumps: The Exportation of Hazardous Waste,” Brooklyn Journal
of International Law 16, no. 2 (1990) : 319
4Strohni, 39-40
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and physical sciences, mathematics, operational research and
system analysis, financial analysis, economics, computer
technology and applications and others.5 It follows
therefore that the price of an environmental disposal site
will take into account the cost of recruiting and
maintaining skilled work force.
The third consideration liberals point out is capital
to create an ideal waste disposal facility. The argument
here is that the technology needed to manage waste most
efficiently is expensive. Because of the fact that some
waste can retain their toxicity for hundreds and sometimes
thousands of years, heavy capital investment for the
treatment and disposal facilities over the long term will
therefore be needed. Liberals argue that if the normative
goal is to provide maximum, long—term protection to human
health and the environment, the current price of hazardous
waste disposal must require the continuing high cost of
capital investment.
By extrapolation from general economic principle,
liberals predict that markets will fail to provide non
economic values like protection of the human health and the
environment. Liberal analysts of the waste trade therefore
5Roger Batstone, James E. Smith, Jr., and David Wilson
(eds.), The Safe Disoosal Hazardous Wastes: The Special
Needs and Problems of Develooin~ Countries, World Bank
Technical Paper Number 93, Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: World
Bank, 1989), 96.
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contend that the public welfare demands some form of
government intervention in the international markets to
insure that hazardous waste is handled “properly and
safely.” This argument for government regulation or
intervention in the market mechanisms to insure proper and
safe hazardous waste disposal remains the theoretical core
of the liberal analysis of the international waste trade.
In a memo which leaked out to the press, Lawrence
Summers, an orthodox economist, makes yet another liberal
assertion of his view of the world environment saying:
shouldn’t the World Bank be encouraging more
migration of the dirty industries to the LDCs
[Less Developed Countries]? I can think of three
reasons:
(1) The measurement of the costs of health-
impairing pollution depends on the foregone
earnings from increased morbidity and mortality.
From this point of view a given amount of health-
impairing pollution should be done in the country
with the lowest cost, which will the country of
the lowest wages. I think the economic logic
behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the
lowest-wage country is impeccable and we should
face up to that.
(2) The costs of pollution are likely to be non
linear as the initial increments of pollution will
probably have very low low cost. I’ve always
thought that under-populated countries in Africa
are vastly under-polluted; their air quality is
properly vastly inefficiently low [sic] compared
to Los Angeles or Mexico City. Only the
lamentable facts that so much pollution is
generated by non-tradeable industries (transport,
electrical generation) and that the unit
transport costs of solid waste are so high and
prevent world-welfare-enhancing trade in air
pollution and waste.
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(3) The demand for a clean environment for
aesthetic and health reasons is likely to have
very high income-elasticity. The concern over an
agent that causes a one-in-a-million change in the
odds of prostate cancer is obviously going to be
much higher than in a country where people survive
to get prostate cancer than in a country where
under-five mortality is 200 per thousand. Also,
much of the concern over industrial atmospheric
discharge is about visibility-impairing
particulates. These discharges may have very
little direct health impact. Clearly trade in
goods that embody aesthetic pollution concerns
could be welfare-enhancing. While production is
mobile, the consumption of pretty air is a non
tradeable. The problem with the arguments against
all of these proposals for more pollution in L]DCs
(intrinsic rights to certain goods, moral rights,
social concerns, lack of adequate markets, etc.)
[is that they] could be turned around and used
more or less effectively against every Bank
proposal for liberation.6
Though this memo was denied as an official opinion of
the author, the contents of the memo made the point about
the liberals’ viewpoint on the global environment. A
serious contention in this memo that attracts attention is
that individual lives in the Third World, especially in West
Africa, judged by their “foregone earnings” from sickness
and death, are worthless and in comparison with the
individual lives in the advanced countries are hundred times
less. Therefore, the poor in the periphery are the ones to
be dumped on if the overall economic value of human life is
to be maximized worldwide. Too, if polluting industries
were shifted from the industrial to the poor countries,
6The Economist, February 8, 1992, p. 1.
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worldwide costs of production would fall.7 This is indeed
an open display of an exploitative attitude towards the
world’s poor countries
Liberals also advance solutions to the problems of the
Waste Trade with a long list for correcting the market
failures that may result from free trade in hazardous and
toxic wastes. These include, the harmonization of
definitions and standards of wastes, prior informed
notification and consent, and rules on international
liability, the creation of an international emergency fund,
waste reduction and minimization at its source and
redefinitions of state sovereignty.
Harmonization of Definitions and Standards
Is it possible that all states can agree on a
definition of hazardous or toxic waste? Because of
differing definitions of hazardous waste by the different
countries, it has been fairly difficult to regulate
transboundary movements of hazardous or waste. In this
regard, liberal theorists agree that decisions concerning
which kinds or classes of waste are to be controlled are the
underlying factor of any control system.8 In the absence of
7J. B. Foster, Monthly Review, 1993.
8Harvey Yakowitz, “Harmonization of Specific
Descriptors of Special Wastes Subject to National Controls
for Eleven OECD Countries,” Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, Transfrontier Movements of
Hazardous Wastes (Paris: OECD, 1985), 51.
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common definitions, the international community has only
been able to make up control systems that acknowledge that
hazardous waste is a term that is so defined under the
domestic law of a particular country.9 Much as the liberals
insist on common definitions, in reference to the trade in
waste with Africa or West Africa, harmonization of
definitions may not serve any useful purpose if the
exporting countries are not honest in their definition or
classification of any waste exported. This form of control
presumes all waste trade are cases of official waste trade
between governments. How will this control address
desperate and willful dumping of toxic and hazardous wastes
in poor uninformed Third World countries by waste exporters
or brokers who do this by mislabelling as a common trade
practice in West Africa? The argument here is that
consistency in definitions is not enough guarantee to ensure
safe management of hazardous waste.
Brain Wynne supports this argument and contends that
because waste treatment and disposal standards are very high
in industrialized countries; these countries should prohibit
shipments of their waste to countries where management
standards are less stringent since prospects for
9”The Basel Convention on the Control of Transfrontier
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal,T UNEP
Document UNEP/IG.80/3, 22 March 1989, reprinted in
International Legal Materials 28, no. 3 (1989): 657.
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standardization through international cooperation are
“illusory. ~
Hilz and Ehrenfeld agree with Wynne by making the same
argument linking the harmonization of management with the
price mechanism.” Both contend that if all countries were
to have similar ways of waste management, there should be no
differences in the disposal prices in the Third World and
the industrial countries. At issue with this argument is
that, without price differentials, the incentive to ship
wastes across borders would diminish.
Helfenstein on standardization of management, goes a
step ahead to propose that countries with the more stringent
waste management should impose such management on other
countries. For example, she writes that “the United States
should prohibit the export of hazardous substances (waste
inclusive) except when satisfied that the recipient or
importing country has the information and technology to
handle hazardous wastes.”2 The question with such a
~ Wynne, “The Toxic Waste Trade: International
Regulatory Issues and Options,” Third World Quarterly 11,
no. 3 (July 1989) : 142—143.
“Christoph Hilz and John R. Ehrenfeld, “Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes--A Comparative Analysis of
Policy Options to Control the International Waste Trade,”
International Environmental Affairs 3, no. 1 (Winter 1991)
57.
‘2Allegra Helfenstein, “U.S. Controls on International
Disposal of Hazardous Waste,” The International Lawyer 22,
no. 3 (Fall 1988) : 790.
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proposal is, would the U.S. government be able to control
importing or receiving states to conform to its definition
of standards? Obviously not, as these states may likely see
such a move as an imposition of American management
standards.
Prior Informed Notification and Consent
The major problem of the waste trade is that more often
trade with poor countries, is based on uninformed decisions.
Liberals argue that lack of complete knowledge about the
trade is the greatest market imperfection. However, this
problem is related to cases of official importation between
governments. It never holds for cases of waste dumping
trade. Many times importing states are unaware of what
exactly they are importing or what exporting countries want
to dump on them for cash. Some waste agents mislead
importers by mislabelling while others lie about the
contents of the shipment.
Liberal theorists like Lothar Gundling and Cyrus Mehri
contend that countries or the international community as a
whole, can right this market imperfection by requiring waste
brokers to provide importers with accurate information well
in advance of the actual shipment. This advance information
allows governments to make informed decisions whether to
import waste or not.’3
13For more clarity of the “developing norm” of prior
informed notification and consent in international law, see
74
Normally this notification procedure occurs between
governments--the exporting party notifies its home
government, which in turn notifies the government of the
country to which the waste is going. The government of the
importing country gets some time to respond to notification,
and if no objection, tacit approval may be implied. The
notification requirements are given the name “prior informed
notification,” “prior informed choice,” or prior informed
consent,” depending upon the level of decision—making power
granted the importing country.’4 There is a great deal of
debate though about effectiveness,’5 notification systems are
the basis of international agreements on controlling the
transboundary movements of hazardous waste, whether at the
treaty, regional or global level.’6 Analysts of the waste
trade still contend that the prior notification requirements
Lothar Gundling, “Prior Informed Notification and
Consultation,” in Gunther Handl and Robert E. Lutz (eds.),
Transferring Hazardous Technologies and Substances: The
International Legal Challenae (London: Graham & Trotman,
1989), 63-82; and Cyrus Mehri, “Prior Informed Consent
Emerging Compromise for Hazardous Exports,” Columbia
International Law Journal 21 (1988) : 365-389.
14See Gunther Handi, “Environmental Protection in Third
World Countries: Common Destiny-Common Responsibility”, ~
York University Journal of International Law and Policy 20,
no. 3 (Spring 1988) : 616.
‘5See Michael P. Walls, “Chemical Exports and the Age of
Consent: The High Cost of International Export Controls,”
New York University Journal Of International Law and Policy
20, no. 3 (Spring 1988) : 753—775.
‘6Article 6 of the Basel Convention outlines provisions
for a system of prior informed consent.
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are not sufficient to correct market failure in transmitting
information among trading parties. Eherenfeld and Hilz,
however, suggest the creation of a centralized tracking
system through which notifications would be sent through an
international body for checking rather than being routed on
a government-to-government basis.’7 There is no doubt that
international cooperation would be needed to effect such a
system which Eherenfeld and Hilz have not proffered any idea
on how it might be done.
International Liability
Liberals think one of the solutions to the problems of
the hazardous and toxic wastes trade can be by the
establishment of legal liability rules. This is similar to
what obtains in many industrialized countries where they
have in place a liability system created by domestic
legislation. For example, under this system waste
generators are held responsible for all environmental
abuses, damages caused by improper management of their waste
regardless of when it was done or who did It.’8 For example,
in the United States, anybody can bring a civil suit against
a waste company or generator where damaged is done to the
person by that waste--even where such incidence occurred
‘7Hilz and Ehrenfeld, 57.
‘8Cornorehensive Environmental Resoonse. Com~ensat ion,
and Liability Act (CERCLA) 42 US Code, sec. 9601.9675
Cc) [1988]
76
years after the waste was generated.’9 The idea here is that
strict liability encourages waste generators to supervise
the disposal of their wastes.
For situations beyond the national frontiers,
Eherenfeld and Hilz argue that the system should emphasize
“the policy that the cost of [hazardous waste management]
belongs to the waste generator and not the communities that
live near the disposal sites.20 Many liberal analysts have
advanced different approaches to the idea of international
liability but, effective enforcement of the liability law is
another debatable issue.
An International Emerc~encv Fund
Accidents occur in the transportation of hazardous
waste across borders and this could cause “market failure.”
There have been cases of huge oil spills resulting from
tanker accidents. For example, an incident off the coast of
Japan brings the issue to focus.2’
Given this type of unexpected accident, Cusack has
suggested the creation of an international fund that would
provide contingency financial support. Provisions in the
‘9lbid.
20Hilz and Ehrenfeld, 57.
21A chemical tanker loaded with 25,700 tons of toxic
chemicals exploded, killing the crew. According to one news
report, rescue ships were unable to approach the burning
vessel for several hours because of the intensity of the
fire, Boston Globe (March 15, 1989), 12.
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1989 Basel Convention also initiates the creation of such a
fund that might be used to offset tank leakage or otherwise
dangerous containers while arbitration and litigation
processes determine who should have financial responsibility
for such development.22 Eherenfeld and Hilz both propose
mandatory insurance requirements for transboundary wastes
shipments 23
Waste Reduction and Minimization
Of all the alternative liberal solutions to the
problems of waste trade, waste reduction and minimization
appears plausible. This is so because if less waste were
generated, less waste would move across boundaries and risk
of global pollution would be minimized. The problem that
mitigates against the lofty idea of waste reduction and
minimization is rightly pointed out by Worrell who observes
that ~exporting waste, especially to developing nations,
provides a less costly alternative, thereby undermining
efforts to implement reduction techniques.”24 Worrell also
contends that government intervention in the form of tax
22Basel Convention, Article 14.
23Hilz and Ehrenfeld, 57.
24Danny Worrell, “Issues and Policy Considerations
Regarding Hazardous Waste Exports,” Houston Journal of
International Law 11 (1989) : 391.
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relief for the companies sinks a large portion of their
research and development budgets into pollution prevention.25
Redefining Sovereignty
Many liberal waste trade analysts think that a possible
solution to the international trade in hazardous waste lies
in changing the present institutions and power
configurations of the international system. In line with
this argument, Eherenfeld and Hilz contend that
national sovereign rights regarding the
environment should be limited in favor of more
extended rights resting in an international agency
and in the long run, a broad international
agreement is the dominant option.26
This idea sounds more theoretical than practical as it will
be almost impossible to create and implement a supra
national waste management authority.
The Realist Persoective and the Waste Trade in West Africa
The realists perspective assumes that states or
nation-states are the principal actors in the international
system and conceives of them as rational, unitary and
egoistic. More appropriately in this study, state is
25This is the thrust the pollution prevention program
implemented by the North Carolina State University at the
Global Pollution Prevention 91 International Conference and
Exhibition, April 3-5, 1991 (Washington, D.C.).
26Hilz and Ehrenfeld, 55.
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defined as the central decision-makers of a government.27
Realists contend that states (or the decision makers or
bourgeoisie that represent them) weigh the risks and
benefits before taking any course of action or determining
ways to maximize rewards. It is also worth noting that many
times the rationality of states can be imperfect,
considering that there could be constraints in the
accessibility of complete information, structural
impediments in bureaucracies and other decision-makers to
understand the entire range of possible risks or benefits.28
The West African region has even an added problem of
being plagued with political systems that are authoritarian,
unstable, conflictual and corrupt. In many states in West
Africa, environmental awareness is still lacking among most
policy makers. There are hardly any laws regulating waste
disposal, and very little action in place to follow up with
environmental issues. Environmental concerns have only
recently begun and still there is gross absence of
technology to tackle environmental issues in general and in
particular disposal of toxic and hazardous wastes. The
27See Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National
Interest: Raw Material Investments and US Foreign Policy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 12-13; or see
David N. Balaam and Michael Veseth, Introduction to
International Political Economy (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
1996), 6.
28See Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study
of Decision-Making Process in Administrative Organization,
2nd ed. (New York: MacMillian Co., 1957), 38-41.
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point here is that in West Africa, countries behave contrary
to the assumption of the realist theory of states being
rational and able to weigh risks or benefits. As a result,
most states are unable to make the right determination and
in this way often become vulnerable and open for
exploitation. A case study (see Chapter VI) of Guinea
Bissau involvement with international trade in wastes,
reveals that the country lacked the expertise of determining
the risks in wastes disposal as an importer, and therefore
was compelled to depend on the expertise of the exporters to
make its decisions.
Also, Guinea-Bissau reluctantly called off the wastes
trade deal with Western exporters only as a result of
external pressures from the Organization of African Unity
(OAU), concerned African leaders and other world
organizations. The OAU’s resolutions and the Economic
Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) regional
pressures seem to be effective coercive measures in
preventing African states from engaging in the hazardous and
toxic wastes trade. The question for further research in
the African situation is, how do realists see the
intervention of continental and regional organizations in
states’ affairs like waste trade?
Some analysts of the international trade in toxic and
hazardous wastes see potential economic benefits for
developing countries. According to the analysts, by
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allowing waste import, a state may reap a variety of
economic rewards, including needed foreign exchange to pay
of t the balance of debt problems or correct the balance of
trade.29 Like the liberals contend, states may realize other
long-term benefits by eventually developing the waste import
into a waste disposal industry that creates new jobs and
fosters economic growth.3° For example, if the importing
state has access to sophisticated waste management
technology, it might be able to take advantage of economies
of scale and create a comparative advantage in waste
disposal services and at the same time be protecting its
environment, analysts conclude.
However, case studies of some of the countries in West
Africa, like Nigeria, Guinea and Sierra Leone reveal more of
government rejections of the toxic and hazardous wastes
trade (see Fig. 4) . Nigerian government in a further action
to ban waste import in the West African region, proposed the
creation of a regional “Dumpwatch.” Nigeria in this
proposal worked and cooperated with other West African
states to help each other in policing their borders and
29Hilz and Ehrenfeld, 31.
30Some proposals to export wastes to developing
countries do often add plans for this kind of economic
benefit. Guinea-Bissaus deal to import wastes from the
Western states included a plan for a disposal industry.
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turning back illegal waste shipment.3’ This ingenious
attempt by Nigeria to give some teeth to an illegal waste
import ban might be opposed by realists, possibly, arguing
that a ban especially on a regional agreement would not be
any more enforceable than the liberal global solutions.
The realists approach of the political economy assumes
too, that the state is the proper unit of analysis and in a
world of zero-sum game, self-interested states would rather
win than lose. The West African states have been losers in
the waste trade not because they are not self-interested,
but, for the lack of what Professor Strange calls structural
power32 or to be more precise, bargain power. In all cases
of waste trade studied in West Africa, the foreign waste
brokers always dictated the prices for disposal and these
prices were token compared to what could have been otherwise
the cost in the exporting countries, yet, these money offers
were tempting if not always acceptable to government
officials. The disparaging state of the West African
countries weakens their bargaining power in waste trade
deals. The winners always are the aggressive waste brokers
or agents who take advantage of the weak bargaining power of
~ Greenpeace, 34; and TransAfrica Forum Issue Brief
7, no. 3 (Winter 1988/1989) : 1.
32Balaam and Veseth, 13. Professor Strange defines
structural power as “the power to shape and determine the
“structures” of the global political economy. She lists the
four global structures as: “security, production, finance,
and knowledge.”
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poor countries. Antony T. K. Gadzey writing on the
condition of states in the Sub-Saharan Africa notes that:
After three decades of self-rule, most countries
in the region are still characterized by low
production and consumption, repeated food crisis,
large external debts, and a basic inability to use
needed foreign technology. Economic stagnation
has created so much political disarray that many
governments in the region no longer meet the
imperial definition of a state based on its
ability to exercise control by defining,
implementing, and enforcing laws policies, and
regulations ~
Corrupt and inefficient administrations and
increasingly repressive and extractive tendencies
have eroded the legitimacy of many African
governments .~
The economically and politically weak picture according
to Gadzey of the Sub-Saharan region which includes West
Africa countries, also affects the rationality assumption of
these states as the proper unit of analysis especially with
added weaknesses like: corruption, inefficiency, and lack of
control.
The realist political economy also addresses how
changes in the distribution of international power affect
the form and type of international economy like determining
cross-border waste movement. In a structural realist
33Robert H. Jackson and Carl Rosberg, Personal Rule in
Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1982), 6.
34Antony T. K. Gadzey, “The Political Economy of Central
and Delayed Capitalism in Sub-Saharan Africa,” in Manochehr
Dorraj, The Chanoina Political Economy of the Third World
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 86.
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hypothesis construct on waste movement based on the unequal
distribution of power in the international political system:
the direction of cross-borders waste movements would depend
upon political relationships among states. This hypothesis
would likely conclude that waste movement would be from the
most powerful to the weakest countries--like the toxic and
hazardous wastes movement from the powerful industrial
nations to the poor and weak states of West Africa,
a one-way traffic. Some analysts may differ with this
hypothesis giving isolated examples of waste movement from a
relatively weak country to a more powerful state (like the
case of Romania’s hazardous waste going to France).35
But waste movements among powerful states or from
relatively weak countries to more powerful states are more
often for commercial recycling purposes using high-level
technology and are legal and safe. This type of waste may
be classified as useful waste. The waste movement from
Western nations to West Africa is usually traded for illegal
disposal or dumping and may be classified as “unwanted
waste.’ Other factors to be considered are: the level of
environmental awareness, knowledge or technology to handle
waste disposal safely in the recipient country. Taking all
factors together, unwanted waste would always follow the
355ee Greenpeace, 315. Greenpeace reports that France is
the largest importer of hazardous waste in the world. France
imported hazardous waste from West Germany, Belgium,
Netherlands, Switzerland, Spain, Italy, Romania, Ireland and
Luxembourg.
85
realists’ hypothesis which fairly agrees with the hypothesis
adopted in this study that “unwanted waste” follow the path
of the poor or the corrupt and the uninformed.
The Radical/Marxist Perspective and the Waste Trade
in West Africa
The radicals/marxists begin with the assumption that
the present structure of the international political economy
serves more the interest of the rich countries than those of
the poor countries. As a consequence, the radicals/
marxists theorize that disproportionate burden of the rich
industrial countries’ waste disposal problems will be lumped
on the poor countries to bear.36 Rich industrial countries
include private firms, large corporations and governments
that support the deadly trade in wastes. The radical/
marxist analysis of international waste trade is that it is
an unbalanced trade between the rich countries and the poor
developing countries. The contention is that the rich
countries, as a result of their unbridled pursuit for wealth
and power, are flooded with hazardous wastes, the by-product
of decades of squandering natural resources. Given the
structure of the international economic and political
system, the rich, powerful interests in the industrialized
nations exploit poor, weak, developing nations by dumping on
36Mark A. Montgomery, “Want Not, Waste Not: A Realist
Theory of the International Trade in Hazardous Waste,”
(Ph.D. diss., The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,
Tufts University, 1933), 34.
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them their toxic and hazardous wastes. Because poor nations
are desperate for economic growth, and because they depend
upon the handouts of the rich and powerful nations, they
have been made ‘sanctuaries” for hazards and garbage
unwanted in the industrialized nations. Cusack supports
this notion of industrialized states of the North dumping
hazardous wastes on the poor states of the South. He
states:
Fundamentally. . . . the issue of exportation of
toxic waste to the Third World is thoroughly
grounded in the existing global economic
structure. Until this global inequality is
resolved, wealth will continue to permit
industrialized nations to proclaim, “Not In My
Backyard. “37
There is no doubt that global economic structure is
unequal. Unequal because the developed countries dictate
the terms to the Third World or the developing countries
because they are richer.
Diven also believes that the hazardous waste trade is
an unsurpassing result of the structure of the international
system when he states thus:
For those who understand the historical context of
the Third World poverty, toxic dumping is just one
more link in the chain of exploitation that has
37Marguerite M. Cusack, “International Law and the
Transboundary Shipment of Hazardous Waste to the Third
World: Will the Basel Convention Make a Difference?”
American University Journal of International Law and Policy
5 (1990) : 423.
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impoverished people throughout Africa and the
Caribbean. 38
Radical/Marxists see industrialized states as accomplices in
the hazardous waste trade. For example, Wasserman writes
that: “...national attitudes reflect those of industry, so
that legislation is based on beggar-my-neighbor principles
or let’s-keep-our-country clean and never mind about the
rest of the World.”39
Greenpeace, the World’s largest and most influential
environmental organization supports the radical perspective.
Greenpeace writes that:
In the World’s most heavily industrialized
countries, where landfills and incinerators have
polluted the environment beyond public tolerance,
chemical firms have faced increasingly high fees
for dumping their wastes in heavily-regulated
disposal sites. These high disposal rates have
inspired many chemical manufacturers and waste
brokers to look beyond North America and Western
Europe for dump sites. Heavily industrialized
countries have accommodated these firms, allowing
them to export their wastes to the World’s
cheapest dumping grounds. And in the global waste
marketplace, the most attractive targets for waste
dumpers are the countries that are further removed
from the economic benefits of industrialization.40
In support of Greenpeace contention, Marx made the same
explanation that the international capitalist system “has
38Diven, “Our Newest Hazardous Export” (Washington, DC:
Oxfam America, September 1988), quoted in Wynne, 121.
39Ursula Wassermann, “Attempts at Control Over Toxic
Waste,” Journal of World Trade Law 15 (1981): 427-428.
40Greenpeace, 1990. 5.
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made barbarian and semi-barbarian countries dependent on
civilized ones, nations of peasants on nations of
bourgeoisie, the East on the West;”41 therefore, the
radicals/marxists predict that the rich countries of the
North will depend on the poor countries of the South for
dumping their wastes.
The radical/marxist prescription for the problems
involved with toxic and hazardous wastes trade is a total
ban. One of the foremost advocates of worldwide ban on the
waste trade has been Greenpeace which contends that:
The debate over how best to prevent the
environmental, political, social, and moral ills
presented by the international waste trade has
resulted in two types of legal instruments-
control mechanisms and bans. The former is
generally supported by major industrialized powers
and consists of a notification and consent regimen
(sic) known commonly as “prior informed consent”
or (plc) (sic) .... The latter is more generally
supported by less-industrialized countries and
calls for outright prohibition of hazardous waste
trade.... Greenpeace firmly believes that
instruments that rely on PlC cannot possibly
combat waste trade or mitigate its political,
ecological, moral and social ills.
PlC cannot be a just contract in a world of such
disproportional economic and political planes.
The approval of a single government official
anywhere cannot reflect the desires and fates of
those people living in proximity to a waste import
dump site. PlC cannot pretend to address the
disincentive for waste minimization and for the
implementation of clean production methodology
(sic) when industrial interests can cheaply export
41Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Manifesto of the
Communist Party,” in Robert C. Tucker (ed.), The Marx and
En~els Reader, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1978),
477.
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their waste problems rather than take
responsibility for them at home.
Thus rather than accepting “control systems” based
on some form of ‘prior informed consent,
Greenpeace and most of the less industrialized
world have insisted on complete import and export
bans as the only means to adequately remedy the
problems associated with the international trade
in hazardous wastes.42
The above passage is a critique of the liberal
supported legal instrument of control mechanisms that,
according to the radicals/marxists, is an unjust contract
for the less industrialized countries. Radicals/marxists
oppose the liberal approach of a cooperative or negotiated
effort by the World’s states for solutions, because of the
lopsided structure of the international system. The
argument is that such negotiated solution will amount to
economic blackmail. For example, Cusack writes that the
Basel Convention
reflects most industrialized nations’ strategy to
checkmate developing nations into accepting waste
exports... [Thus] Basel Convention has legitimized
the international toxic waste game and proclaimed
industrial nations the winners.43
Cusack contends, further that liberal economics and
environmental protection are irreconcilable: “Control of the
transboundary movement of hazardous waste. . . increasingly





Many experts like Cusack and some liberals support the
ban on international waste trade. According to Greenpeace’s
account, seventy-eight countries, mostly less developed
countries, have banned the import of hazardous wastes.45 In
principle, the EEC in 1989 also agreed to ban all waste
exports to sixty-eight developing countries of Africa, the
Caribbean, and the Pacific ACP countries under the terms of
the Lome IV Convention.46
Dependency Perspective and the Waste Trade in West Africa
On the issue of Africa being exploited as a dumping
ground, Rodney contends:
In their vantage position as the conqueror, the
dominant powers--militarily, economically and
politically--were able to exploit Africa’s
natural resources... [and] in addition Africa
served as a dumping ground for their cheap and
surplus products. The end product of all these
events was that Africa became a dependent economy,
serving European interests and thus externally
controlled and regulated by the metropolitan
countries ~
The hazardous waste trade in West Africa is a development
that emanates from dependency--a condition that makes West
African states vulnerable to all forms of exploitation.
45Greenpeace, Countries Banning Waste Imports -
November 1990.
46Final Act, Minutes, and Fourth ACP-EEC Convention of
Lome, Final Act and Minutes, Done at Lome, Togo, December
15, 1989. Printed in International Leaal Materials 29
(1990): 783.
47Daniel A. Offiong, Imperialism and Dependency (Enugu,
Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co., 1980), 80.
91
From the perspective of the West African region,
historical situations of dependency have conditioned
contemporary underdevelopment. According to Off iong,
dependency relations in Africa have also shaped the social
structure of underdevelopment and he states:
Thus a crucial problem of underdevelopment is the
fact that in this process of dependency there has
arisen a coincidence of interest between the local
or internal bourgeois and the external capitalist
oligarchies. The internal compradors greatly
benefit from this dependency situation.... So
after independence these national bourgeois have
strengthened their relationship with their
international allies. Their investments are
geared towards export and activities complementary
to foreign industrial capital. They have connived
with foreign interest to rob their countries of
their much needed foreign exchange and have been
involved in all sorts of unpatriotic activities
that fail to aid economic development.48
It is the same internal bourgeois who are easily tempted by
cash in some West African countries to import or accept
hazardous and toxic wastes even at the expense of the threat
to human lives and the environment.
African countries have unequal trade relations with the
industrial countries as Rodney rightly writes:
Africa was forced into the international market
system at a competitive disadvantage. Since
Africa did not, nor does it now, possess the kind
of advanced technology known in the West and North
America, it was virtually impossible for Africans
to compete with the Europeans and the result was a
one-way trade.49
48Ibid 75.
49Walter Rodney, “How Europe Underdeveloped Africa,” in
Ibid., 80.
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Dependency approach also addresses the role of the
African leaders and bureaucrats or the national bourgeoisie.
International trade in hazardous and toxic wastes has been
very much aided and abetted by some African leaders and
bureaucrats. Offiong exposes the role of the African
bourgeois when he writes that “the African bourgeois fails
to possess something crucial to a bourgeois, and that is
‘Money’ . . .If he is given enough time and opportunity, this
bourgeois will embezzle enough money to stiffen his
domination. “50 According to Frantz Fanon, the African
bourgeoisie is a phantom bourgeoisie, so greedy that he is
willing and ready to accept what his international
counterpart can give. Driven by such greed and corruption,
the African bourgeoisie has been very much tempted by the
extra cash from waste trade schemes. The London New
Scientist made this assertion of the African bourgeoisie:
.observers in Africa said that, given Africa’s
weak bureaucracies, compounded by lucrative bribes
by the industry’s middlemen to corrupt officials,
stopping illegal imports of toxic waste will be a
difficult task in the continent. Many African are
angry that their own people put greed before the
well being of the environment. Nation, Kenya’s
leading daily newspaper, . . . described such people
as “the epitome of greed,” adding that they had
become pachyderms of the most ferocious kind.51
There is no doubt that African bureaucrats or
bourgeoisie have played a part in perpetuating the hazardous
50Ibid. , 158
51New Scientist, June 23, 1988, p. 31.
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and toxic waste trade in West Africa. A notorious example
is the role played by Benin officials. For example, in a
press interview, President Mathieu Kerekou openly explained
his country’s plan to import toxic waste denying rumors that
it was nuclear residue.52 Benin’s president here appears not
to take seriously the warnings by OAU members and other
African leaders to stop toxic waste importation. His role
in the waste trade typifies the interest some African
bourgeoisie have in any trade deal with foreign
counterparts. Trade deals of the sort gives the African
bourgeois elite the opportunity to make money for himself at
the expense of the masses.
In summary, three problems are exemplified by the
dependency approach--poverty, underdevelopment and
historical exploitation. Poverty can be justly described in
terms of inadequate shelter, structural malnutrition, poor
health care, and more fundamentally, the lack of a
sociopolitical consensus capable of taking care of these
problems. It is an economic condition and it could be
natural. But, according to Richard W. Lombardi,
underdeveloPment represents, as it were, a metaphysical loss
of footing. Underdevelopment occurs when economic and
material structures bypass intellectual and spiritual
values. It is a loss of identity to the Third World in the
Africa Report, 1988, p. 47.
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name of free trade. Underdevelopment is introduced and
represents a deliberate mental blackout.53 It is primarily
what makes West African countries gullible and open to all
forms of exploitative trade.
The dependency school contends that dependence is a
historical product that manifests in debts and
underdevelopment. Most, if not all West African countries,
are dependent on external financing. This resort to
external financing and the accompanying rise in external
debt obligations together worsen the balance-of--payments
difficulties of this undeveloped region of West Africa.
These countries of West Africa are maintained in a relation
of dependency vis-a-vis their Western creditors, and this
type of maintenance perpetuates underdevelopment. Many of
the countries in West Africa are faced with serious external
debt problems and to some there has been the temptation to
import Toxic and hazardous wastes to earn foreign exchange.
(See Tables 1 and 2)
The liberal and the radical/marxist perspectives have
some common grounds. Liberals see markets as the most
efficient provider of value and welfare. On the issue of
environment, markets are assumed to be unable to provide
non-economic values such as protection of human health,
clean air, pure water, and unpolluted earth. Where the
53Richard W. Lombardi, “The Debt Trap Rethinking the
Logic of Development,” 13.
TABLE 1
PROFILE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN WEST AFRICA
Estimated Total Total Real GOP GNP Aid Fl w Total Health
Population GOP GNP percap percap USS Debt (as% Profile
(million) ($bill) )Sbill) (ppp8) Total Mns of GNP) pop access
1989 1989 1989 1989 1990 1989 to sani—
1960 1990 tation
1988—90 svc
Cape Verde 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 717 780 79 46
Zambia 3.1 8.5 12.3 4.7 3.1 767 390 430 159
Camneroon 5.3 11.6 16.7 11.1 11.7 1699 1000 475 44 — 41
Ghana 6.8 15.0 20.6 5.3 5.5 1005 390 470 60 31 61
CoLe dIvoire 3.8 12.0 17.6 7.2 9.3 1381 790 675 180 40 31
Nigeria 42.3108.5149.6 28.9 28.3 1160 250 214 97 —46
Liberia 1.0 2.6 3.6 0.0 937 94 119 — 39
Togo 1.5 3.5 4.9 1.3 1.4 752 390 205 — 23 61
Senegal 3.2 7.3 9.7 4.7 4.7 1208 658 724 93 - 40
Eq. Afr. 0.3 0.4 0.5 0 0.1 330 35 146
Benin 2.2 4.6 6.4 1.6 1.8 1030 380 254 72 35 18
Chad 3.1 5.7 . . . 190 314 37 — 30
Gu. Bi. 0.5 1.0 1.2 — 0.2 820 180 110 271 20 -
Gambia 0.4 0.9 1.1 — 0.2 885 180 94 162 77 —
Mali 4.4 9.2 12.7 2.1 2.1 576 270 462 105 22 15
Niger 3.0 7.7 10.8 2.0 2.2 634 290 357 79 10 43
Bw. Fa. 4.5 9.0 12.1 2.5 2.7 617 320 305 30 49
Sic—Leo 2.2 4.2 5.4 0.9 0.8 1061 220 66 120 43 —
Guinea 3.1 5.8 7.8 2.8 2.4 602 430 274 85 — 32
Source: World Bank Social Indicators of Dev., 1987—
TABLE 2
TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT
Public and publicly Private Use of IMF credit Short-term debt Total external debt
guaranteed nonguaranteed (millions of dollars) (millions of dollars) (millions of dollars)




Mozambique - 3885 — 245 0 56 551 4737
Ethiopia 169 2876 0 0 0 30 107 3013
Tanzania 250 4505 15 13 0 129 272 4918
Somalia 77 1814 0 0 0 150 173 2137
Bangladesh 15 9926 0 0 0 719 68 10712
Lao PDR 8 939 0 0 0 8 2 949
Malawi 122 1242 0 4 0 101 — 48 1394
Nepal 3 1290 0 0 0 52 — 18 1359
chad 33 317 0 0 3 24 28 - 368
Bunundi 7 810 0 0 8 40 - 17 — 867
Sierra Leone 59 512 0 0 0 105 - 440 - 1057
Madagascar 89 3345 0 0 0 165 — 97 — 3607
Nigeria 452 31668 115 406 0 0 — 759 - 32832
Uganda 138 1489 0 0 0 225 - 95 - 1809
Zaire 311 7571 0 0 0 627 — 643 — 8843
Mali 238 2055 0 0 9 55 — 46 — 2157
Niger 32 1127 0 259 0 85 — 108 — 1578
Burkina Faso 21 685 0 0 0 1 - 71 - 756
Rwanda 2 606 0 0 3 1 — 45 — 652
India 7838 54776 100 1478 0 1566 — 4689 — 62509
TABLE 2 (continued)
Public and publicly Private Use of IMF credit Short-term debt Total external debt
guaranteed nonguaranteed (millions of dollars) (millions of dollars) (millions of dollars)
1970 1989 1970 1989 1970 1989 1970 1989 1970 1989
china — 37043 0 0 0 908 — 6907 — 44857
Haiti 40 684 0 0 3 41 77 802
Kenya 319 4001 88 632 0 415 641 5690
Pakistan 3064 14669 5 138 45 933 — 2770 18509
Benin 41 1046 0 0 0 10 - 121 1177
ctr Afr Rep 24 642 0 0 0 35 38 716
Ghana 488 2279 10 33 46 737 — 29 3078
Togo 40 946 0 0 0 75 — 164 1186
Zambia 624 4095 30 0 0 900 - 1879 6874
Guinea 312 1967 0 0 3 61 - 148 - 2176
Sri Lanka 317 4238 0 103 79 366 394 5101
Lesotho 8 312 0 0 0 10 — 2 324
Indonesia 2497 40851 461 4626 139 608 7026 — 53111
Mauritania 27 1777 0 0 0 69 — 165 - 2010
Afghanistan - -
Bhutan 77 0 0 0 0 2 — 79
Kampuchea,Dem. - - - -
Liberia 158 1091 0 0 4 299 — 371 1761
Myanmar 106 4045 0 0 17 2 124 - 4171
Sudan 298 8261 0 496 31 884 — 3324 — 12965
Viet Nam
TABLE 2 (continued)
Public and publicly Private Use of IMF credit Short-tern debt Total external debt
guaranteed nonguaranteed (millions of dollars) (millions of dollars) (millions of dollars)
1970 1989 1970 1989 1970 1989 1970 1989 1970 1989
Middle-income economies
Lower-middle- income
Angola - - - -
Bolivia 480 36—5 11 200 6 252 — 302 4359
Egypt,Arab Rep 1781 39751 0 1081 49 161 — 7806 48799
Senegal 102 3508 31 33 0 316 — 282 4139
Yemen Rep — 4775 0 0 0 1 — 909 5685
Zimbabwe 229 2568 0 68 0 29 — 423 — 3088
Philippines 625 22992 919 783 69 1177 — 3951 — 28902
Cote dIvoire 256 8156 11 4071 0 370 - 2816 — 15412
Dominican Rep 212 3281 141 105 7 123 — 558 — 4066
Morocco 712 19507 15 200 28 850 — 294 — 20851
Papua New Gui 36 1370 173 958 0 3 — 165 2496
Honduras 90 2823 19 84 0 35 — 407 3350
Guatemala 106 2089 14 110 0 73 — 330 2601
Congo,Ppl Rep 119 3535 0 0 0 12 — 770 4316
Syrian Arab Rep 233 3934 0 0 10 0 — 1268 5202
Cameroon 131 3708 9 378 0 113 — 545 - 4743
Peru 856 12669 1799 1589 10 758 — 4859 — 19875
Ecuador 193 9421 49 158 14 325 — 1407 — 11311
Namibia - - -
Paraguay 112 2098 0 27 0 0 — 365 — 2490
El Salvador 88 1657 88 39 7 5 149 — 1851
Colombia 1297 14001 283 1272 55 0 — 1614 - 16887
Thailand 324 12424 402 4658 0 273 — 6112 — 23466
Jamaica 160 3594 822 42 0 383 — 303 — 4322
Tunisia 541 6085 0 225 13 270 — 319 — 6899
Source: World Development Report, 1991.
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market fails to provide these values, there should be some
intervention to make the necessary corrections. Liberals
however, disagree about the degree of intervention needed to
correct the market failure, but, agree that government (or
supranational institution) intervention to rectify the price
mechanism in some way is the only way to provide
environmental value.
Whereas the radical/marxists’ fundamencal concern is
social equality and on this regard, they believe that the
political system is unjust. The radical/marxists therefore
assert that because of the unequal distribution of power and
wealth in the international system, the poor is very likely
to inherit industrial wastes from the wealthy. The
radical/marxists condemn the trade in hazardous and toxic
wastes as morally repugnant. They proffer the same solution
with the liberals: the free market in hazardous and toxic
wastes should be altered to stop the exploitation of the.
poor by the wealthy and powerful. Radical/marxists believe
generally that high levels of intervention in the
international trade in waste is necessary: hazardous and
toxic wastes trade should be banned.
Another common ground between the liberal and the
radical/marxist analysis of the international trade in
hazardous and toxic wastes lies in their argument that
economics is one powerful variable that determines where the
waste goes. Liberals in their emphasis on price mechanism,
100
make the argument that disposal prices are obviously lower
in developing countries than developed countries. The logic
here being that waste will tend to move to where disposal
prices are lowest. Radical/marxists in their economic
argument on the the waste trade, contend that developing
countries are assumed would be unable to resist the will of
the industrialized nations given their state of economic
distress with attendant political instability. The logic
being that developing states will become “the dumping
ground” for hazardous and toxic wastes.
CHAPTER III
GUINEA - A CASE STUDY
Introduction
The West African country of Guinea is a former French
colony with a population of about 7 million. It became an
independent republic on October 2, 1958, with a one-party
government. Since the coup of April 1984, Guinea like most
West African countries, has been ruled by military
government. Environmental legislation or laws are usually
non-existent under military rule. Under military rule,
typical of a authoritarian rule, environmental consciousness
hardly exist as the military tend not to tolerate grassroot
environmental movements that militate for environmental
protection and awareness.
Like most countries in West Africa, the majority of the
population is dependent upon subsistence agriculture. The
country’s foreign exchange is derived largely from mining.
Guinea has valuable minerals like iron ore, gold, diamonds,
uranium and oil and its the world’s foremost exporter of
bauxite and the second largest producer of bauxite ore.1
Guinea, according to the 1992 World Bank Report, had an
‘The Europa World Year Book, 1996, vol. I., p. 1451
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estimated per capita income of $430 in 1989 and $510 for
1992, while the average for all of the sub-Saharan Africa
(excluding South Africa) was $390. By these estimated GNP
figures, Guinea appears to be doing comparatively better
than most countries of the sub—region. However, Guinea’s
total debt as percentage of GNP was 85 percent in 1989.
Toxic Waste Durnoing
The case of toxic dumping was reported in June 1988
when 15,000 tons of toxic industrial ash from Philadelphia,
United States, was imported by a Norwegian company in Guinea
and dumped in a quarry on the island of Kassa off the
mainland capital of Conakary.2 The importer from Guinea was
not the government, but a Norwegian company, A. S.
Bulkhandling Inc., based in Guinea. The 15,000 tons of
industrial ash was shipped and labeled “raw material for
bricks” to confuse port officials in Guinea. It was not
until the toxic ash had killed a large part of the island
vegetation, as the vegetation was turning brown and the
fetid fumes were making the air unbreatheable, that this
development came to the attention of the government. A
government investigation was undertaken and it was
discovered that 15,000 tons of toxic ash was dumped in an
abandoned mine in the island without its knowledge after
2”Toxic Waste Dumping in Third World,” Third World
Network (1989), 8.
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having been rejected by Panama and Haiti.3 The dangerous
waste from Philadelphia was already poisoning flora and
fauna near the capital of Guinea, Conakry. The waste,
mischievously described as “brick or construction
materials,” was sold to a Guinean company for 63,500
British pounds early in the year. This incidence provoked
the Guinea government under President Lansana Conte to react
swiftly by arresting the Norwegian Consul-General, Sigmund
Strornme for complicity. Upon being arrested, the Norwegian
Consul-General confessed that his company, of which he was
the chairman, forged documents to illegally import and dump
the 15,000 tons of toxic ash. This Norwegian company waste
shipment portrays yet another case of waste importation
acted out in collaboration with a foreign company in Guinea
to misinform the Guinean authorities.
The Norwegian company was paid the equivalent of US $40
per ton. This is compared to an estimated US $1,000 per ton
that could have been paid in the United States to dispose of
the toxic ash in compliance with Government regulation.4
Under pressure on June 13, 1988, by the Guinean government,
Norway agreed to remove the toxic ash and the event led to
the arrest of five Guineans while the sixth person fled.
The Guinea government ended up charging Norway’s Honorary
3Africa ReDort, (September-October 1988) , 48.
4Third World Network, August 1989, p. 8.
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Consul Sigmund Stron~me for forging documents to bring in the
shipment. According to Greenpeace account, officials in
Guinea were also approached in 1988 to accept another
consignment of hazardous waste that was rejected. (See
Fig. 3).
Analysis
Several developments about this case support the
hypothesis advanced in chapter one of this study. This case
supports the hypothesis that toxic and hazardous waste trade
follow the path of the poor, the corrupt or the uninformed
and it is exploitative. It is exploitative for three main
reasons: a) The token amount paid for the exchange was not
comparable to the damage done to Guinea vegetation or
environment. b) The dishonest practice of mislabeling was
a deliberate spirit of taking advantage of the uninformed
government officials and people of Guinea. This corrupt
trade practice was very likely carried out with the
knowledge and possible cooperation of a senior protocol
officer of a foreign embassy residing in Guinea. This is
proof of an exploitative international relationship
explained by dependency. c) This type of trade practice was
devoid of the norm - a trade decision based on proper
information.
COUNTRY GREENPEACE TITLE EXPORTER DATE OUTCOME NATURE
AFRICA
Ang la Kuenzler Incinerator Europe 1988 rejected iterated
Benin Sesco Waste Dumping Eur & N.?.in. 1988 rejected iterated
Benin Ciraftar Europe 1988 unclear* unclear
Cent Afr Rep Haz Waste Deal Europe 1986 unciear* one time
Cong Diesso Gorge USA, Europe 1988 rejected iterated
Djibouti Jelly Wax I Italy 1987 rejected one—time
Equat Gui Chem Waste Dumping Europe 1988 unclear* iterated
Guinea Bulkhandling USA 1988 shipped, retd to exp cty(mislab) one-time
Guinea HW Mismanagement USA 1988 rejected iterated
Guinea-Bissau Khlan Soa USA 1987 rejected one-time
Guinea-Bissau intercontract/Lindaco USA,Europe 1988 rejected iterated
Guinea-Bissau Soserco Dumping Switzerland 1988 rejected iterated
Liberia Radell Devt UK 1988 unclear* unclear
Liberia Three Companies unknown 1988 rejected unclear
Mauritania MCL Belgium 1987 unclear* unclear
Mauritania SOP/Palermo PAG 1988 abandoned iterated
Morocco Allied Technologies USA 1987 export denied one time
Morocco SOP/Western Sahara PAG 1988 abandoned unclear
Namibia Copper Sledge PAG 1988 unclear* unclear
Niger Van Santon Europe 1988 unclear* unclear
Nigeria Jelly Wax/Ecomar/Koko Italy 1988 shipped, retd to exp cty(mislab) one-time
Nigeria Arctic Trader unknown 1988 rejected one-time
Senegal Comm 1 Overseas Devt Europe 1987 rejected iterated
Senegal Khlan Soa USA 1988 rejected one time
Senegal GEl Inc USA 1988 unclear iterated
Senegal Intercontract unkn wn 1988 rejected iterated
Sierra Leone Nodlog Technology USA 1980 rejected iterated
Sierra Leone Dumba Intl UK 1988 shipped, disposed/dumped(mialab) one-time
Somalia Agriswiss unknown 1988 unclear* unclear
Somalia Incinerator Ash USA 1988 unclear* unclear
South Africa US PCB Wastes USA 1980 unclear* unclear
South Africa Mercury Poisoning USA 1980 shipped, recy perm iterated
Sudan US Incinerator Ash USA 1988 rejected iterated
Togo Jelly Wax Italy 1988 rejected iterated
Tunisia SOP PAG 1987 unclear iterated
Zimbabwe Useless Waste Mixture USA 1984 shipp d, disposed/dumped (mislab> one-time
* Possible disposed/dumped case, but reported as unclear.
Fig. 3. Greenpeace Waste Trade Data
Source: Greenpeace, 1990.
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Was the dum~in~ trade based on any informed decisions?
The dumping in Guinea was not based on an informed
decision. The Guinea government was not aware of this toxic
waste import into the country until it was abandoned in an
island where it ruined a large part of the vegetation by
turning it brown and giving off fetid fumes that polluted
the air. The exporters or the importer deliberately
mislabeled the waste as “construction material.’ The
importation by a Guinea Norwegian company was not based on
proper information. The chairman of this Norwegian company,
the Norwegian Consul-General, confessed under arrest that
his company forged documents to illegally import and dump
the 15,000 tons of toxic ash.
Was the payment for the durrrpinp fair?
The Norwegian company was paid the equivalent of US $40
per ton as against an estimated cost of US $1,000 per ton
that could have been paid in the United States to dispose of
the toxic ash in compliance with government regulations.
Was the country a victim of nefarious waste trade brokers?
In this case, the Norwegian company in Guinea acted as
the waste trade brokers. The confession by the chairman of
the Norwegian company that his company forged documents to
illegally import 15,000 tons of toxic ash explains the
typical action of waste brokers. In the case of Guinea, the
country was made the victim by the dishonest activity of the
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Norwegian company. These vicious waste trade brokers see
poor and uninformed African countries as territories they
can pray on and make fortunes out of them.
Conclusion
This case wrongly portrays Guinea as one of the West
African countries that imported toxic ash waste. The Guinea
government has not had cause, even on economic grounds, to
import waste for money. In rejecting an earlier attempt by
Western waste exporters to dump toxic waste on the country,
the Guinea government seems to demonstrate no interest in
hazardous and/or toxic wastes trade. The importing agent
was not Guinea government, but a foreign company residing in
Guinea. The import was done based on informed decision by a
fraudulent company based in Guinea. It was an unholy
arrangement between the foreign waste trade brokers and
local informed company. This case falls in line with
organized crime by companies. The fee paid for the disposal
might have been attractive to the local company, but
comparatively with what could have been paid to dispose in
the United States it was a token cash. This case does not
fully support the hypothesis that toxic and hazardous
dumping follow the path of the poor and the uninformed and
it is exploitative. It was a exploitative, yes, but the
importation was based on informed decision by the company in
Guinea.
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The consequences of this particular illegal
importation/dumping of toxic ash include strain on the
Guinea and Norway relationship, ruin to the Guinea
environment, and possible negative effects to the
population’s health as a result of air pollution. The next
chapter will examine the notorious hazardous and toxic
wastes dumping case in Nigeria that resulted in more
casualties.
CHAPTER IV
NIGERIA - A CASE STUDY
Introduction
Nigeria is a former British colony. With a population
of about 101.9 million, Nigeria is the most populous black
country. In spite of its human and abundant natural
resources, Nigeria has not been performing well economically
and politically since the mid l980s. According to the 1992
World Bank Report, the country’s GNP per capita was about
$990 between 1980-85 and since then slumped to $320 between
1987-92, falling short of the low average of $390 for the
sub-region. Nigeria’s total debt as percentage of GNP was
97 percent in 1989. The majority of the population is
dependent upon subsistence agriculture. The country’s
foreign exchange is derived mainly from oil production. Oil
production provides about 98 percent of the total revenue.
Nigeria also possesses substantial deposits of natural gas,
coal, tin, iron ore and uranium.1
Under civilian president Shehu Shagari in 1982, an ad
hoc inter-ministerial board or commission, imagined to
function as Federal Environmental Agency was proposed. This
The Europa World Year Book, 1994. vol. II., p. 2234
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agency would have a chairman and fourteen “distinguished
scientists” to be appointed by the president. The board
would also include representatives from the ministries of
health, housing and environment, and science and technology,
and three representing interest groups.2 The Shagari
government was toppled by the military government. Writing
on environmental pollution and legislation in Nigeria, in
1985, Hutchful had this to say:
After many years of widespread exploration and
production activities, Nigeria still does not
possess a comprehensive or coherent set of anti
pollution legislation. Existing legislation is
scattered through a number of statutes limited
to specific types of pollution and environment and
lacking the backing of detailed regulations. The
tendency is to leave considerable discretionary
power in the hands of enforcement agencies and
corresponding opportunity for [pollutants] to
evade regulations .~
It might be safe to say that environmental
consciousness barely exists in the country as there are no
legislation or laws on environmental protection.
Critics believe that the military rule that has been in
power for about 28 years of the 36 years of Nigeria’s
independent life, and which has proven repeatedly unable to
redeem the country from a lifestyle of corruption and
indiscipline, has very much prevented true democracy from
2j. N. Obinegbo, “Nigeria Plans Federal Eco-Protection
Agency”, World Environment Report 8, no. 5 (March 15, 1982).
3Eboe Hutchful, “Oil Companies and Environmental
Pollution in Nigeria” in Claude Ake (ed.), Political Economy
of Nigeria (London: Longman, 1985), 118.
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taking proper roots in the country.4 The intervention of
the military in the political process, albeit redemptive in
nature, has, in the author’s opinion, exacerbated more
negative conception of Nigeria by the military’s continued
stay in power with their seeming lack of moral courage to
fight corruption, indiscipline and high crimes that plague
the Nigerian society. The military, unlike the civilian
government, tends not to tolerate any formation of grassroot
environmental movements that advocate environmental
protection. Rather, the military appears to perceive
environmental awareness by grassroot movements as political
insurrection.
The Durnoing of Hazardous and Toxic Wastes
In Nigeria, 4,000 metric tons of chemical (claimed
radioactive) waste from Italy was illegally dumped in the
port of Koko in September 1987. Koko village is some 200
meters away from the port. The waste, including deadly
dioxin and poly-chiorobiphenyl (PCB), a compound linked to
cancer and other diseases, was shipped in drums and
containers in several consignments from Italy to Nigeria and
arrived in five shipments from Pisa between August 1987 and
May 1988. The shipments were smuggled into Nigeria by an
Italian director, Bianfranco Raffaelli, of the Iruekpen
4Dickson Agedah, The Military in Politics: From Ac~uiyi
Ironsi to Ibrahim Babangida (Surulere, Lagos, Nigeria:
Perception Communications, 1993) , i.
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Construction Company using forged Italian cargo clearance
papers and the Nigerian import permits. Koko port officials
were reported bribed to turn a blind eye.5 This import deal
was arranged by an Italian and a Nigerian businessman and
the Nigerian was paid a token 500 naira (worth about $100 in
1988) a month to store the waste.6 To Sunday Nana, a
Nigerian impoverished farmer who was paid this token amount
to store 8,000 drums of chemical in his small plot of land
near the river port of Koko, it was an irresistible deal.
Mr. Sunday Nana and his family lived in a house less than
five meters from the nearest stack of drums (Fig. 4) . They
eat cassava grown inside the fence. And from their porch,
one could hear the drums “popping’ in the heat of the sun
and the smell of acrid vapors all over. When Mr. Sunday
Nana was questioned by a news reporter, he said he had no
knowledge of the contents of the drums. He said that for
five years he had been renting portions of his land to
different importers to store their goods. One of the
importers he identified was Mr. Bianfranco Rafaelli, an
Italian businessman. Mr. Raffaelli, a supposedly a Nigerian
resident for many years, had been importing the waste in
New Straits Times, July 1988.















































collaboration with Iruekpen Construction Company, a Nigerian
firm by forging document and permits.7
Nigerian authorities first learned of the dumping
from Press clippings published in the Nigerian newspaper by
a Nigerian student in Italy.8 Investigation by the Nigerian
authorities revealed that some of the wastes had arrived via
neighboring Benin. The dumping site and the drums were
totally unsuitable for storing industrial toxins. It was
reported that the toxins from the leaking drums had
contaminated the soil, and ground water supplies and the
nearby river. Nana, the Nigerian who stored the drums of
toxins died two years latter and nineteen villagers died
from eating rice contaminated by the toxins. The Nigerian
authorities unfortunately had neither the experience on
toxic waste management expertise nor technical facilities or
the means of handling the toxic materials.9 The alarm of
this incidence claiming many lives, compelled the military
government of Nigeria to respond by jailing more than 50
people and ordered the Italian government to pay for the
return of the chemicals. Cleaning up the dump claimed
lives: three workers repackaging the waste suffered severe
7Environmental Action, November/December 1988, p. 27.
8lbid
9Center for Investigation Reporting and Bill Moyers,
Global Dumping Ground, (Washington: Seven Lock Press, 1990),
1.
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chemical burns, others vomited blood, and one man was
partially paralyzed. The dump site was finally sealed off.
The Nigerian government did request for environmental
experts from Britain and the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency to assist in investigating the site. Scientists did
determine that a large number of the drums contained
volatile solvents and highly toxic and deadly dioxin and
poly-chlorobiphyl (PCBs) . The toxic was sent back to Italy
and the cost of unloading the ship was about $11 million.
The Nigerian government was furious and labeled the episode,
“toxic terrorism” and threatened to execute anyone, native
or foreign convicted of importing toxic substances in
future.’0 In another report by Third World Network, 100,000
tones of waste (including PCB, exhausted earth, asbestos
fiber and assorted pharmaceutical and industrial residues)
were exported to Nigeria in 1989.” Nigeria was also
instrumental to the creation of a regional “Dumpwatch” to
police the West African borders and turn back illegal waste
shipments.’2 The “Dumpwatch” concept was later incorporated
into the Organization of African Unity (OAU) during the
Bamako Convention in 1990.
‘°U.S. News and World Report, November 1988; Newsweek,
November 1988.
11Third World Network, August 1989, p. 8.
‘2See Greenpeace, 34; and TransAfrica Forum Issue Brief
7, no. 3 Winter 1988/1989): 1.
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Analysis
This case does not appear to fully support the
hypothesis advanced in chapter one; that toxic and hazardous
waste dumping trade follow the path of the poor, the corrupt
or the uninformed and it is exploitative. The importing
agent was not the Nigerian government, but an Italian
company in Nigeria. This agent in Nigeria was fully
informed of trade in toxic waste. This type of business
falls under organized crimes by companies and foreign
agents. It is only supportive of the hypothesis in that it
is exploitative. Of particular interest here, is the
pattern of organized crimes by foreign agents using Nigerian
companies. Again, this type of relationship was also
observed in the case of Guinea, where a foreign established
company was engaged in forging documents and bribing its way
to import hazardous and toxic wastes into the country. This
Italian company in Nigeria involved in the importation of
hazardous and toxic wastes into the country was able to
carry out the corruption of Nigerian port authorities and
the illegal disposal of the hazardous and toxic wastes using
uninformed and informed Nigerians. Sunday Nana happened to
be one of the uninformed Nigerians that considered a token
storage fee of $100 a month for the toxic drums a deal and
ended up losing his life, while the Italian Company in
Nigeria and their foreign waste brokers were the profiteers
in the waste disposal schemes trade. This case demonstrates
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the unholy and corrupt relations that accompany the
hazardous and toxic wastes dumping trade. The Nigerian case
had horrifying consequences. Apart from the harm to the
environment, nineteen villagers were reported dead,
including Sunday Nana. Some people were hospitalized and
one man was partially paralyzed. If this toxic waste trade
as reported continues unnoticed for five years, it will
expose the level of corruption in Nigeria that has fast
become a culture.
Was the dum~in~ trade based on any informed decisions.
Of course, the Italian company in Nigeria and their
agents were fully informed. It was possible there was an
exchange of information between the importers and the
exporters, granted that it was an illegal deal. It was not
a case of official importation by the Nigerian government,
but a case of Western waste export agents or brokers working
with an Italian company in Nigeria to dump their hazardous
and toxic wastes through uninformed local Nigerians. Yes,
the dumping trade was based on informed decision. As an
illegal deal, the Italian Company in Nigeria forged
documents, bribed and mislabeled the drums to beat the
scrutiny of the Nigerian authorities at the port of entry.
Was the IDayment for this durnoing fair?
The poor Nigerian farmer was paid a token amount of
$100 a month. And as the story had it, the farmer and many
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villagers lost their lives from contamination with the
deadly chemicals. The payment was not fair and could not
be compared with what it could have cost to dispose the
chemicals in Italy.
Was the country a victim of nefarious waste trade brokers?
This illegal trade was done without the normal
information process between the trading countries; rather it
was a trade transaction between Italian waste trade brokers
and an Italian company in Nigerian. The Nigerian government
authorities were unable to detect the illegal importation
because of corruption by Nigerian officials and middlemen.
Nigeria therefore became the victim of the illegal dumping.
Conclusion
There is no doubt that this chemical waste dumping
scheme in Koko, Nigeria, is a classic illustration of a
waste dumping trade. It fairly supports the stated
hypothesis in chapter I--that toxic and hazardous waste
dumping follows the path of the poor, the uninformed or the
corrupt, and is exploitative. Clearly, this was not an
importation by the Nigerian government to raise revenue, as
Nigeria could do better without the revenue from deadly
waste. It was an illegal dumping based on informed
decisions and corruption. The issue of mislabeling which is
the dumpers’ common way of doing business illustrates a
typical mean spirited ploy agents from exporting countries
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resort to in order to penetrate uninformed countries.
Indeed, this incident stands out as a classic case of an
exploitative dumping on the uninformed. It could also be
termed as a case of an organized crime by a foreign company
operating in Nigeria with international waste brokers. And
it is important to add that ever since this incident,
Nigeria has become an outspoken opponent of shipments of
wastes to Africa. Soon after this horrible incident,
Nigeria initiated the creation of a regional “Dumpwatch.”
Nigeria also sought to cooperate with other West African
countries in an attempt to help one another police the West
African borders and turn back illegal waste shipments.’3
(See Fig. 5) . The consequences of this illegal dumping were
many. A farmer, Mr. Sunday Nana, lost his life, nineteen
villagers were reported dead, three workers repackaging the
toxins were severely burned, and one was partially
paralyzed. One can only imagine the threat to the health of
the surrounding population caused by the toxin leaching into
the groundwater and the nearby river. Over 50 people were




Fig. 5. An Artist Impression of the Nigerian Authorities
Reaction to Toxic Waste Import.
4 ,... ~
Source: Nigerian Daily Times, 1994.
CHAPTER V
SIERRA LEONE - A CASE STUDY
Introduction
Sierra Leone is a former British colony and
protectorate with a population of about 4.2 million. (1990)’
Sierra Leone had a fairly stable civilian government up
until April 29, 1992 when the military took over in a
military coup. From World Bank social and economic
indicators, Sierra Leone in 1989 was ranked one of the
poorest countries in the world. In the same year its total
debt as percentage of GNP was 120 percent. Between 1990-92,
the country had an estimated per capita income of $170
falling from $220 in 1989 and below the average of $390 for
all of the sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa) ~2
Sierra Leone’s export earnings come from the agricultural
sector (including forestry and fishing) of the economy that
employs about two-thirds of the work force. The main
subsistence crop is rice while cocoa, coffee and palm kernel
are the leading agricultural exports. Minerals extracted
‘World Bank, Social Indicators of Deve1o~ment, 1994
(Washington: The World Bank 1994) and 1994 Social Indicators




include gold, bauxite and rutile. A rapidly dwindling
diamond reserve provided about 15 percent of export earnings
in l989.~
Like most West African countries, environmental
consciousness is non or barely existent in Sierra Leone and,
of course, there are no grassroot environmental movements to
militate for environmental protection. The illiteracy rate
of Sierra Leone for 1987-92 is estimated at about 79
percent .~
According to Africa ReDort of October, 1988, the waste
dumping in Sierra Leone occurred in 1988 when the United
Kingdom exported about 628 bags of hazardous waste
containing Ammonia and formaldehyde mislabeled as
construction material to some local importers. The local
importers, on finding out that the contents of the bags were
not construction material they had originally ordered,
decided to dump the hazardous waste in a local garbage. The
shipment of this mislabeled hazardous waste was done by
Dumba International. This incident came to light when
residents complained of choking fumes that was fast
spreading and penetrating the area.5 After an official
3Political HandBook of Africa: South of the Sahara,
Political Science Dept., Clark Atlanta University, 1992.
4World Bank, Social Indicators of DeveloiDment, 1994.
World Pa~er/Journa1 of Commerce, September 1988, p. 6.
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investigation, Sierra Leone authorities arrested two people,
including Minette Golley, the wife of a prominent judge.
According to Golley account, the bags were imported from the
U.K. as construction materials, but were found to be
unusable for construction and were subsequently dumped.
Tests run on the wastes in Sierra Leone determined that they
contained ammonia, formaldehyde, and carbon monoxide.6
According to Greenpeace report, another attempt to dump
solid waste from Belgium in 1989 was rejected by Sierra
Leone. Earlier in 1979 an American company, the Colorado-
based Nedlog Technology Group Inc., had offered Sierra Leone
$25 million to use its territory for waste disposal. It was
under mounting pressure that the then President Siaka
Stevens was forced to reject such a tempting deal.7
Analysis
The Sierra Leone case of dumping and cases of refusal
to accept hazardous wastes for dumping appear not to fully
support the hypothesis advanced in Chapter I of this
study--that toxic and hazardous waste trade follow the path
of the poor, the corrupt or the uninformed and it is
exploitative. From World Bank social and economic
6Greenpeace, 102. These 628 bags of poisonous wastes
are considered hazardous by this study as they are capable
of posing health risks.
7Africa Report, August 1988.
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indicators of development, Sierra Leone in 1989 was ranked
one of the poorest countries in the world. Such a picture
has tempted developed countries to perceive Sierra Leone as
a country that would readily be open for hazardous wastes
dumping schemes for cash. It is interesting to see a poor
country like Sierra Leone refusing to accept hazardous
wastes for cash. Secondly, the refusal of a $25 million
deal by the then president Siaka Stevens under pressure,
explains to some degree the level of awareness in the
country regarding hazardous waste, while also explaining
that more likely some of the dumping schemes are usually
abetted by African leaders. This importation was not an
official order by the government of Sierra Leone. It was an
importation by an informed local citizen. This is another
possible case of organized crime by the exporting country,
the UK, or its agents, who mislabeled hazardous waste as
construction materials and shipped such to Sierra Leone.
The shipment was a fraud that could not be detected by the
entry port authorities. The sustained argument here in
support of the hypothesis is that it is exploitative.
Was the waste importation based on informed decisions?
The dumping case here was fairly based on informed
decisions as the importers of the construction material knew
exactly what they were importing and were able to detect
their order was not right. The shipment was a fraud that
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was not detected by the Sierra Leone authorities at the port
of entry. The labeling of the hazardous waste as
construction material was mischievous. The exporting
country, UK, must be blamed for this type of trade based on
deception and misinformation. The importation here by local
citizens of Sierra Leone was some how based on informed
decisions as the importers knew exactly what they were
importing. The shipment was a fraud that could not be
detected by the entry port authorities. In the other
hazardous waste importation schemes or attempts, the
government authorities in Sierra Leone were well informed
and they decided to deny their entry into the country.
Was the waste trade exoloitative?
The fact that the hazardous waste shipment was labeled
construction material” rather than hazardous waste made it
obvious that the exportation was fraudulent and was designed
to take advantage of the Sierra Leone’s authorities at the
port and the importers. This type of trade is surely
fraudulent and exploitative.
Conclusion
The conclusion from the case of importation and cases
of attempted dumping of hazardous wastes is that they do not
in totality support the hypothesis advanced in Chapter I-
that hazardous and toxic wastes trade follow the path of the
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poor, the corrupt or the uninformed, and is exploitative.
The import trade deal was one based on informed decisions.
The cases of attempted dumping of hazardous wastes were
based on informed decision as the Sierra Leone government
officials were able to determine for themselves that such
deals were not to their best interest and therefore refused.
The fraudulent manner with which the waste was exported
into the country was a deliberate attempt to exploit an
African country by European waste trade brokers. There is
no doubt that the cases of attempted waste import were cases
of trying to take advantage of a poor African country.
The hypothesis is supported very much only in the fact that
this type of trade is exploitative. The importing or
recipient country though poor demonstrated it was somehow
informed about the dangers of hazardous waste trade and was
not so desperate to accept hazardous and toxic wastes for
cash. The trade in hazardous or toxic wastes has
consequences too, in the case of Sierra Leone, though no
dead was reported, the air or the environment around the
dumping site was polluted by choking fumes from the
hazardous chemicals and the threat to health could only be
imagined.
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The following chapter examines the case of dumping in
Guinea-Bissau that the government was pressured by external
influence to rescind the contract before it was about to
take off.
CHAPTER VI
GUINEA-BISSAU - A CASE STUDY
Introduction
Guinea-Bissau, with a population of about one million.
In 1989 it had an estimated per capita income of $180, which
was far less than the average for all of the Sub-Saharan
Africa (excluding South Africa) of $390.’ Guinea-Bissau had
an external debt that stood at about $458mn in 1988 and
$505mn in 1989, giving total external debt as percentage of
GNP of 271 percent for 1988 and 1989.2 Indeed, with Guinea
Bissau’s economic performance, it ranks among the poorest
countries in the world.
Guinea-Bissau gained independence from the Portuguese
in 1974. The country depends a great deal on foreign aid
from industrialized countries and other international
development agencies.3 In Guinea-Bissau, environmental
awareness is non-existent. With low level adult education
‘World Bank, Social Indicators of Development, 1987
(Washington: The World Bank, 1987), 4; and The Europa World
Year Book, 1994, vol. 1.
2EIU Country Profile: Guinea-Bissau, 46-47.
3Rosemary E. Galli and Jocelyn Jones, Guinea-Bissau:




the population depends on the government to protect both the
environment and the public health. And the government has
no environmental laws or legislation and like other West
African countries, environmental protection is low on the
government list of priorities. Given Guinea-Bissau’s social
indicators of development, the country is among the poorest
in the region. It is politically weak with no signs of
being able to break out of the circle of poverty.
According to a Greenpeace account, Guinea-Bissau
officials were first approached by Western exporters of
waste in 1987 to accept a load of incinerator ash aboard the
Khian Sea. This request was rejected by the Guinea-Bissau
government.4 In 1988 a Swiss company, Soserco, negotiated
with the Guinea—Bissau government to import a million tons
of hazardous waste for three to five years. This scheme was
rejected by the Guinea-Bissau officials, according to
spokesmen for the company.5 The basis for rejection was as
a result of public outcry.
Again in 1988, a consortium of Swiss, American, and
British companies approached the government of Guinea-Bissau
to ship millions of tons of hazardous waste to this country
for over several years. This type of scheme, according to
4Greenpeace, The International Trade in Wastes: A




Greenpeace, supports very much the argument that the
distribution of power and wealth in the international
political economy dictates that developing states become the
dumping ground for the waste of the industrialized
countries 6
The government of Guinea-Bissau was to receive $40
dollars per ton for accepting to be dumped on. By
calculation, this could have provided Guinea-Bissau with a
total revenue of about $600 million, an amount about four
times the country’s GNP and twice its foreign debt. The
deal appeared initially attractive to the government of
Guinea-Bissau as it was seen as added revenue to pull the
country out of poverty and its circle of debt. The wastes
would have been dumped in landfills near Guinea-Bissau’s
border with Senegal. This deal is believed to have been
spearheaded by an Italian waste broker.
According to the Greenpeace report, the Minister of
Natural Resources and Industry, Filinto Barros, had signed a
preliminary contract with two British companies in February
1988, indicating his approval for them to import up to
fifteen million tons of toxic waste from the United States,
Europe and Australia for five years. The contract, signed
by Barros, authorized the firms BIS Import-Export Ltd., with
an office in London, and Hobday Ltd., with its head office
in the Isles of Mann, to carry out the importation of the
6lbid 81—83.
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toxic waste into Guinea-Bissau. Hobday was represented in
Guinea-Bissau by a Portuguese citizen, Mr. Carlos Albino
Marques de Freitas. BIS Import-Export was represented by an
unnamed Portuguese citizen.
Environmental impact assessments of the waste disposal
site was under contract with a French consultancy, but were
never done. The cash from this raw deal was very tempting
and the government officials were very much tempted to make
what appeared a big cash deal to them without questioning
how much such offer would compare with disposal of the same
wastes in the exporting Western countries. By a comparative
analysis of disposal cost, it could have been possible to
determine how fair the amount offered was.
The U.S. Embassy in Guinea knew about this contract in
March 1988, a month after the signing of the contract.7
Hardly was there any information about the activities of the
companies involved, or their relationship to one another as
they preferred to operate in secret about their plan.8
7According to US Ambassador Blacken, the agreement
first came to the attention of Embassy personnel when the
contract was brought to the consul to be notarized(as there
are few notaries in Guinea-Bissau) . The consul brought the
deal to the Ambassador’s attention. Backen then cabled the
State Department expressing concern about negative political
ramifications against the US should the proposal actually
succeeds. Mark A. Montgomery, “Want Not, Waste Not: A
Realist Theory of the International Trade in Hazardous
Waste,” (Ph.D. diss., The Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1993), 43.
8U.S. State Department Telegram Guinea-Bissau 0455, 09
March 1988. Ambassador Blacken reported that the agreement
to import wastes was “closely held as the company
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Later, another company became involved in this scheme.
A Swiss firm, Societe Intercontract S.A. (some documents
refer to it as Empresa Intercontract.9) also negotiated a
contract with the same Guinea-Bissau minister, Filinto
Barros. Intercontract had a post office box and an address
with the secretary in Belfaux, Canton Fribourg, Switzerland,
through which a Genoa-based Italian company conducted
business. This company was manned by Gian Franco Ambrosini,
who had been involved in a number of other waste trade deals
with developing countries.10
Much as Europe and Australia were mentioned as
exporting countries in this waste scheme in Guinea-Bissau,
no available information shows that Intercontract, BIS
Import-Export, or Hobday had made contact with these
countries. Evidence, however, shows that one American
company was planning to ship tons of waste to Guinea-Bissau.
On investigation, U.S. government officials in Washington
found that Robert Zeff, a prominent divorce attorney in
Detroit had somehow become associated with Intercontract.”
representative who brought it to the embassy did not want
the embassy’s national employees to know of it.” See
Montgomery, 43.
9U.S. State Department Telegram, Bern 02721, 20 April
1988.
‘0The standard account of the Zanoobia case appears in
Global Durnoinc~ Ground, 30-32.
11Montgomery, 34.
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Zeff had no direct meeting with the Guinea-Bissau minister,
Filinto Barros.
Zeff had created a company named Lindaco a day before
it proposed to export wastes to Guinea-Bissau, even though
he had no previous experience of waste management. The same
Zeff had interests in jai alai frontons in Connecticut, oil
companies in Louisiana and Texas and casino in Las Vegas.’2
The only connection Zeff had with the waste disposal
business may have been his personal relations with waste
hauling company in Bridgeport, Connecticut.’3 The U.S. State
Department was concerned about the political ramifications
of waste export plan that it invited Zeff to Washington for
meeting. Detroit News had this account of the meeting:
Arriving by Private jet, accompanied by a lawyer
and two waste disposal specialists from New
Jersey, he (Zeff) held forth for an hour on the
advisability of the project. He showed
photographs of the dump site. He talked of
feasibility studies and environmental safeguards.
During the entire meeting, one participant
recalled, Zeff never removed his sunglasses
At the State Department meeting, Zeff did not win
over the participants. The EPA’s Grieder said
pictures of the area where the hazardous waste is
to be unloaded showed a “rickety little dock.”
12Richard Willing, “Detroiter Wants to Ship Waste to
Africa: Nation Stalls Dumping of Hazardous Material,”
Detroit News, June 19, 1988, Al:6.
‘3According to Richard Willing, Zeff was involved with
business dealings relating to the jai alaifronton in
Bridgeport, CT, with the son of Emilio Daddario (sometimes
known as “Hi Ho Daddario”) who operated a municipal waste
collection business in Bridgeport. See Montgomery, 109.
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‘It looks like something I’d go crabbing off over
in Maryland, “ she said.’4
This account gives a vivid picture of a typical waste
trade broker. It is common to find waste trade brokers with
this kind of unsavory character who will go to any length to
make their fortune out of the poor and the uninformed. The
author believes an investigation of the role, reputation and
activities of these companies and entrepreneurs involved in
wastes schemes and their relationships with exporter
countries, should be a subject of a further study to fully
comprehend the masterminding business of these mindless
waste brokers.
Few days after Zeff made his trip to Washington, his
lawyer, Ronald A. Schy, filed a notification of intent to
export hazardous waste to Guinea-Bissau, and asked for the
notification to be processed.’5 Zeff’s Lindaco company
requested for permission to export all types of hazardous
waste to Guinea-Bissau. Well over 1000 different waste
compositions were included in the notification letter from
Schy, including explosives to corrosive chemicals. The
waste was to be dumped or stored on the land until one
‘4Montgomery, 110.
‘5According to EPA, this notification is required under
RCRA Waste Export Regulations.
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million tons were received leading possibly to land
incineration.16
A Guinea-Bissauan businessman, Carlos Bernardo Vieira
on March 25, 1988 met with Ambassador Blacken to say that he
was involved in the plan to import industrial waste. Mr.
Vieira however, did not give specifics of his role but,
maintained that all guidelines would be adhered to and that
Veritas had been given contract to control and supervise the
import and storage [of the wastes] ~17 According to Roelants
du Vivier account, Carlos Bernardo Vieira is the brother of
the President of Guinea-Bissau and the owner of the land
where part of the imported waste was to be dumped or
disposed.’8 This land is very near Farim, on the border with
Senegal.’9 This involvement by the President’s brother
possibly suggests a personal and vested interest of the
President in the waste deal.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency sent a
telegram on April 5, 1988 to U.S. Embassy in Guinea-Bissau
explaining U.S. regulations on the shipment of the hazardous
16See article 8 of the contract between Intercontract
and the government of Guinea-Bissau outlines this project.
Fig II.
17U.S. State Department Telegram, Bissau 0608, 28 March
1988.
‘8Francois Roelants du Vivier, Las Vaisseaux du Poison:




waste to Guinea-Bissau. The telegram, a form letter,
outlined the proposal made by Lindaco and explained the
amounts and types of hazardous waste to be exported. The
telegram also instructed embassy personnel to inform the
government of Guinea-Bissau requesting a written consent
authorizing waste transfer.2°
As the stage was set and this waste shipment business
was about to start, the international media took on this
proposal and exposed the whole deal. The first exposure
appeared on April 4 1988, in Lisbon’s leftist daily
newspaper, Diario de Lisboa.21 On April 14, Lisbon radio
reported on the contract between a Swiss firm and Guinea
Bissau government to ship waste to Guinea-Bissau.22
The Senegalese news service on April 14 reported that
Guinea-Bissau government had signed a contract to import 15
million tons of toxic waste from the United States for over
ten years. Coincidentally, the Economic Officer of the U.S.
Embassy was at the home of Alfred da Silva, the chief of
accounting of the National Bank of Guinea dining when the
Senegalese news bulletin came on and both were listening
20This is a standard procedure under the RCRA Waste
Export Regulations. See US State Department telegram State
106385, April 5, 1988.
21U.5. State Department Telegram, Lisbon 03531, April
19, 1988.
22The British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World
Broadcasts/The Monitoring Report, April 19, 1988,
ME/W0O22/l.
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together. In their conversation, Mr. da Silva expressed his
fears of Guinea-Bissau becoming the world’s toxic waste
dumping ground and questioned Filinto Barros and Carlos
Bernardo Vieira motives in the waste deal. In a telegram to
Washington later, the Embassy official quoted Mr. da Silva’s
statement in their conversation saying:
several western ambassadors have spoken to
President Vieira to object to the deal, and he
hoped that the U.S. Embassy would add its voice in
warning the President. (The Brazilian, French and
U.S. are the only western ambassadors residing
here.) [U.S. Embassy personnel] were already aware
that the French Ambassador made a demarche to
President Vieira opposing the deal. Guinea
Bissaus ambassador in the U.S.S.R. had called on
da Silva that same day for details concerning this
matter 23
Here, the impact of international pressures on Guinea
Bissau on the waste deal was becoming a concern of the U.S.
Embassy and more so as some well informed Guinea-Bissauans
were not in accord with the decision of Barros and President
Vieira.
The Portuguese daily, Diario Popular, on April 14 also
carried an article about the waste deal.24 At the same time
the U.S. Embassy in Guinea-Bissau responded with another
telegram to Washington requesting the State Department for
“press guidance” on the hazardous waste deal and
231J.5. State Department Telegram, Bissau 0745, April 11,
1988; Montgomery, 110.
24U.S. State Department Telegram, Lisbon 03531, April
19, 1988; and “Bissau recebe lixo do ocidente,” Diario
Popular (Lisbon), April 15, 1988. See also Montgomery, 114.
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Lindaco/Intercontract proposal specifically. The telegram
pointed out the concern that the Senegalese and Portuguese
press reports were giving the impression that the U.S. was
the only likely source of the waste to be shipped into
Guinea-Bissau.
In spite of U.S. denial that it was not the sole waste
exporter to Guinea-Bissau, evidence was overwhelming that
Lindaco of Detroit, an American company, was the only
company that had actually pursued a plan to export waste to
Guinea-Bissau. Intercontract of Switzerland and the British
firms BIS Import and Hobday apparently had not shown any
plans to be involved in the waste export. There was no
evidence that these two companies were successful in
locating customers in Europe.25 What then appeared obvious
was that the waste was indeed going to be primarily of
American origin.
25U.S. State Department Telegram, Bern 2721, April 20,
1988. This report was based on a “street rumor” that a
Norwegian Firm was probably involved, but such rumor was
never confirmed. The same telegram continued that the Swiss
Federal Environmental Office had heard of “two companies
located at the same address in Geneva, Maribe, S.A. and
Tradasec, S.A., both of 47 rue du 31 Decembre, C}-{ 1211,
Geneva, Switzerland, have been seeking to negotiate a
contract to serve as agents for Guinea-Bissau in arranging
shipment of such wastes from Europe, including Switzerland
when their export is permitted by (the government of
Switzerland.” In another telegram, US State Department
Telegram Bern 3908, June 8, 1988, pointed out that Ambrosini
had tried to “recruit potential (solvent) clients” in
Switzerland and Germany, but could locate none by the time
Barros had rescinded from the deal. See Montgomery, 114.
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On April 16, 1988, a wire service item from the
Portuguese News A~encv appeared on the second foreign news
page of the Darker newspaper, Le Soleil, reporting the plan
to send waste to Guinea-Bissau.26 In another article in
April 17th reported in the leading Lisbon Daily, Diario de
Noticias, the news of Guinea-Bissau deal was mentioned
briefly adding that “no decision had yet been reached” by
the government of Guinea-Bissau.
On April 19th, the U.S. Embassy received a reply from
Filinto Barros, Guinea-Bissau Minister of Natural Resources
that the government of Guinea—Bissau was considering
Lindaco’s (the American company’s) proposal.
At this stage the pressure was building up on the
government of Guinea-Bissau. The waste trade proposal had
been carried alive in the domestic news in Guinea-Bissau.
The Minister of Natural Resources, Filinto Barros, was
forced to give a radio broadcast on April 23rd giving
assurance that the government of Guinea-Bissau was carefully
studying the proposal to import waste to ensure safeguards
against damage to the people and the environment.
The U.S. Ambassador in Guinea-Bissau, Ambassador
Blacken, felt at this juncture to make his assessment of the
waste trade deal and the political clout engendered in
Guinea-Bissau by this waste trade. Ambassador Blacken made
26See U.S. State Department Telegram, Dakar 04362, April
18, 1988.
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the following observations in a telegram to the State
Department in Washington:
My impression is that GOGB (Government of Guinea—
Bissau), when approached by the representatives of
the waste exporting companies, was given a smooth
pitch in which possible problems of waste disposal
were minimized. The prospect of receiving dollars
40 per ton for 15m tons caused GOGB leaders to
leap into the agreement without much prior
investigation about the complexities of handling
toxic wastes. Since then, each week someone
raises a new question and the Guineans are
realizing that they do not know much about
hazardous waste disposal and that the people who
sold them the idea certainly did not prepare them
adequately for either the technical questions
concerning safeguards and processing the wastes or
the public relations implications. The GOGE is
beginning to realize that if proper safeguards can
be assured, the public relations aspects involving
the country’s image must be considered.
(...) No members of the international press
have arrived here on scene. However, I am getting
queries and expressions of concern from GOGB
officials who wonder about the GOGB’s ability to
analyze the dangers and enforce the agreement with
the importing companies. They report that
President Vieira has told them that he has
discussed the pro and cons with me, that I am
obtaining information about the wastes and that he
has full confidence in that I will help the GOGB
avoid problems. I have discussed the matter with
the President, drawing upon guidance Department
has provided and have urged him to ascertain that
the firm Veritas doing the feasibility studies
proved answers to the questions as I am not a
specialist in such matters. While expression of
confidence in the embassy’s knowledge are
flattering, they are also disconcerting. I am
trying to limit my role in this to that of a
channel for information and I keep responsibility
for evaluation and decision on GOGE and Veritas.
Nevertheless, relations here are such that the
President and others on both sides of the issue
will keep turning to the Embassy for information,
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advice and reassurance. We ask therefore to be
given as much useful information as possible.27
The picture here is that Blacken strongly believed that
Barros and other Guinea-Bissau officials had been misled by
the companies proposing the waste imports, and that they
were not prepared for the political and/or environmental
risks of the waste trade. This picture also supports the
conclusion that Guinea-Bissau was a victim of nefarious
waste trade brokers.
During a press conference on April 29, 1988, Francois
Roelants du Vivier, a member of the European Parliament and
one of the co-founders of L’Entente Europeenne pour
L’Environnement, “uncovered” the Guinea-Bissau contract with
Intercontract of Switzerland. In his moral outrage he
explained the exploitation of an impoverished country like
Guinea-Bissau by nefarious traffickers in toxic death.28
Copies of the memorandum written by Menezes d’Alva, as well
as a copy of the contract between the government of Guinea
Bissau and Intercontract were distributed during the
conference. This press conference gave rise to the
internationalization of the Guinea-Bissau case.
On May 4, 1988, President Lansana Conte of Guinea made
a five-hour surprise visit to Guinea-Bissau to call on
27U.S. State Department Telegram, Bissau 816, April 27,
1988.
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President Vieira. Many speculate that Conte’s visit was
possibly to advise Vieira not to accept the waste shipment.29
On May 10, 1988, thirty-eight UN personnel based in
Guinea-Bissau signed a letter of protest to UN Secretary
General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, registering their concern
about the waste trade proposal, requesting him to take
whatever action possible to keep it from materializing. The
letter reads as follows:
We, the United Nations staff stationed in Guinea
Bissau, wish to inform you of the governments
imminent decision to authorize the deposit of
toxic industrial waste in its territory. We are
extremely anxious and concerned about this very
distressing situation and would request you to
thoroughly investigate the consequences of this
decision and take action as appropriate lest
serious environmental hazards affect both the
local population and the international
community. 30
In a later conversation meeting of American Ambassador
Blacken, Gordon Powers, Deputy Director of the State
Departments Economic Policy Staff for Africa (who happen to
be in Guinea-Bissau on routine visit) and Filinto Barros,
Guinea-Bissau Minister for Natural Resources, Barros
admitted that the international politics of the affairs were
beginning to weigh on his decision. He pointed out the
furor in the foreign press, the concern of other African
29U.S. State Department Telegram, Bissau 0969, May 13,
1988.
30U S. State Department Telegram, Bissau 1053, May 13,
1988
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states, and the rejection by Guinea(Conakry) of the ash
dumped on Kassa Island.3’
As international pressures were building up, the
government of Guinea-BisSau was weighing the risks and
benefits of importing hazardous waste. In mid-May, two
international organizations made news as they went to press
condemning the hazardous trade. The European Parliament on
May 19, unanimously passed a resolution condemning the
export of hazardous waste to developing nations.32
It must be added that this European resolution makes several
references to the Guinea-BisSaU case, indeed suggesting, the
parliament vote was influenced very much by the Guinea
Bissau example.33
31U.S. State Department Telegram, Bissau 0969, May 13,
1988. See also Montgomery, 111.
32European Parliament, Resolution on Exports of Toxic
Waste to the Third World, adopted unanimously May 19, 1988.
Printed in Official Journal of the European Communities No.
c 167 (June 27, 1988), 266—267.
33The Reuter Business Report (NEXIS), May 19, 1988.
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Resolution on Exports of Toxic Waste to the Third World
The European Parliament
A. having regard to the documents circulated by the “Entente
Europeenne pour l’Environnement’ which show that European
and American firms have concluded contracts with the Guinea
Bissau authorities for the disposal in that country of toxic
industrial waste at a rate of three million tonnes per year
for a five year period at least,
B. whereas the Republic of Guinea-Bissau has been offered a
payment of 120 million dollars per annum in return for
accepting this waste, a sum which is greater than the
country’s annual GNP,
C. whereas, in addition to the dangers posed by toxic waste,
account must also be taken of the risks involved in long
distance transport,
D. whereas the humid climate and the permeable soil of
Guinea-Bissau make it unsuitable for the large-scale
disposal of dangerous waste, particularly in a region where
the European Community is funding a rural development
proj ect,
F. whereas it is irresponsible on the part of industrialized
countries to dispose of their waste in the poorest
countries.
1. Condemns all large-scale exportation of dangerous waste
to the developing countries, and calls for existing
contracts to be canceled, particularly those involving
Guinea-Bissau;
On May 23, 1988, The Organization of African Unity
(OAU) Council of Ministers passed a resolution condemning
the dumping of nuclear and other hazardous waste in Africa
by foreign firms. This resolution was also very much
influenced by the Guinea-Bissau case as several paragraphs
made veiled references to the proposal contract initially
approved by Guinea-Bissau government.
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OAU Resolution Against Dumping of Hazardous Waste in Africa
The Organization of African Unity
Aware of the growing practice of dumping nuclear and
industrial wastes in African countries by transnational
corporations and other enterprises from Industrialized
countries, which they cannot dispose of within their
territories,
Gravely concerned about the growing tendency of some
African countries to conclude agreements or arrangement with
such corporations and enterprises which facilitate the
dumping of nuclear and industrial wastes in their
territorial boundaries,
Bearing in mind the harmful effects of radiation from
nuclear and other hazardous industrial waste to human and
marine life as well as to the ecosystems on which they
depend for their existence:
1. DECLARES that the dumping of nuclear and industrial
wastes in Africa is a crime against Africa and the African
people;
2. CONDEMNS all transnational corporations and
enterprises involved in the importation, in any form, of
nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa; and DEMANDS that
they clean up the areas that have already been contaminated
by them;
3. CALLS UPON African countries which have concluded or
are in the process of concluding agreements or arrangements
for dumping nuclear and industrial wastes in their
territories to put an end to these transaction;
4. REQUESTS Member States of the OAU to carry out
information campaigns among their people about the danger of
Nuclear and Industrial Wastes;(...)34
Indeed, it was this OAU resolution, which like the
proverbial straw, broke the camel’s back. The Guinea-Bissau
Minister of Natural Resources and his government could not
face such strong and unified opposition by African
countries, western countries and international environmental
34Organization of African Unity, Council Ministers,
Resolution on Durnoina of Nuclear and Industrial Waste in
Africa, OAU Document CM/Res. 1153 (XVIII), May 23,1988.
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organizations. Filinto Barros was forced to back out of the
deal.
A report in the Washington Times on June 1, 1988, made
it clear the Lindaco/Intercontract waste deal was dead. The
Times article said that Barros final decision ‘Techoed a
resolution passed at last week’s summit meeting of the
Organization of African Unity that condemned the use of poor
African countries as dumping ground for industrial
countries.” The article also added that Barro’s decision
“also followed an appeal by the National Union of Guinean
Workers to cancel the project on safety grounds.”35
According to a telegram report to Washington by the
U.S. Ambassador in Guinea-Bissau, John Blacken, Baross
pointed out to Blacken that:
even if the studies were to show that safeguards
could be maintained, the pressure created by
international criticism and the OAU resolution had
been so strong that the government of Guinea
Bissau made a political decision not to proceed
with the project, despite the country’s desperate
need of foreign exchange.36
Minister Barros followed up his government decision
with this letter to the U.S. Ambassador, John Blacken:
35”Guinea-Bissau Cancels Toxic Waste Agreement,”
Washington Times, June 1, 1988, 2. The report was also
subsequently picked up by the BBC on June 2, 1988. Agence
France-Presse also carried a similar report.
~ State Department Telegram, Bissau 01152, June 3,
988.
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Letter from Minister Filinto Barros to
Ambassador John D. Blacken
Bissau, June 3, 1988
Subject: Project on storage of industrial wastes in Guinea
Bissau
Excellency,
Guinea-Bissau has been faced during this period
with a difficult and very delicate international situation
within the scope of the project mentioned. In spite of all
efforts and attempts made to reassure the international
public opinion about the government’s intention, making
known the steps taken during the whole process for a good
eventual implementation of the project, an international
(and national) campaign was launched in an intensive way
against Guinea-Bissau which caused some negative-domestic
and external--reactions concerning the project.
Thus, faced with this campaign and taking into
account the “resolutions and decisions” reached by the
conference of heads of the OAU member states held recently
in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), we regretfully took upon us to
inform you that we decided to “suspend” all activity and
negotiations that have been undertaken within the scope of
this project.
We hope that you will take into account the
reasons for our present position, regarding the project
mentioned, which is due to a pressured situation.
We are very grateful for the support and
information provided by you in the course of the whole
process, and we hope to find the same openness, availability
and cooperation for other activities in the future.
Please, accept my sincere compliments.
Filinto Barros, Minister of Natural Resources and Industry37
On June 16, 1988, President Vieira of Guinea-Bissau
called upon developed nations to help in his nation’s
development instead of offering to dump their industrial
37U S State Department Telegram, Bissau 01232, June 14,
1988.
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waste there in exchange for cash. “Send us what will enable
us to conquer the state of underdevelopment, but not what
could kill us.” Reaffirming his country’s refusal to become
“the dust bin of developed countries” under the pretext of
being poor, he said Guinea-Bissau will fight “for the good
and development of its people and not for creating a
situation which risks endangering the whole nation.” 8
Analysis
It was indeed the alarm raised by international concern
and the OAU resolve that forced the government to rescind
its decision. Some may well argue that Guinea—Bissau
finally abandoned this deal because it gathered sufficient
technical advice to make such decision, justifying high risk
to the environment. But, its equally true that the main
reason for backing out of this deal was the strong
international pressure, internal political pressure in
Guinea-Bissau and particularly African leaders pressure
following the Organization of African leaders resolve to ban
the trade in waste that actually aided Guinea-Bissau
decision.
38Xinhua General Overseas News Service, June 16, 1988
(NEXIS), item no. 0616062.
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Was the waste trade based on any informed decisions?
To a large extent in this proposal there was a lack of
vital technical exchange of information between the exporter
and the recipient country, the Guinea-Bissau government on
the messy and problematic aspect of this trade. For
example, the contract neither mentions exactly how
hazardous, how toxic, or how dangerous the waste might be,
nor specified how the waste was to be disposed. Also, since
Ambrosini (waste broker) was behind the scheme, and had
problems exporting waste to other countries, one might well
argue that he perhaps deliberately kept the troubling
details secret possibly hoping the Guinea-Bissau officials
would not ask too many questions. Or it could be that
Arnbrosini and other nefarious brokers were planning to
defraud the Government of Guinea-Bissau.
There is also the argument about the bargaining power
between the Third World and industrialized countries. For
example, the Brooklyn Journal of International Law, made
this argument:
The great disparity of the bargaining power
between the Third World and the industrialized
world, coupled with the inadequacy of C...)
notification requirements, limit the Third World’s
ability to make an informed decision. It is
probable that even when exporters comply with
(...) notice and consent provisions, it is highly
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unlikely that the consent given by less developed
countries is truly informed.” ~
Was the payment for the dumping fair?
The government of Guinea-Bissau would have received $40
dollars per ton for disposal service. This would amount to
a total revenue of about $600 million, a figure about four
times the GNP for Guinea-Bissau. At issue here is that the
Government of Guinea-Bissau was very much tempted by the
foreign exchange to the point that it almost approved the
deal if not for mounting pressures. The government of
Guinea-Bissau possibly did not bother to check on how much
it could have cost to dispose of the same waste in the
export countries. It definitely would cost about $1000.0 or
more per ton to dispose of the same toxic waste in the
United States in compliance with government regulation. The
payment therefore might have been attractive to poor Guinea
Bissau but in comparing with what it would otherwise be paid
in the exporting country, it was unfair.
Conclusion
The case of Guinea-Bissau clearly supports the study
hypothesis that wastes dumping trade follow the path of the
poor, the corrupt or the uninformed and it is exploitative.
Guinea-Bissau is a poor country that was tempted by the
39Mary Critharis, Third World Nations Are Down in the
Dumps: The Expectation of Hazardous Waste, “ Brooklyn Journal
of International Law 16, no. 2 (1990) : 327.
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economic benefit of importing hazardous wastes. The Guinea
Bissau government was forced to rescind its decision to
import the wastes by external political pressures
particularly pressure from member countries of the
Organization of African Unity.
The case of Guinea-Bissau was very much the triumph of
political pressures over economic benefits. The West
African countries fit into this pattern where external
pressures always serve to salvage them from the temptation
of becoming victims of nefarious waste brokers in desperate
attempts to make easy cash. The reluctant manner with which
this deal was called off demonstrates Guinea-Bissau
officials interest in making easy money. The whole episode
calls to question the intentions of Filinto Barros,
President Vieire and his brother, Carlos Beinada Vieira.
As typical African national bourgeoisie, this waste trade
was an opportunity for them to swell their pockets even at
the expense of the masses. Frantz Fanon supports this
tendency by African bourgeoisie to capitalize on money deals
with foreign counterparts to enrich themselves. Fanon
writes:
Since the bourgeoisie has not the economic means
to ensure its domination and to throw a few crumbs
to the rest of the country; since, moreover, it is
preoccupied with filling its pockets as rapidly as




While this deduction in the case of Guinea-Bissau could be
presumptuous, since the deal was prevented by public and
international outcry, this tendency is a common practice
among African national bourgeoisie. The case of Guinea
Bissau informs too about unsavory international waste
brokers who serve as agents of the industrial countries.
The Guinea-Bissau’s case confirms the assertion by dependent
theorists that an alliance of convenience and common
interest exists between the centers of international
capitalism and the clientele class that wields power in the
dependent economy.4’ However, the case of Guinea-Bissau
helped in furthering the consolidation of the African
resolve to ban the trade in toxic and hazardous wastes
completely in Africa.
The next chapter examines the dumping schemes in Benin.
Benin like Guinea-Bissau is a classic example of official




BENIN - A CASE STUDY
Introduction
Benin, a former French colony, was known as Dahomey
until 1975. The population of Benin is about 4.6 million
(1990) . Its GNP per capita in 1989 was $380, slightly lower
than the average for all of Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding
South Africa) of $390.1 Benin had a total debt as
percentage of GNP of 72 percent in 1989. The country’s
total external debt was $l,367m at the end of 1992.2
Benin has very few natural resources, some of which are
not yet exploited, and it derives less than one percent of
its GDP from mining. The government operates on a deficit.
Living conditions in Benin are harsh compared to other West
African countries. About a third of the urban labor force
was estimated to be unemployed or underemployed in early
l990s. Benin is one of the countries in West Africa that
relies wholly on foreign financial support. Environmental
consciousness in the country appears to be virtually nil,
‘World Bank Social Indicators of Development 1987
(Washington: The World Bank, 1987), 4; and The Europa World
Year Book, 1994, Vol. 1.
2The Europa World Year Book, 1994.
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and there are no grass roots environmental movements to
militate for environmental protection.
Benin has been ruled by a former military officer,
Mathieu Kerekou since 1972 who later in 1987 resigned from
the army to become a civilian head of state. Kerekou
pursued a policy of “scientific socialism”--a local form of
socialism supposedly based on Marxism-Leninism philosophy.3
As will be seen in the following paragraphs, the People’s
Republic of Benin under the leadership of Mathieu Kerekou
became almost notorious for its role in receiving and
storing hazardous and toxic wastes for cash.
According to Africa Analysis, a London based journal,
two French shiploads of radioactive French waste were dumped
in Benin in 1988 and Greenpeace reports this as unclear
(Fig. 3). In exchange for these waste dumping, Benin was to
receive special finance assistance for thirty years.4 A
shipment of nuclear waste from Le Havre in the north of
France and transported by the “ganvie” (Benin’s only
merchant-marine vessel) was buried in Saklo in the Abomey
region.5 It was one of these dumping practices in Benin
that prompted a reaction from Nigeria, a neighboring country
3lbid., 530.
4Richard Dowden, “Toxic Waste Secretly Dumped in
Africa” published in Independent (London, England, 1988).
5Africa Newsfile, July 1988, a London-based bulletin.
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to issue strong warnings to the Benin government. The
Nigerian authorities were aware of an agreement between
President Mathieu Kerekou and France to bury nuclear waste
near Abomey, which is some 160km north-west of Lagos.6
In another report by Africa Newsfile, a London based
bulletin, the Soviet Union dumped “several tons” of
radioactive waste in Benin between 1984 and 1986.
The Benin President, according to the bulletin, was well
aware of the secretive dumping. A former head of Benin’s
air force, Christophe Fandohan, was dismissed for trying to
stop the Soviets from dumping under the tarmac of the
military airfield the Russians were constructing at Canna,
15 km south of Abomey. More than two Benin workers were
reported to have died following this incidence at Canna in
1984. This incidence also resulted in a temporary
suspension of the airport project. More Soviet radioactive
wastes were also dumped in a abandoned quarry at Dan, 25 km
north of Abomey. This area has since been converted to a
“military zone” and restricted from general public use.
In 1988 Benin signed a contract with the Gibralter
registered Sesco Ltd. Under this contract, Sesco Ltd. was to
deliver up to five million tons of toxic waste from Europe
and North America to Benin each year, and will pay Benin
6Charles Secrett, “Deadly Offer Poor Countries Find
Hard to Refuse”, in New Straits Times, July 1988.
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$2.50 per ton of waste dumped. The normal cost of disposing
such waste in Europe according to European Environmental
Association, is estimated between $140—160 per tonne.
However, the dumping site for the waste was to be near the
historical center of the Fon empire at Abomey, about 60
miles north of the capital, Cotonu.
This deal sparked an uproar. Abomey, being
traditionally a hot bed of dissent against the Benin
supremo, dumping the waste there sparked opposition protests
which followed army officers from Abomey being arrested and
accused of plotting a coup. Because of the mounting
pressure, Benin was forced to back out of this waste deal.
Benin of all the states in West Africa that are involved in
the waste trade has maintain the most equivocal attitude
towards this trade in hazardous and toxic wastes. This
attitude of Benin was encouraged and abetted by its
President, Mathieu Kerekou. Interviewed during a meeting of
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) leaders,
President Mathieu Kerekou openly explained his country’s
plan to import toxic waste, denying rumors that it was
nuclear residues.
7Africa ReDort, September 1988, 47.
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Analysis
This Benin case study is another good example that
supports the hypothesis that toxic and hazardous waste trade
follow the path of the poor, the corrupt or uninformed and
it is exploitative. There is no doubt that Benin is a very
poor country even on a comparative basis with the rest of
the West African countries and as such depends largely on
handouts from the rich countries. It is important to note
too that the French government still maintains a neo
colonial and exploitative relationship with their former
colonies in West Africa. Benin happens to be one of such
countries in West Africa that still serves very much the
French interest. The French exploited such relationship
with Benin as a means of transferring their unwanted wastes
to this poor country for token economic assistance.8 On the
other hand, the Benin government leaders particularly under
President Mathieu Kerekou, were very much tempted by foreign
cash considering the country’s poor condition. The
dismissal of a former Head of Benin’s Air Force, Christophe
Fandohn, for trying to stop the Soviets from dumping under
the tarmac of the military airfield at Canna, illustrates
how costly and humiliating it can be to oppose foreign
collaborated interests in West Africa, even when these
interests are at the expense of the common people. If an
8lbid., 48, and Dowden, 1988.
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air force officer was treated this way for opposing a waste
deal, you can imagine how a common civilian would be
treated. Benin has a high illiteracy rate (77%)9, which
makes it more difficult to have grassroot environmental
awareness movement in this country. Also, it appears that
in spite of the pressures several African leaders have
brought upon Benin to stop importing wastes, this country’s
attitude remains defiantly equivocal.
Was the durnoin~ trade based on informed decisions?
In all the cases of dumping or importation, there are
no evidence to show that the Benin government was properly
informed or briefed about the type of waste that was
exported into the country either by the Soviets or the
French. The fact that the then President Mathieu Kerekou
had denied that the wastes dumped in his country were not
nuclear wastes proves the point that either the President
was refusing to accept the fact or could not distinguish
between nuclear or radioactive waste and other types of
waste. More often as it has been pointed out in previous
case studies, the exporters of wastes have the tendency of
misleading the importers or recipient countries by
mislabeling. For recipient countries to make well informed
decisions, their assessment of the wastes must be based on
~l994 World Bank Social Indicators of Development.
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official communicated knowledge from the exporting countries
which also requires verification from other sources. The
case of Benin, like most of the cases in West Africa, was a
trade based largely on uninformed decisions.
Was payment for the dumping fair?
The French nuclear waste dumping was in exchange for
some French financial assistance, and the specific amount
was not given. The Soviet dumping too did not give the
specific payments made to the Benin government. But the
later rejected the deal, the contract with the Gibraltar-
registered British company Sesco Ltd. to dump up to 5
million tons of wastes was a raw deal for Benin. Benin was
offered $2.50 a ton compared to $40 a ton offered by other
companies to Guinea-Bissau and the normal cost of disposing
waste in Europe at $l40-160 per ton. To poor Benin these
token offers might have been quite a deal, given the
country’s poor condition. But, comparing these offers to
what could have been paid in the exporters’ countries, and
considering that the dumping schemes in Canna for example,
claimed two Benin workers’ lives, the payments were token
and exploitative.
Conclusion
Some deductions can be made from this case of waste
dumping in Benin, which in some way supports the stated
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hypothesis in chapter one: that hazardous and toxic wastes
dumping trade follow the path of the poor, the corrupt or
the uninformed and it is exploitative. The Benin trade of
importing nuclear wastes was an official government business
based on uninformed decisions. Uninformed because from all
indications, the government of Benin like most West African
countries, does not have the technical expertise of managing
hazardous and toxic wastes. Benin with illiteracy rate of
about 77% clearly explains why there is a total absence of
environmental awareness and grassroot environmental
movements that should have helped enlightened the people
about environmental issues. In the absence of environmental
awareness and education, the people of Benin like what
obtains in most West African countries rely wholly on their
government to protect the environment. Also, as a poor
country given Benin’s social indicators of development, the
government under President Kerekou was tempted very much by
foreign exchange payment for waste maybe to settle its huge
foreign debt and not minding the risks to lives and the
environment. The case of Benin also portrays the
exploitative relationship that still exists between West
African countries and their colonial masters. Benin for
example, is still very much dependent on France for its
economic survival, France being its main creditor. Benin
dependence on France has been very much a collaboration
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strongly supported by some government officials like the
then President Mathieu Kerekou. Benin possibly enjoyed the
same economic relationship with the former Soviet Union.
For President Mathieu Kerekou to embrace a local form of
socialism based on marxism—leninism philosophy suggests he
had deep interest in the socialist ideology and likely
maintained good relationship with the socialist countries.
President Kerekou’s outspoken stand to continue the
importation of hazardous and toxic wastes despite pressure
from his neighboring African states explains how desperate
Benin was to make money from the waste trade. President
Kerekou and his loyal government officials involvement in
hazardous and toxic wastes trade very much highlights the
problems of the African national bourgeoisie. Writing on
the problems of the national bourgeoisie, Fantz Fanon
contends that:
The national bourgeoisie turns its back more and
more on the interior and on the real facts of its
undeveloped country, and tends to look toward the
former mother country and the foreign capitalists
who count on its obliging compliance.’0
Benin Government’s waste trade relation with France and the
former Soviet Union was based on a dependent or exploitative
basis that made Benin to settle for any token gesture. The
consequences for Benin in this trade in hazardous and toxic
10Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of The Earth (New York:
Grove Press, Inc., 1963), 165.
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wastes are many. Benin officials may not be aware that
without the scientific knowledge of safe disposal and
management of the hazardous and toxic wastes, it could be a
costly adventure that could end up destroying the entire
population and the environment with time. Like a timed
bomb, these toxic and hazardous wastes disposed anyhow would
surely surface someday and the population will stand to
loose. The threat to human lives, the damage to the soil
and drinking water can only be imagined.
CHAPTER VIII
SUNMARY AND CONCLUSION
This study has fairly examined the impact of the
international trade in hazardous and toxic wastes in West
Africa. This chapter begins with a brief summary of the
international response to the waste trade to shed more light
on the international perception of this trade.
Since the 1980s, international trade in hazardous
wastes trade has drummed up a lot of world attention and
concerns. As a result, an evolution of continental and
global concerns and decisions has emerged which is shaping
the general perception about this trade in toxic and
hazardous wastes towards a total ban. There is a growing
global awareness to ban international trade in hazardous
wastes. One reason is the United Nations Environmental
Program working group models its efforts after the
regulatory systems created in North America and Europe. As
a result, these systems, which are based on the principle of
“prior informed consent,” have done nothing to stem the flow
of wastes, often illegal, from North America and Europe to
developing countries. Also, bureaucratic systems designed
to monitor the flow of wastes from industrialized nations
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appear to be incapable of stopping the proliferation of
“sham recycling” and overtly illegal waste export schemes.
The international trade in hazardous wastes has been
widely condemned by Africans, other Third World countries,
some developed countries, and many international
organizations. The incidence of trans-national dumping of
hazardous and toxic wastes was a major issue in Lome during
the June 1988 conference of the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS). It was realized from the
conference that at least 10 African states had signed or
were negotiating waste disposal contracts. This revelation
emerged with shocking brutality and raised serious concerns
about the North-South relations. The meeting of ECOWAS
leaders though in principle agreed to make it a criminal
offense, for trading in dangerous waste. Leaders like
President Mathieu Kerekou of Benin, openly explained his
country’s plan to import toxic waste, denying rumor that it
was nuclear residues.’ The position of President Kerekou,
for example, illustrates the different positions of some
African leaders on this international trade based on their
interest and perception of environmental issues.
However, in June 1988, the 16 heads of state of
Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) followed
with a declaration that it was a criminal offense to aid
‘Africa Rewort, August 1988, 47
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dumpers in the region. Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Gabon, Senegal, Togo, and Ivory Coast have
all at the country level officially prohibited the use of
their territories for dumping hazardous and toxic wastes.
For example, in the Ivory Coast, there is legislation that
permits imprisonment of up to 20 years and fine of up to
$l.6m for a toxic trade deal. Nigerian military government
has threatened to execute guilty importers.2
On a wider international level, concerns over the
international trade in hazardous waste have brought about
resolutions to ban hazardous wastes trade. In 1972, a
United Nations Conference on Human Environment, in a
declaration called “principle 21” adopted at Stockholm,
states that each state is responsible for ensuring that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond
the limits of their national jurisdiction.
In June 1987, a resolution called the Cairo Guidelines
and Principles for the Environmentally Sound Management of
Hazardous Wastes adopted by the Governing Council of the
United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) by decision
14/30 was adopted. The Cairo Guidelines state in part that
states should take such steps as are necessary to promote
the development and employment of low-waste technologies
2Kenya, Daily Nation, June 1988.
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applicable to activities generating hazardous wastes and the
recycling and reuse of hazardous wastes unavoidably produced
by such activities.
The Lome’ convention of 1989 banned waste exports from
the European Community to any of the former European
Community (EC) colonies, 69 in Africa, Caribbean and
Pacific.
In the late 1980s, against the backdrop of several
highly publicized transboundary toxic shipments and dumping
of hazardous wastes illegally in developing countries, the
Basel Convention was negotiated. The Basel Convention was
adopted in March 1989. Ninety-one countries plus the EC
ratified the international treaty to control the trade in
hazardous wastes in Switzerland and came into force in May
1992. The United States did not ratify this treaty. At
this meeting, a decision was taken asking all developing
countries to ban all hazardous waste imports. It was agreed
that industrialized countries should ban all hazardous
waste exports, pending the review of a paper on the issue of
recycling to be submitted to the second Conference of
Parties. Two important recognition of this treaty as
contained in articles 6 and 9 were the need for notification
between parties and the handling of illegal trafficking.
The Basel Convention in summary has four fundamental
principles: 1. Parties must ensure that the transboundary
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movement of hazardous wastes be reduced to a minimum. 2.
Parties must ensure that the generation of hazardous wastes
be reduced to a minimum. 3. Parties must have the obligation
“to the extent possible” to locate hazardous waste
management facilities on their own territories. 4. Parties
must take “all practicable steps” to ensure that hazardous
wastes are managed in an environmentally sound manner.
The Basel Convention to some expert is a product of the
Cold War era that has been drawn on lines between the North
and the South. For example, Cusack wrote that the Basel
Convention
reflects most industrialized nations’ strategy to
checkmate developing nations into accepting waste
exports... [Thus] Basel Convention has legitimized
the international toxic waste game and proclaimed
industrial nations the winners.3
However, many waste trade critics still maintain that
wastes are not appropriate commodities for trade in the
global market place. The export of wastes they contend
serve as safety valve for waste generators in the
industrialized countries, where both popular and official
recognition of the need for better protection of public
health and the environment is escalating the cost of waste
disposal.
3Marguerite M. Cusack, “International Law and the
Transboundary Shipment of Hazardous Waste to the Third
World: Will the Basel Convention Make a Difference?”
American University Journal of International Law and Policy
5 (1990) : 393—423.
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The prevailing trend shows that many countries and
regions of the world are responding in support of a call for
a ban on international trade in hazardous wastes trade.
According to Greenpeace account, as of September 1993, 95
countries and two regions of the World (Africa and Central
America) have prohibited all imports of hazardous wastes
into their territories. The Pacific and the Mediterranean
regions are in the process of drafting their regional
instruments to ban waste trade. The list continues with 16
of the 24 countries of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), including Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the G-77 (Group of 77, a
coalition of less industrialized and newly industrialized
countries), and China.4
Finally on March 25, 1994, in Geneva, Switzerland, 65
parties to the Basel Convention unanimously banned all
transboundary movements of hazardous wastes from the 25
rich, industrialized countries of the OECD including Mexico
to other non-OECD states. This bold decision to ban waste
trade is both historic and unprecedented and shall take
4Greenpeace, Toxic Trade UIDdate, Third Quarter, 1993,
p. 4.
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effect in 1998 as it includes all hazardous wastes even
those destined for recycling or recovery.5
Summary of Analyses
Preceding chapters on literature review and
theoretical analysis have reviewed the contributions and
limitations of the adopted approaches on international
political economy for the study of international trade in
toxic and hazardous wastes. The different analyses of the
international trade in wastes dumping is rooted in the
different perceptions of toxic and hazardous wastes as a
trading commodity. The liberal perspective sees the poor
countries with low wage as the proper place to dump, or
dispose of globally produced hazardous and toxic wastes in
order to maximize worldwide economic value of human life.
And too, that in moving polluting industries from industrial
to poor countries, worldwide cost of production will fall.
It emphasizes the philosophy of laissez-faire where the
“invisible hand” determines the supply and demand mechanisms
of the market. The liberals’ solutions to the problems of
wastes trade include proposals for correcting the market
failures; like harmonization of definitions and standards,
prior informed notification and consent, and rules and
international liability, the creation of an international
5lbid , 2
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emergency fund, waste reduction and minimization at its
source, and redefinitions of state sovereignty.
The realists would prefer to adopt protectionists trade
policies to safeguard the interest of the states whenever
necessary, but will not support a ban on the international
trade in wastes. The realists’ state—centric and power
assumptions seem to ignore the role of international
organizations in global environmental protection.
Realists’ assumptions do not all apply to the West African
countries given the disparaging conditions of most of these
countries. Therefore, these assumptions do not fully inform
on the waste trade.
The radical/marxist perspective to international trade
in wastes contends that the present structure of the
political economy favors the interest of the rich countries
over the interest of the poor countries. The radicals/
marxists favor protectionism and postulate that the poor are
poor because of inequality in the world economic structure
governing trade, aid and monetary relation. Developing
countries are held captives by the supranational forces of
the world’s capitalist system. The radicals/marxists
therefore advocate that the solution to the problem with
waste trade is outright ban.
The dependency perspective stresses the exploitative
relations between the developed countries and the poor
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developing countries--a historical pattern that can be
traced back to slave trade days in West Africa. The
resultant effect of dependency is underdevelopment and
poverty. For example, the dependency school stresses that
the debt condition of the West African countries tends to
create permanent dependent local structures that are
gullible and vulnerable.
The various approaches to the same issue can be
summarized around two opposing paradigms. The first
paradigm, which could substitute for protectionism, is a
common denominator for the radical/marxist and the
dependency approaches that defines the trade in wastes as
exploitative dumping on the poor and the uninformed and such
trade as promoting distortions in development strategy.
This paradigm fairly supports the adopted case study
hypothesis--that hazardous and toxic wastes trade follow the
path of the poor, the corrupt or the uninformed and it is
exploitative. The solution, according to this paradigm, is
an outright ban of this trade. The realists’ reasoning fall
under this categorization where states always emerge the
winners of the zero-sum game. The realists, however, differ
in their solution to the waste problem.
The second paradigm, which underlies the liberal
perspective sees wastes trade as a natural element of growth
that can spread development from the developing countries to
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the poor developing countries. The solution, according to
this paradigm, is not in outright banning but in form of
international control by international regulations that
ensures that recipient or importing states are always
properly informed before agreeing on any trade transactions.
But, the problem here lies in the guarantee that
international regulations will be enforced. And one might
add by who and how?
The case studies of Guinea, Nigeria, Sierra Leone,
Guinea-Bissau and Benin fairly confirm the hypothesis that
toxic and hazardous wastes trade follow the path of the
poor, the corrupt or uninformed and is exploitative. These
countries are by their GNP poor countries that have been
made to depend wholly on the industrialized countries for
their survival. Environmental awareness in these West
African countries is lacking as this type of awareness is
hardly encouraged by authoritarian rule that abounds in this
region. Government regulations and laws are non-existent.
As a result, it has been easy for these West African
countries to become victims of nefarious Western waste trade
brokers and waste importers.
This study notes the enlightened and political roles
played by organizations like OAU and Greenpeace and other
environmental organizations that have helped in alarming the
world of the dangers of this deadly trade. The OAU member
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countries have particularly been influential politically in
helping to discourage poor African countries from being
tempted by monetary attractions to become dumping grounds
for toxic and hazardous wastes (see Appendix E)
The cases of waste trade in Nigeria, Guinea and Sierra
Leone were cases of corrupt trading schemes between West
African based foreign companies and/or individuals in the
West African countries and nefarious Western waste trade
brokers or companies. Indeed, the three cases may not be
unrelated with organized crimes by companies. These were at
large cases of exploitation by foreign waste companies and
abetted by middlemen in the West African countries. All
these cases were very much successful schemes of dumping of
toxic and hazardous wastes which were in all cases done
without the proper information exchange with the governments
of the recipient countries.
The cases of waste trade in Guinea-Bissau and Benin
illustrate cases of poor and desperate West African
governments maneuvering or trying to import toxic and
hazardous waste for money. Again, these two countries
driven by poverty were saved the potential of becoming major
West African toxic and hazardous waste dumping grounds by
the strong political will of the OAU member countries and
international environmental organizations who helped expose
the waste schemes. These countries considered economic
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benefit over potential health, environmental, and
socioeconomic effects. Benin particularly, has been very
reluctant to stop the importation of wastes in spite of
strong protest by other OAU member countries.
Benin and Guinea-Bissau examples have also demonstrated
that even in cases of official importation of wastes, the
West African countries are always on the disadvantage as
they are usually uninformed on environmental issues and on
the basis that trade exchange and relations are always
uneven. The point must also be made that in all the cases
examined, it was always the exporting countries or their
agents, the waste brokers, who approached the poor West
African countries to accept hazardous and toxic wastes for
cash. The Benin and Guinea-Bissau examples illustrate the
continuation and perpetuation of dependent relations between
France and Portugal respectively with their former colonial
territories. For example, Benin is still very much
dependent on France for its economic survival, France being
its main creditor. Benin dependence on France has been
supported by some government officials like the then
President Mathieu Kerekou. Benin possibly enjoyed the same
economic relationship with the former Soviet Union. For
President Mathieu Kerekou to promote a local form of
socialism based on marxism-leninism philosophy suggests he
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had deep interest in the socialist ideology and likely
maintained good relationship with the socialist countries.
President Kerekou’s outspoken stand to continue the
importation of hazardous and toxic wastes despite pressure
from neighboring African states explains not only how
desperate Benin was to make money from the waste trade, but
also explains the problem of the African national
bourgeoisie. The same deduction can be made of the Guinea
Bissaus case. The reluctant manner with which the waste
deal was called off demonstrates Guinea-Bissau officials
interest in making easy money. The whole episode calls to
question the intentions of Filinto Earros, President Vieire
and his brother, Carlos Beinada Vieira. As typical African
bourgeoisie, this waste trade was an opportunity for them to
swell their pockets even at the expense of the masses.
Frantz Fanon supports this tendency by African bourgeoisie
to capitalize on money deals with foreign counterparts to
enrich themselves as he writes:
Since the bourgeoisie has not the economic means
to ensure its domination and to throw a few cr~imbs
to the rest of the country; since, moreover, it is
preoccupied with filling its pockets as rapidly as
possible,.. the country sinks all the more deeply
into stagnation.6
On the relationship between the foreign waste brokers
and local bourgeoisie elite, foreign waste brokers have been
6Frantz Fanon, The Wretched Of The Earth (New York:
Grove Press, 1963), 165.
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known to encourage and perpetuate corruption in poor
countries in their desperate attempts to dispose wastes for
cash. The cases of Nigeria, Guinea and Sierra Leone are
glaring examples of corrupt collaborative relations between
foreign waste brokers and local bourgeoisie elites. Agents
of the industrialized countries have the tendency of often
mislabeling their waste shipments to evade arrest by local
custom officials. Imagine the role of the waste brokers and
regulatory agencies of the exporting countries who always
tend to give assurances to recipient countries of the
harmlessness of wastes from which no safe means of disposal
exist.
This study posits that the political economy of
international trade in hazardous and toxic wastes in West
Africa is better explained by the radical/marxist and
dependency approaches as these perspectives seek to address
the implications and dangers in the waste trade than the
liberal’s approach that appears to show utter contempt for
the world’s poor and the world environment. The radical/
marxist and dependency approaches argue that the potential
health risks, environmental effects, and other long-term
effects arising from the toxic and hazardous wastes trade
schemes are likely to exceed the short term economic
benefits and possibly with more tragic consequences than
slave trade. The dependency approach contentions also
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fairly support the hypothesis--that hazardous and toxic
wastes trade is exploitative.
Conclusion
It is clear that toxic and hazardous wastes dumping
trade will likely continue to follow the path of the poor,
the corrupt or the uninformed and remain exploitative except
the global ban on this trade is enforced. This
international trade in hazardous and toxic wastes does not
properly serve development in the West African countries.
As defended strongly by the dependency and the
radical/marxist theories, this type of waste trade relations
between the industrialized countries and the developing
countries cannot lead to true development. It is inhumane
to deliberately dump life and environmentally threatening
hazards on others especially the uninformed. It is morally
repugnant. The international trade in hazardous and toxic
wastes does not only divert attention from proper
development, it posses a serious threat to the lives of the
West African people and the environment.
Many in Africa for example, have equated the
international trade in hazardous and toxic wastes in Africa
as another form of slave trade. And they contend, as a
modern form of slave trade, the version is just as nasty
but, the cargo is hazardous wastes, not human beings and
although the traffic is still one-way, the direction has
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changed. Other Africans see this trade as TTtoxic
terrorism. IT African consumer organizations from 18
countries at a meeting in Nairobi in 1988 deplored the
dumping of industrial waste on the continent and demanded
“an immediate stop to such shameful acts and call on all
African governments and international agencies to act
decisively on these acts of toxic terrorism.”7
Organization of African Unity (OAU) Foreign Ministers
Summit in Addis Ababa condemned this trade and demanded an
outright ban. On May 25, 1988, African foreign ministers
pledged in a resolution to stop the dumping of foreign
(toxic) wastes in Africa. In a declaration drafted to mark
the 25th anniversary of the founding of the Organization of
African Unity, African states pledged
to refrain from entering into agreements with any
industrialized countries, transnational
corporations, privates companies or interest
groups on the dumping of nuclear and hazardous
industrial wastes on African territories.8
In 1991 the Bamako Convention was enacted, banning all
waste imports into Africa, but permitting movements between
African countries pursuant to the prior notification and
informed consent requirement, and a version of proximity and
7Kenya, Daily Nation, June 1988, p. 17.
8Greenpeace International, “International Trade in
Toxic Wastes: Policy and Data Analysis,” Third World
Network, 1988.
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self-sufficiency principles parallel to the one contained in
the Basel Convention. Critics, however, see the Bamako
Convention as an idealistic legislation establishing
ambitious goals but without means (financial resources) to
enforce and support the ban. (Appendix E gives the full
text of the Bamako Convention.) In spite of criticism, the
Bamako Convention has been reported as curbing the waste
trade with African countries and contributing to the
increase of waste trade with other less developed
countries.9 The Bamako waste ban legislation, its
shortcomings not withstanding, supports very much the
conclusion of this study. Indeed, this study contends that
the shortcomings, like lack of enforcement and financial
resource, can be addressed by adopting the Nigerian
initiative of organizing a regional “Dumpwatch” which is
more financially feasible than a state-organized
“Dumpwatch, as an enforcement mechanism.
It must be noted that other international instruments
like the Basel Convention have played important roles in
generating and focusing debates on the international trade
in toxic and hazardous wastes. For example, both the Basel
and Bamako Conventions have tended to restrict or ban waste
movements. The Basel Convention, adopted in 1989 and
ratified in 1991, stresses prior notification and informed
9’U.S. Waste Scheme Angers Argentina, Chicacro Tribune,
Nov. 24, 1991, 24.
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consent of the importing country before any waste transfer.
It favors recycling, disposal close to the place of waste
generation and emphasizes self-sufficiency in the waste
management. However, the Basel Convention fails to identify
“sound waste management” which opens it to divergent
interpretations. For example, critics contend that the
Basel Convention uses politically popular vocabulary to
cloak realistic but unpopular goals in order to make them
acceptable to certain constituencies. However, on March
1994, the Basel Convention, in a bold and historic decision
that will take effect in 1998, banned all transboundary
movements of hazardous wastes from the 25 rich
industrialized countries of the QECD, including Mexico, to
other non-OECD countries. As this study finds, the ban on
waste trade is not only gaining African consent but also
global support.
In addition to the ban on waste trade, West African
countries must see democratization as a priority to salvage
the disparaging state of development in the region.
Democratization should be encouraged to replace
authoritarian rule that abounds in the region. There is
also the strong need for the West African countries to
embrace environmental education and become more politically
aware and address corruption especially at the national
bourgeoisie level. West African countries must learn fast
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to encourage democratic rule that allows for more political
enlightenment, awareness and freedom of expression and at
the same time encourages environmental education and
awareness. In doing this, the masses will become
environmentally aware and be able to form grassroots
environmental movements that will help lobby the government
to promulgate environmental regulations to address issues of
waste trade and the environment. Democratically elected
government that permits the rule of law, political awareness
and freedom of expression is the only possible check to the
corrupt indulgence of the bourgeois elites. There is an
essential need for African countries, particularly West
Africa, to encourage environmental studies and education to
narrow down the widening gap in environmental awareness and
technology between them and the industrialized countries.
The industrialized nations must realize that the
threat to innocent lives and the environment is real in
promoting this type of waste trade. The industrialized
countries must face up to the responsibility of properly
managing their ‘unwanted wastesT’ rather than shifting the
burden and responsibility to poor and uninformed countries
or relying on the presumptuous liberal philosophy of
laissez-faire. Many critics of the international trade in
hazardous wastes, particularly from the rich to poorer
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countries, admit that this trade is a global obstacle to
overcoming the hazardous waste crisis.
A lasting solution to the toxic and hazardous wastes
dumping trade lies in an enforced worldwide ban. A ban
hopefully will provide the incentive to come up with
environmentally safe technology at the production end that
will minimize or totally eliminate excessive production of
toxic and hazardous wastes. For as long as rich countries
can cheaply export their hazardous wastes to their poorer
neighbors, or poor West African countries, significant steps
to eliminate hazardous waste at their source will hardly
take place. Action must be taken to eliminate most of the
toxic and hazardous wastes problems through prevention.
Recommendations
The following recommendations are therefore advanced in
this study:
1. (a) A ban of the toxic and hazardous wastes trade
between the developed industrialized nations and the poor,
uninformed and unstable countries of West Africa as this
region’s economic development is not served by becoming a
dumping ground for hazards that ruin the environment, but,
in a prior agricultural revolution as experienced in the
West and Japan. Also, for the ban to be effective, this
study highly recommends the continuation of the regional
“Dumpwatch” concept initiated by the Nigerian government as
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monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. Waste dumping
(including sea) and/or waste imports should be treated as
illegal and criminal act. (Also see Appendix E, Article 4.)
(b) Coupled with the waste ban enforcement, West
African countries should embrace democratization.
2. A radical rethinking in the rich developed countries
about the continued production of hazardous wastes and
arsenal military weapons like nuclear bombs that produce
nuclear wastes, over-hauling of outdated production
technology and the encouragement of new incentives and
technology that encourage prevention which promote less
toxic and hazardous wastes generation. The Vice President,
Al Gore, in his book, Earth in the Balance, has, in a global
Marshall Plan, proposed a worldwide development of a
Strategic Environment Initiative (SEI) ,‘~ a program that
hopefully would discourage and phase out older inappropriate
production technologies and replace them with new and
sophisticated and environmentally safe and adaptable
technology. This initiative by the Vice President is highly
recommended.
‘°Al Gore, Earth in the Balance (New York: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1992), 317—320.
PROFILE OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT SUB SAHARA AFRICA
Real GDP GNP Mean Years of Population per Fertility
Per Capital Per Capital Schooling Nurse
1960 1989 1963 1989 1980 1990 1965 1984 1965 1990
Mauritius 69.9 72 2 118 1990 5375
South Africa 61 7 64 7 125 2470 4958
Gabon 52 5 54.2 90 68 102 61 2960 4735
Botswana 59.8 62 8 89 53 41 99 74 86 1600 3180
Cape Verde 67.0 67.9 71 16 125 77 780 1717
Lesotho 57.3 61.8 80 48 21 101 78 470 646
Zimbabwe 59 6 61 4 72 93 94 650 1469
Sao Tome & Principe65 5 79 103 340 -
Congo 53.7 56 3 81 38 112 57 940 2382
Kenya 59.7 61.7 30 88 69 72 360 1023
Madagascar 54.5 56.0 56 22 91 80 53 230 690
Zambia 54.4 55.5 75 59 92 73 67 390 767
Cameroon 53.7 55.3 41 32 94 54 65 1000 1699
Ghana 55.0 56.8 95 60 57 390 1005
Namibia 57.5 58.8 1030
Cote dIvoire 53.4 55 2 31 102 50 790 1381
Comoros 55.0 55.5 82 90 52 460 732
Tanzania 54.0 55.7 81 94 40 130 557
H
PROFILE OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT SUB SAHARA AFRICA (con
COUNTRY Life expectancy at Popul W/ Popul w/ Popul W/ Daily cal. Adult Liter. Combined GNP Per Real GDP
Birth Years access to access to access to supply as rate % Pri Sec Capita Per Capita
health svc safe water sanitation % of req. enrol ratio (US $) (PPP $)
Totall99O Femalel99O 1987—89 1989—90 1988—90 1988 1990 1988—89 1989 1989
Zaire 53 0 54.7 26 34 92 72 54 260 380
Nigeria 51 5 53.3 46 48 85 51 48 250 1160
Liberia 54.2 55.5 39 55 97 40 937
Togo 54.0 55.8 61 71 23 94 43 64 390 752
Uganda 52.0 53.7 60 20 30 82 48 51 250 499
Rwanda 49.5 51.2 28 64 57 79 50 47 320 680
Senegal 48 3 49.3 40 54 84 38 38 650 1208
Ethiopia 45.5 47.1 46 19 19 67 28 120 392
Angola 45.5 47.1 30 35 21 75 45 610 1225
Malawi 48.1 48.7 80 56 89 49 180 620
Burundi 48.5 50.2 61 38 93 50 37 220 611
Equat Guinea 47.0 48.6 50 330
C African Rep 49.5 52.0 51 21 87 38 39 390 770
Sudan 50.8 52.0 51 21 79 27 36 1042
Mozambique 47.5 49.2 49 24 70 33 34 80 1060
Mauritania 47.0 48.7 30 66 100 34 35 500 1092
Benin 47.0 48.7 18 54 93 23 43 380 1030
Chad 46.5 18.1 30 74 3— 33 190 582
Somalia 46.1 47.6 28 73 24 14 170 861
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PROFILE OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT SUB SAHARA AFRICA (cont)
COUNTRY Life expectancy at Popul WI Popul WI Popul WI Daily Cal. Adult Liter. Combined GNP Per Real GDP
Birth Years access to access to access to supply as rate % Pri Sec Capita Per Capita
_________________ health svc safe water sanitation % of req. enrol ratio (US $) (PPP $)
Totall99O Femalel99O 1987—89 1989—90 1988—90 1988 1990 1988—89 1989 1989
Guinea Bissau 42.5 44.1 - 25 20 92 37 38 180 820
Djibouti 48.0 49.7 80 47 66 32
Gambia 44.0 45.6 77 103 27 42 240 886
Mali 45.0 46.6 15 38 22 91 32 16 270 576
Niger 45.5 47.1 43 10 96 28 17 290 634
Burkina Faso 48.2 49.9 49 69 8 83 18 21 320 617
Sierra—Leone 42.0 43.6 - 42 43 79 21 37 220 1061
Guinea 43.5 44.0 32 32 88 24 22 430 602
Source: Human Development Report, 1992.
PROFILE OF HUMAN DEPRIVATION SUB SAHARA
AFRICA MILLIONS
PROFILE OF HUMAN DEPRIVATION SUB SAHARA
AFRICA MILLIONS
Without Without Without Children Malnourished Children not Illiterate Illiterate People beloe
access to access to access to Dying Children Under in Primary or Adults Females poverty line





Mauritius 00 01 01 (.) () 01 — — 01 01
Seychelles 0 0 0 0 - (.) ( ) - - - - -
South Africa - - 0.10 - - -
Gabon 0 1 0 4 0.01
Botswana 0.1 0 6 0 8 0.01 (.) 0.1 0 7 0.5
Cape Verde - 01 0.3 (.) (.) (.) - - -
~
Lesotho 0.4 0.9 1.4 0.01 (.) 0 1 — 1.0 0.8
d
Zimbabwe 2.7 - 0.04 0.2 0.2 -
Sao Tomer & Principe (.) - - (.) (.) - W
Congo 0.4 1.4 0.01 0.1 —
Kenya - 16.7 0.12 2.2 10.7
Madagascar 5.3 9.3 0.10 0.7 1.7 6.0
Zambia 2.1 3. . 0.05 0.4 0.9
Cameroon 7.0 8. 0.08 0.4 1.2
Ghana 5.9 6. . 0.09 0.7 1.9






2.9 1.8 3.5 2.8
3.3 2.0 6.7 3.7
Cote dIvoire 0 08 0 3 H
PROFILE OF HUMAN DEPRIVATION SUB SAHARA
AFRICA MILLIONS (cont)
Without Without Without Children Malnourished Children not Illiterate Illiterate People beloe
access to access to access to Dying Children Under in Primary or Adults Females poverty line
Health Svcs Sate Water Sanitation Before Five 1990 Secsch 1990 1990 Total 1990 Rural 1990
Comoros 0 1 (.) ( ) 0.1
Tanzania 5 2 12 2 6 3 0.24 2 7 5.2 - -
Zaire 26 3 23.6 30 6 0.21 7 6 17 4 28 2 17 3
Nigeria 58 6 56.3 0 87 0.1 — 0.9 0 5 0.3
Togo 1.4 1.0 2.7 0.02 0.9 2.9 4.9 3.1 —
Uganda 7.5 15.0 13.1 0.16 0.5 1.2 1.8 1.2 6.2 6.0
Rwanda 5.2 2.6 3.1 0.07 0.3 1.4 2.5 1.5
Senegal 4.4 3.4 0 0.06 3.5 10.6
Ethiopia 26.6 40.1 40.1 0.53 1.6
Angola 7.0 6.5 . 0.14 0.4 1.4 6.8
Malawi 1.8 3.9 0.13 0.4 1.0 1.5 0.9 4.6 4.4
Burundi 2 1 3 4 0 05 0 1 0 1
Equatorial Guinea ( ) 0.5 1 0 0 6 1 5
C African Rep 1 7 2 7 0 02 1 9 4.9 10 1 6 1 16 7
Sudan 123 199 019 16 3.0 59 34
Mozambique 8 0 0.7 0 02 0 1 0.4 0 7 0.4
Mauritania 1 4 0 7 0 02 0 8 1 9 1.0
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PROFILE OF HUMAN DEPRIVATION SUB SAHARA
AFRICA MILLIONS (cont)
Without Without Without Children Malnourished Children not Illiterate Illiterate People beloe
access to access to access to lYying Children Under in Primary or Adults Females poverty line
Health Svcs Sate Water Sanitati n Before Five 1990 Secsch 1990 1990 Total 1990 Rural
Benin 3.8 2.2 3.0 0.03 1.1 2.3 1.3 2.7 2.2
Chad 4.0 2.2 3.0 0.03 — 1.9 3.0 1.7 4.4 3.3
Somalia 5.4 4.8 6.1 0.08 (.) 0.2 0.4 0.2
Guinea Bissau - 0.7 0.8 0.01 0.1 0.1 (.)
Djibouti 0.1 0.2 0.1 (.) 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.3
Gambia — 0.2 0.01 0.6 2.4 3.3 1.9 4.1 3.6
Mali 7.8 5. 7.3 0.13 0.8 2.0 2.9 1.7 2.2
Niger 4.4 7.0 0.09 2.1 4.1 2.3
Burkina Faso 4.6 2.7 8.3 0.10 . 0.8 1.8 1.0
Sierra-Leone - 2.4 2.4 0.05 1.4 2.3
Guinea 3.9 3.9 0.07 . 0.1
Source: Human Development Report, 1992.






















































— 61 78 250





















Life expectancy Under five Population Daily Calorie Adult literacy Combined Primary Real GDP Per
at Birth Years Mortality access to Supply (% of rate and Secondary Capita (PDPS)
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TRENDS IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (cont
Life expectancy Under five Population Daily Calorie Adult literacy Combined Primary Real GOP Pei
at Birth Years Mortality access to Supply (% of rate and Secondary Capita (POPS)
rate (1000) water (%) Requirement) envolement ration
1960 1990 1960 1990 1975—80 1988—90 1965 1988 1970 1990 1970 1988—89 1960 1989
Tanzania 40 5 54 0 249 170 39 56 98 92 42 72 — 310 380
Nigeria 39.5 51.5 316 167 — — 95 85 25 51 21 48 550 1160
Liberia 41.2 54.2 310 205 94 97 18 40 450 937
Togo 39.3 54.0 305 147 16 71 101 94 97 43 39 64 420 752
Uganda 43.0 52.0 223 164 35 20 96 82 41 48 25 51 320 499
Rwanda 42.3 49.5 248 198 68 64 73 79 32 50 42 47 240 680
Senegal 37.2 48.3 299 185 36 54 104 84 12 38 24 38 760 1208
Ethiopia 36.0 45.5 294 220 8 19 77 67 11 28 290 392
Angola 33.0 45.5 345 292 17 35 81 75 12 42 880 1225
Malawi 37.8 48.1 366 253 51 56 91 89 23 49 240 620
Burundi 41.3 48.5 260 192 29 38 103 93 20 50 18 37 410 611
Equatorial Guinea 36.8 47.0 316 206
C.African Rep 38.5 49.5 308 169 91 87 16 38 36 39 590 70
Sudan 38.7 50.8 292 172 79 79 17 27 24 36 670 1042
Mozambique 37.3 47.5 331 297 86 7— 22 33 28 34 790 1060
Mauritania 35.3 47.0 321 214 88 100
Benin 35.0 47.0 310 147 34 4 88 93
410 1092
600 1030 ~
TRENDS IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (con
Life expectancy Under five Population Daily Calorie Adult literacy Combined Primary Real GDP Per
at Birth Years Mortality access to Supply (% of rate and Secondary Capita (PDPS)
rate (1000) water (%) Requirement) envolement ration
1960 1990 1960 1990 1975—80 1988—90 1965 1988 1970 1990 1970 1988—89 1960 1989
Chad 34.8 46.5 325 216 — — 99 74 11 30 19 33 520 582
Somalia 36.0 46.1 294 215 38 37 92 73 3 24 7 14 480 861
Guinea Bissau 34.0 42.5 336 246 10 25 29 38 — —
Djibouti 36.0 48.0 — 42 47 — — — — — -
Gambia 32.3 44.0 375 238 — — — — — 16 42 430 886
Mali 34.8 45.0 369 284 — 83 91 8 32 15 16 400 576
Niger 35.3 45.5 321 221 85 96 4 28 8 17 280 634
Burkina Faso 36.2 48.2 363 228 25 69 91 83 8 18 18 21 290 617
Sierra—Leone 31.5 42.0 385 257 14 42 79 79 13 21 22 37 280 1061
Guinea 33.6 43.5 336 237 14 32 81 88 14 24 24 22 410 602
Source: Human Development Report, 1992.
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WIDENING GLOBAL SOUTH - NORTH HUMAN GAPS: WIDENING GLOBAL SOUTH - NORTH HUMAN GAPS:
NORTH = 100 (SEE NOTE) NORTH = 100 (SEE NOTE)
Real GOP GNP Mean Years of Population per Fertility
COUNTRY Per Capital Per Capital Schooling Nurse
1960 1989 1963 1989 1980 1990 1965 1984 1965 1990
Mauritius 21 36 22 14 41 41 52 98
Seychelles - 51 46 -
South Africa 56 33 32 18 41 39 49 44
Gabon 17 31 23 22 27 26 62 52 73 37
Botswana 10 21 6 12 22 24 3 20 43 28
Cape Verde 22 22
Lesotho 5 11 4 3 30 34 52 33
U
Zimbabwe 13 10 15 5 22 29 47 14 38 34
Sao Tome & Principe 25 23 U
Congo 12 16 11 7 22 21 53 30
Kenya 10 7 7 3 22 23 38 28
Madagascar 14 5 9 2 22 22 45 29
Zambia 16 5 13 3 29 27 8 19 45 26
Cameroon 11 11 8 7 15 16 58 28
Ghana 11 7 13 3 36 35 13 8 44 30
Namibia 14 8 19 17 49 32
Cote dIvoire 16 9 12 6 19 19 41 26
WIDENING GLOBAL SOUTH - NORTH HUMAN GAPS:
NORTH = 100 (SEE NOTE) (cont)
Real GDP GNP Mean Years of Population per Fertility
COUNTRY Per Capital Per Capital Schooling Nurse
1960 1989 1963 1989 1980 1990 1965 1984 1965 1990
Comoros 5 3 11 10 - 41 26
Tanzania 4 4 5 1 22 20 22 3 45 27
Zaire 7 3 18 2 16 16 50 31
Nigeria 12 8 7 2 11 12 8 16 43 28
Liberia 10 6 18 20 20 10 47 28
Togo 9 5 6 3 16 16 9 11 46 29
Uganda 7 3 9 2 11 11 43 26
Rwanda 5 5 3 2 11 11 6 4 40 23
Senegal 16 8 14 5 8 8 19 7 47 30
Ethiopia 6 3 3 1 11 11 8 3 52 28
Angola 19 8 8 4 16 15 12 14 47 30
Malawi 5 4 3 1 19 17 38 25
Burundi 9 4 5 2 3 3 6 3 47 28
Equatorial Guinea 5 2 9 8 -
C.African Rep 13 5 5 3 11 11 - — 67 31
Sudan 14 7 8 8 14 11 45 30
Mozambique 17 7 7 1 18 16 - 44 30
WIDENING GLOBAL SOUTH - NORTH HUMAN GAPS:
NORTH = 100 (SEE NOTE) (cont)
Real GDP GNP Mean Years of Population per Fertility
COUNTRY Per Capital Per Capital Schooling Nurse
1960 1989 1963 1989 1980 1990 1965 1984 1965 1990
Mauritania 9 7 7 4 3 3 - — 46 29
Benin 13 7 6 3 7 7 19 8 44 27
Chad 11 4 5 1 2 2 3 4 50 33
Somalia 10 6 5 1 2 2 12 9 45 29
Guinea Bissau — - 4 5 3 3 - - -
Djibouti — - - 3 3 — - — —
Gambia 9 6 6 2 5 6 — — —
Mali 9 4 4 2 3 3 14 10 46 27
Niger 6 4 11 2 1 1 8 30 42 27
Burkina Faso 6 4 5 2 1 1 11 8 47 29
Sierra Leone 6 7 6 2 9 9 11 13 47 29
Guinea 9 4 5 3 9 8 — — 51 27
Note: All figures are expressed in relation to the North average, which is indexed to equal 100.
The smaller the figure the bigger the gap, the closer the figure to 100 the smaller the gap,
and a figure above 100 indicates that the country is better than the North average.
Source: Human Development Report, 1992. F-’
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APPENDIX E
ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU)
RESOLUTION
HEADQUARTERS: ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA
MEMBER STATES: EVERY INDEPENDENT AFRICAN STATE, EXCEPT SOUTH
AFRICA
29.1. BAMAKO CONVENTION ON THE BAN OF THE IMPORT INTO
AFRICA AND THE CONTROL OF TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENT AND
MANAGEMENT OF HAZARDOUS WASTES WITHIN AFRICA OF
29 JANUARY 1991
29.1.1. STATUS AS OF 6 MARCH 1991,UN DOC.
UNEP/CHW/WG. 1/2/INF. 1,1991
AD HOC WORKING GROUP OF LEGAL AND TECHNICAL
EXPERTS TO DEVELOP ELEMENTS WHICH MIGHT BE
INCLUDED IN A PROTOCOL ON LIABILITY AND
COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGE RESULTING FROM
THE TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENTS AND DISPOSAL
OF HAZARDOUS WASTES AND OTHER WASTES
Second session
Nairobi, 6-9 March 1991
NOTE FROM THE UNEP SECRETARIAT
As requested, the UNEP Secretariat is providing members
of the Working Group with copies of the Bamako Convention,
signed in Bamako on 29 January 1991. The draft which the
UNEP Secretariat possesses is not in final form. The
changes adopted in Bamako are introduced in the margin of
the text.
To the knowledge of the UNEP Secretariat, the Bamako













As far as the UNEP Secretariat is aware, no
ratification has been received up to date.
The Bamako Convention will enter into force after
receiving the tenth instrument of ratification.
The Bamako Conference was attended by 29 African
countries and by observers from UNEP, WMO and FAO.
29.1.2. CONVENTION ON THE BAN OF THE IMPORT INTO AFRICA AND
THE CONTROL OF TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF
HAZARDOUS WASTES WITHIN AFRICA. BAMAKO, 29 JANUARY 1991
(TEXT PROVIDED BY THE OAU TO THE UNEP ON 5 AUGUST 1991)
PREAMBLE
The Parties to this Convention,
1. Mindful of the growing threat to human health and the
environment posed by the increased generation and the
complexity of hazardous wastes,
2. Further mindful that the most effective way of
protecting human health and the environment from the dangers
posed by such wastes is the reduction of their generation to
a minimum in terms of quantity and/or hazard potential.
3. Aware of the risk of damage to human health and the
environment caused by transboundary movements of hazardous
wastes,
4. Reiterating that States should ensure that the generator
should carry out his responsibilities with regard to the
transport and disposal of hazardous wastes in a manner that
is consistent with the protection of human health and
environment, whatever the place of disposal,
5. Recalling relevant chapters of the Charter of the
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) on environmental
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protection, the African Charter for Human and Peoples
Rights, Chapter IX of the Lagos Plan of Action and other
Recommendations adopted by the Organisation of African Unity
on the environment,
6. Further recognizing the sovereignty of States to ban the
importation into, and the transit through, their territory,
of hazardous wastes and substances for human health and
environmental reasons,
7. Recognizing also the increasing mobilization in Africa
for the prohibition of transboundary movements of hazardous
wastes and their disposal in African countries,
8. Convinced that hazardous wastes should, as far as is
compatible with environmentally sound and efficient
management, be disposed in the State where they were
generated,
9. Convinced that the effective control and minimization of
transboundary movements of hazardous wastes will act as an
incentive, in Africa and elsewhere, for the reduction of the
volume of the generation of such wastes,
10. Noting that a number of international and regional
agreements deal with the problem of the protection and
preservation of the environment with regard to the transit
of dangerous goods,
11. Taking into account the Declaration of the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm,
1972) , the Cairo Guidelines and Principles for the
Environmentally Sound Management of Hazardous Wastes adopted
by the Governing Council of the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP) by Decision 14/30 of 17 June, 1987, the
Recommendations of the United Nations Committee of Experts
on the Transport of Dangerous Goods (formulated in 1957 and
updated biennially), the Charter of Human Rights, relevant
recommendations, declarations, instruments and regulations
adopted within the United Nations System, the relevant
articles of the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of hazardous Wast3es and their
Disposal Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
their Disposal which allow for the establishment of regional
agreements which may be equal to or stronger than its own
provisions, Article 39 of the Lome’ IV Convention relating
to the international movement of hazardous wastes and
radioactive wastes, African intergovernmental organisations
and the work and studies done within other international and
regional organisations,
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12. Mindful of the spirit, principles, aims and functions
of the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and
Natural Resources adopted by the African Heads of State and
Government in Algiers (1968) and the World Charter for
Nature adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations
at its Thirty-seventh Session (1982) as the rule of ethics
in respect of the protection of the human environment and
the conservation of natural resources,
13. Concerned by the problem of transboundary traffic in
hazardous wastes,
14. Recognizing the need to promote the development of
clean production methods, including clean technologies, for
the sound management of hazardous wastes produced in Africa,
in particular, to avoid, minimize and eliminate the
generation of such wastes,
15. Recognizing also that where necessary hazardous wastes
should be transported in accordance with relevant
international conventions and recommendations,
16. Determined to protect, by strict control, the human
health of the African population and the environment against
the adverse effects which may result from the generation of
hazardous wastes,
17. Affirming a commitment also to responsibly address the
problem of hazardous wastes originating within the Continent
of Africa,
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
Article 1
Definitions
For the purpose of this Convention:
1. “Wastes” are substances or materials which are disposed
of, or are intended to be disposed of, or are required to be
disposed of by the provisions of national law;
2. “Hazardous wastes” means wastes as specified in Article
2 of this Convention;
3. “Management” means the prevention and reduction of
hazardous wastes and the collection, transport, storage, and
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treatment either for the reuse or disposal, of hazardous
wastes including after-care of disposal sites;
4. “Transboundary movement” means any movement of hazardous
wastes from an area under the national jurisdiction of any
State to or through an area under the national jurisdiction
of another State, or to or through an area not under the
national jurisdiction of another State, provided at least
two States are involved in the movement;
5. “Clean production methods” means production or
industrial systems which avoid, or eliminate the generation
of hazardous wastes and hazardous products in conformity
with Article 4, section 3 (f) and (g) of this Convention;
6. “Disposal” means any operation specified in Annex III to
this Convention;
7. “Approved site or facility” means a site or facility for
the disposal of hazardous wastes which is authorised or
permitted to operate for this purpose by a relevant
authority of the State where the site or facility is
located;
8. “Competent authority” means one governmental authority
designated by a Party to be responsible, within such
geographical areas as the Party may think fit, for receiving
the notification of a transboundary movement of hazardous
wastes and any information related to it, and for responding
to such a notification, as provided in Article 6 of this
Convention;
9. “Focal point” means the entity of a Party referred to in
Article 5 of this Convention responsible for receiving and
submitting information as provided for in Articles 13 and
16;
10. “Environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes”
means taking all practicable steps to ensure that hazardous
wastes are managed in a manner which will protect human
health and the environment against the adverse effects which
may result from such wastes;
11. “Area under the national jurisdiction of a State” means
any land, marine area or airspace within which a State
exercises administrative and regulatory responsibility in
accordance with international law in regard to the
protection of human health or the environment;
12. “State of export” means a State from which a
transboundary movement of hazardous wastes is planned to be
initiated or is initiated;
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13. “State of import” means a State to which a
transboundary movement is planned or takes place for the
purpose of disposal therein or for the purpose of loading
prior to disposal in an area not under the national
jurisdiction of any State;
14. “State of transit” means any State, other than the
State of export or import, through which a movement of
hazardous wastes is planned or takes place;
15. “States concerned” means States of export or import, or
transit states, whether or not Parties;
16. “Person” means any natural or legal person;
17. “Exporter” means any person under the jurisdiction of
the State of export who arranges for hazardous wastes to be
exported;
18. “Importer” means any person under the jurisdiction of
the State of import who arranges for hazardous wastes to be
imported;
19. “Carrier” means any person who carries out the
transport of hazardous wastes;
20. “Generator” means any person whose activity produces
hazardous wastes, or, if that person is not known, the
person who is in possession and/or control of those wastes;
21. “Disposer” means any person to whom hazardous wastes
are shipped and who carries out the disposal of such wastes;
22. “Illegal traffic” means any transboundary movement of
hazardous wastes as specified in Article 9 of this
Convention;
23. “Dumping at sea” means the deliberate disposal of
hazardous wastes at sea from vessels, aircraft, platforms or
other man-made structures at sea, and includes ocean
incineration and disposal into the seabed and sub-seabed.
Article 2
Scope of the Convention
1. The following substances shall be “hazardous wastes” for
the purposes of this convention:
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(a) Wastes that belong to any category contained in
Annex I of this Convention;
(b) Wastes that are not covered under paragraph (a)
above but are defined as, or are considered to be,
hazardous wastes by the domestic legislation of
the State of export, import or transit;
(c) Wastes which possess any of the characteristics
contained in Annex II of this Convention;
(d) Hazardous substances which have been banned,
canceled or refused registration by government
regulatory action, or voluntarily withdrawn from
registration in the country of manufacture, for
human health or environmental reasons.
2. Wastes which, as a result of being radioactive, are
subject to any international control systems, including
international instruments, applying specifically to
radioactive materials, are included in the scope of this
Convention.
3. Wastes which derive from the normal operations of a
ship, the discharge of which is covered by another
international instrument, shall not fall within the scope of
this convention.
Article 3
National Definitions of Hazardous Wastes
1. Each State shall, within six months of becoming a Party
to this Convention, inform the Secretariat of the Convention
of the wastes, other than those listed in Annex I of this
Convention, considered or defined as hazardous under its
national legislation and of any requirements concerning
transboundary movement procedures applicable to such wastes.
2. Each Party shall subsequently inform the Secretariat of
any significant changes to the information it has provided
pursuant to Paragraph 1 of this Article.
3. The Secretariat shall forthwith inform all Parties of
the information it has received pursuant to paragraphs 1 and
2 of this Article.
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4. Parties shall be responsible for making the information
transmitted to them by the Secretariat under Paragraph 3 of




1. Hazardous Waste Import Ban
All Parties shall take appropriate legal, administrative
and other measures within the area under their jurisdiction
to prohibit the import of all hazardous wastes, for any
reason, into Africa from non-Contracting Parties. Such
import shall be deemed illegal and a criminal act. All
Parties shall:
(a) Forward as soon as possible, all information
relating to such illegal hazardous waste import
activity to the Secretariat who shall distribute
the information to all Contracting Parties;
(b) Co-operate to ensure that no imports of hazardous
wastes from a non—Party enter a Party to
this Convention. To this end, the Parties shall,
at the Conference of the Contracting Parties,
consider other enforcement mechanisms.
Ban on Dumping of Hazardous Wastes at Sea and Internal
Waters
(a) Parties in conformity with related
international conventions and instruments shall,
in the exercise of their jurisdiction within their
internal waters, territorial seas, exclusive
economic zones and continental shelf, adopt
legal, administrative and other appropriate
measures to control all carriers from
non-Parties, and prohibit the dumping at sea of
hazardous wastes, including their incineration at
sea and their disposal in the seabed and sub
seabed. Any dumping of hazardous wastes at
sea, including incineration at sea as well as
seabed and sub-seabed disposal, by Contracting
Parties, whether in internal waters, territorial
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seas, exclusive economic zones or high seas shall
be deemed to be illegal;
(b) Parties shall forward, as soon as possible,
all information relating to dumping of hazardous
wastes to the Secretariat which shall distribute
the information to all Contracting Parties.
Waste Generation in Africa
ach Party Shall:
(a) Ensure that hazardous waste generators submit to
reports regarding the wastes that they generate in
order to enable the Secretariat of the Convention
to produce a complete hazardous waste audit;
(b) Impose strict, unlimited liability as well as
joint and several liability on hazardous waste
generators;
(c) Ensure that the generation of hazardous wastes
within the area under its jurisdiction is reduced
to a minimum taking into account social,
technological and economic aspects;
Cd) Ensure the availability of adequate treatment
and/or disposal facilities, for the
environmentally sound management of hazardous
wastes which shall be located, to the extent
possible, within its jurisdiction;
(e) Ensure that persons involved in the management of
hazardous wastes within its jurisdiction take such
steps as are necessary to prevent pollution
arising from such wastes and, if such pollution
occurs, to minimize the consequence thereof for
human health and the environment;
The Adoption of Precautionary Measures:
(t) Each Party shall strive to adopt and implement the
preventive, precautionary approach to pollution
problems which entails, inter-alia, preventing the
release into the environment of substances which
may cause harm to humans or the environment
without waiting for scientific proof regarding
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such harm. The Parties shall co-operate with each
other in taking the appropriate measures to
implement the precautionary principle to
pollution prevention through the application of
clean production methods, rather than the pursuit
of a permissible emissions approach based on
assimilative capacity assumptions;
(g) In this respect Parties shall promote clean
production
methods applicable to entire product life cycles
including:
- raw material selection, extraction and
processing;
- product conceptualisation, design, manufacture
and assemblage;
- materials transport during all phases;
- industrial and household usage;
- reintroduction of the product into industrial
systems or nature when it no longer serves a
useful function;
Clean production shall not include “end-of-pipe pollution
controls such as filters and scrubbers, or chemical,
physical or biological treatment. Measures which reduce the
volume of waste by incineration or concentration, mask the
hazard by dilution, or transfer pollutants from one
environmental medium to another, are also excluded;
(h) The issue of preventing the transfer to Africa of
polluting technologies shall be kept under
systematic review by the Secretariat of the
Conference and periodic reports shall be made to
the Conference of the Parties;
Obligations in the Transport and Transboundary Movement of
Hazardous Wastes from Contracting Parties:
(i) Each Party shall prevent the export of hazardous
wastes to States which have prohibited by their
legislation or international agreement all such
imports, or if it has reason to believe that the
wastes in question will not be managed in an
environmentally sound manner, according to
criteria to be decided on by the Parties
at their first meeting;
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(j) A Party shall not permit hazardous wastes to be
exported to a State which does not have the
facilities for disposing of them in an
environmentally sound manner:
(k) Each Party shall ensure that hazardous wastes to
be exported are managed in an environmentally
sound manner in the State of import and transit.
Technical guidelines for the environmentally sound
management of wastes subject to this Convention
shall be decided by the Parties at their first
meeting;
(1) The Parties agree not to allow the export of
hazardous wastes for disposal within the area
South of 60 degrees South Latitude, whether or not
such wastes are subject to transboundary movement;
Cm) Furthermore, each Party shall:
Ci) Prohibit all persons under its national
jurisdiction from transporting, storing or
disposing of hazardous wastes unless such
persons are authorized or allowed to perform
such operations;
(ii) Ensure that hazardous wastes that are to be
the subject of a transboundary movement are
packaged, labeled, and transported in
conformity with generally accepted and
recognized international rules and standards
in the field of packaging, labeling, and
transport, and that due account is taken of
relevant internationally recognized
practices;
(iii) Ensure that hazardous wastes be accompanied
by a movement document, containing
information specified in Annex IV B, from the
point at which a transboundary movement
commences to the point of disposal;
Cn) Parties shall take the appropriate measures to
ensure that the transboundary movements of
hazardous wastes only are allowed if:
Ci) The State of export does not have the
technical capacity and the necessary
facilities, capacity or suitable disposal
sites in order to dispose of the wastes in
question in an environmentally sound and
efficient manner; or
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(ii) The transboundary movement in question is in
accordance with other criteria to bedecided
by the Parties, provided those criteria do
not differ from the objectives of this
Convention;
(o) Under this Convention, the obligation of States
in which hazardous wastes are generated,
requiring that those wastes are managed in an
environmentally sound manner, may not under any
circumstances be transferred to the States of
import or transit;
(p) Parties shall undertake to review periodically the
possibilities for the reduction of the amount
and/or the pollution potential of hazardous wastes
which are exported to other States;
(q) Parties exercising their right to prohibit the
import of hazardous wastes for disposal shall
inform the other. Parties of their decision
pursuant to Article 13 of this Convention;
(r) Parties shall prohibit or shall not permit the
export of hazardous wastes to States which have
prohibited the import of such wastes, when
notified by the secretariat or any competent
authority pursuant to sub-paragraph (q) above;
Cs) Parties shall prohibit or shall not permit the
export of hazardous wastes if the State of import
does not consent in writing to the specific
import, in the ca4e where that State of import has
not prohibited the import of such wastes;
(t) Parties shall ensure that the transboundary
movement of hazardous wastes is reduced to the
minimum consistent with the environmentally sound
and efficient management of such wastes, and is
conducted in a manner which will protect human
health and the environment against the adverse
effects which may result from such movement;
Cu) Parties shall require that information about a
proposed transboundary movement of hazardous
wastes be provided to the States concerned,
according to Annex IV A of this Convention, and
clearly state the potential effects of the
proposed movement on human health and the
environment.
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(a) Parties shall undertake to enforce the obligations
of this Convention against offenders and
infringements according to relevant national
laws and/or international law;
(b) Nothing in this Convention shall prevent a Party
from imposing additional requirements that are
consistent with the provisions of this Convention,
and are In accordance with the rules of
international law, in order to better protect
human health and the environment;
(c) This Convention recognizes the sovereignty of
States over their territorial sea, waterways, and
air space established in accordance with
international law, and jurisdiction which States
have in their exclusive economic zone and their
continental shelves in accordance with
international law, and the exercise by ships and
aircraft of all States of navigation rights and
freedoms as provided for in international law and
as reflected in relevant international
instruments.
Article 5
Designation of Competent Authorities, Focal Point and
Dumpwat ch
To facilitate the implementation of this Convention, the
Parties shall:
1. Designate or establish one or more competent authorities
and one focal point. One competent authority shall be
designated to receive the notification in case of a State of
transit.
2. Inform the Secretariat, within three months of the date
of the entry into force of this Convention for them, which
agencies they have designated as their focal point and their
competent authorities.
3. Inform the Secretariat, within one month of the date
of decision, of any changes regarding the designations made
by them under paragraph 2 above.
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4. Appoint a national body to act as a Dumpwatch. In such
capacity as a Dumpwatch, the designated national body only
will be required to co-ordinate with the concerned
governmental and non-governmental bodies.
Article 6
Transboundary Movement and Notification Procedures
1. The State of export shall notify, or shall require
the generator or exporter to notify, in writing, through the
channel of the competent authority of the State of export,
the competent authority of the States concerned of any
proposed transboundary movement of hazardous wastes. Such
notification shall contain the declarations and information
specified in Annex IV A of this Convention, written in a
language acceptable to the State of import. Only one
notification needs to be sent to each State concerned.
2. The Party of import shall respond to the notifier in
writing consenting to the movement with or without
conditions, denying permission for the movement, or
requesting additional information. A copy of the final
response of the State of import shall be sent to the
competent authorities of the States concerned that are
Parties to this Convention.
3. The State of export shall not allow the transboundary
movement until it has received:
(a) written consent of the State of import; and
(b) from the State of import, written confirmation of
the existence of a contract between the exporter
and the disposer specifying environmentally sound
management of the wastes in question.
4. Each State of transit which is a Party to this
Convention shall promptly acknowledge to the notifier
receipt of the notification. It may subsequently respond to
the notifier in writing, within 60 days, consenting to the
movement with or without conditions, denying permission for
the movement, or requesting additional information. The
State of export shall not allow the transboundary movement
to commence until it has received the written consent of the
State of transit.
5. In the case of a transboundary movement of hazardous
wastes where the wastes are legally defined as or considered
to be hazardous wastes only:
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(a) By the State of export, the requirements of
paragraph 8 of this Article that apply to the
importer or disposer and the State of import shall
apply mutatis mutandis to the exporter and State
of export, respectively;
(b) By the Party of import, or by the States of import
and transit which are Parties to this Convention,
the requirements of paragraphs 1, 3, 4 and 6 of
this Article that apply to the exporter and State
of export shall apply mutatis mutandis to the
importer or disposer and Party of import,
respectively; or
(c) By any State of transit which is a Party to this
Convention, the provisions of paragraph 4 of this
Article shall apply to such State.
6. The State of export shall use a shipment specific
notification even where hazardous wastes having the same
physical and chemical characteristics are shipped regularly
to the same disposer via the same customs office of entry of
the State of import, and in the case of transit, via the
same customs office of entry and exit of the State or
States of transit; specific notification of each and every
shipment shall be required and contain the information in
Annex IV A of this Convention.
7. Each Party to this Convention shall limit their points
or ports of entry and notify the Secretariat to this effect
for distribution to all Contracting Parties. Such points and
ports shall be the only ones permitted for the transboundary
movement of hazardous wastes.
8. The Parties to this Convention shall require that each
person who takes charge of a transboundary movement of
hazardous wastes sign the movement document either upon
delivery or receipt of the wastes in question. They shall
also require that the disposer inform both the exporter and
the competent authority of the State of export of receipt by
the disposer of the wastes in question and, in due course,
of the completion of disposal as specified in the
notification. If no such information is received within the
State of export, the competent authority of the State of
export or the exporter shall so notify the State of import.
9. The notification and response required by this Article
shall be transmitted to the competent authority of the
State concerned.
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10. Any transboundary movement of hazardous wastes shall
be covered by insurance, bond or other guarantee as may be
required by the State of import, or any state of transit
which is a Party to this Convention.
Article 7
Transboundary Movement from a Party
through States which are not Parties
Paragraph 2 and 4 of Article 6 of this Convention shall
apply mutatis mutandis to transboundary movements of
hazardous wastes from a Party through a State or States
which are not Parties.
Article 8
Duty to Re-import
When a transboundary movement of hazardous wastes to which
the consent of the States concerned has been given, subject
to the provisions of this Convention, cannot be completed in
accordance with the terms of the contract, the State of
export shall ensure that the wastes in question are taken
back into the State of export, by the exporter, if
alternative arrangements cannot be made for their disposal
in an environmentally sound manner within a maximum of 90
days from the time that the importing State informed the
State of export and the Secretariat. To this end, the State
of export and any State of transit shall not oppose, hinder
or prevent the return of those waste to the State of export.
Article 9
Illegal traffic
1. For the purpose of this Convention, any transboundary
movement of hazardous wastes under the following situations
shall be deemed to be illegal traffic:
(a) if carried out without notification, pursuant to
the provisions of this Convention, to all States
concerned; or
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(b) if carried out without the consent, pursuant to
the provisions of this Convention, of a State
concerned; or
(c) if consent is obtained from States concerned
through falsification, misrepresentation or fraud;
or
(d) if it does not conform in a material way with the
documents; or
Ce) if it results in deliberate disposal of hazardous
wastes in contravention of this Convention and of
general principles of international law.
2. Each Party shall introduce appropriate national
legislation for imposing criminal penalties on all persons
who have planned, carried out, or assisted in such illegal
imports. Such penalties shall be sufficiently high to both
punish and deter such conduct.
3. In case of a transboundary movement of hazardous wastes
deemed to be illegal traffic as the result of conduct on
the part of the exporter or generator, the State of export
shall ensure that the wastes in question are taken back by
the exporter or generator or if necessary by itself into the
State of export, within 30 days from the time the State
of export has been informed about the illegal traffic.
To this end the States concerned shall not oppose, hinder or
prevent the return of those wastes to the State of export
and appropriate legal action shall be taken against the
contravenor(s)
4. In the case of a transboundary movement of hazardous
wastes deemed to be illegal traffic as the result of conduct
on the part of the importer or disposer, the State of import
shall ensure that the wastes in question are returned to the
exporter by the importer and that legal proceedings




1. The Parties to this Convention shall co-operate with one
another and with relevant African organizations, to improve
and achieve the environmentally sound management of
hazardous wastes.
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To this end, the Parties shall:
(a) Make available information, whether on a bilateral
or multilateral basis, with a view to promoting
clean production methods and the environmentally
sound management of hazardous wastes, including
harmonization of technical standards and practices
for the adequate management of hazardous wastes;
(b) Co-operate in monitoring the effects of the
management of hazardous wastes on human health and
the environment;
(c) Co-operate, subject to their national laws,
regulations and policies, in the development and
implementation of new environmentally sound clean
production technologies and the improvement of
existing technologies with a view to eliminating,
as far as practicable, the generation of hazardous
wastes and achieving more effective and efficient
methods of ensuring their management in an
environmentally sound manner, including the study
of the economic, social and environmental effects
of the adoption of such new and improved
technologies;
(d) Co-operate actively, subject to their national
laws, regulations and policies, in the transfer of
technology and management systems related to the
environmentally sound management of hazardous
wastes. They shall also co-operate in developing
the technical capacity among Parties, especlally
those which may need and request technical
assistance in this field;
(e) Co-operate in developing appropriate technical
guidelines and/or codes of practice;
(f) Co-operate in the exchange and dissemination
of information on the movement of hazardous wastes
in conformity with Article 13 of this Convention.
Article 11
International Co-operation
Bilateral, Multilateral and Regional Agreements
1. Parties to this Convention may enter into bilateral,
multilateral, or regional agreements or arrangements
regarding the transboundary movement and management of
hazardous wastes generated in Africa with Parties or non-
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Parties provided that such agreements or arrangements do
not derogate from the environmentally sound management of
hazardous wastes as required by this Convention. These
agreements or arrangements shall stipulate provisions which
are no less environmentally sound than those provided for by
this Convention.
2. Parties shall notify the Secretariat of any bilateral,
multilateral or regional agreements or arrangements referred
to in paragraph 1 of this Article and those which they have
entered into prior to the entry into force of this
Convention for them, for the purpose of controlling
transboundary movements of hazardous wastes which take place
entirely among the Parties to such agreements. The
provisions of this Convention shall not affect transboundary
movements of hazardous wastes generated in Africa which take
place pursuant to such agreements provided that such
agreements are compatible with the environmentally sound
management of hazardous wastes as required by this
Convention.
3. Each Contracting Party shall prohibit vessels flying its
flag or aircraft registered in its territory from carrying
out activities in contravention of this Convention.
4. Parties shall use appropriate measures to promote South-
South co-operation in the implementation of this Convention.
5. Taking into account the needs of developing countries,
co-operation between international organizations is
encouraged in ,order to promote, among other things, public
awareness, the development of rational management of




1. The Conference of Parties shall set up an Ad Hoc expert
organ to prepare a-draft Protocol setting out appropriate
rules and procedures in the field of liabilities and
compensation for damage resulting from the transboundary




1. The Parties shall ensure that in the case of an accident
occurring during the transboundary movement of hazardous
wastes or their disposal which is likely to present risks
to human health and the environment in other States, those
States are immediately informed.
2. The States shall inform each other, through the
Secretariat, of:
(a) Changes regarding the designation of competent
authorities and/or focal points, pursuant to
Article 5 of this Convention;
(b) Changes in their national definition of hazardous
wastes, pursuant to Article 3 of this Convention;
(c) Decisions made by them to limit or ban the import
of hazardous wastes
Cd) Any other information required pursuant to
paragraph 4 of this Article.
3. The Parties, consistent with national laws and
regulations, final set up information collection and
dissemination mechanisms on hazardous wastes. They shall
transmit such information through the Secretariat, to the
Conference of the Parties established under Article 15 of
this Convention, before the end of each calendar year, in a
report on the previous calendar year, containing the
following information:
(a) Competent authorities, Dumpwatch, and focal points
that have been designated by them pursuant to
Article 5 of this Convention;
(b) Information regarding transboundary movements
of hazardous wastes in which they have been
involved, including:
(1) The quantity of hazardous wastes exported,
their category, characteristics, destination,
any transit country and disposal method as
stated in the notification;
(ii) The amount of hazardous wastes imported,
their category, characteristics, origin, and
disposal methods;
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(iii) Disposals which did not proceed as intended;
(iv) Efforts to achieve a reduction of the amount
of hazardous wastes subject to transboundary
movement;
(c) Information on the measures adopted by them in the
implementation of this Convention;
(d) Information on available qualified statistics -
which have been compiled by them on the effects on
human health and the environment of the
generation, transportation, and disposal of
hazardous wastes - as part of the information
required in conformity with Article 4 Section
3 (a) of this Convention;
(e) Information concerning bilateral, multilateral
and regional agreements and arrangements
entered into pursuant to Article 11 of this
Convention;
(f) Information on accidents occurring during the
transboundary movements, treatment and disposal of
hazardous wastes and on the measures undertaken to
deal with them;
(g) Information on treatment and disposal options
operated within the area under their national
jurisdiction;
(h) Information on measures undertaken for the
development of clean production methods, including
clean production technologies, for the reduction
and/or elimination of the production of hazardous
wastes; and
(i) Such other matters as the Conference of the
Parties shall deem relevant.
4. The Parties, consistent with national laws and
regulations, shall ensure that copies of each notification
concerning any given transboundary movement of hazardous




1. The regular budget of the Conference of Parties, as
required in Article 15 and 16 of this Convention, shall be
prepared by the Secretariat and approved by the Conference.
2. Parties shall, at the first meeting of the Conference of
the Parties, agree on a scale of contributions to the
recurrent budget of the Secretariat.
3. The Parties shall also consider the establishment of a
revolving fund to assist, on an interim basis, in case of
emergency situations to minimize damage from disasters or
accidents arising from transboundary movements of hazardous
wastes or during the disposal of such wastes.
4. The Parties agree that, according to the specific needs
of different regions and sub-regions, regional or sub
regional centers for training and technology transfers
regarding the management of hazardous wastes and the
minimization of their generation should be established, as
well as appropriate funding mechanisms of a voluntary
nature.
Article 15
Conference of the Parties
1. A Conference of the Parties, made up of Ministers having
the environment as their mandate, is hereby established.
The first meeting of the Conference of the Parties shall be
convened by the Secretary-General of the OAU not later than
one year after the entry into force of this Convention.
Thereafter, ordinary meetings of the Conference of the
Parties shall be held at regular intervals to be determined
by the Conference at its first meeting.
2. The Conference of the Parties to this Convention shall
adopt Rules of Procedure for itself and for any subsidiary
body it may establish, as well as financial rules to
determine in particular the financial participation of the
Parties to this Convention.
3. The Parties to this Convention at their first meeting
shall consider any additional measures needed to assist them
in fulfilling their responsibilities with respect to the
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protection and the preservation of the marine and inland
waters environments in the context of this Convention.
4. The Conference of the Parties shall keep under continued
review and evaluation the effective implementation of this
Convention, and in addition, shall:
(a) promote the harmonization of appropriate policies,
strategies and measures for minimizing harm to
human health and the environment by hazardous
wastes;
(b) consider and adopt amendments to this Convention
and its annexes, taking into consideration, inter
alia, available scientific, technical, economic
and environmental information;
(c) consider and undertake any additional action that
may be required for the achievement of the purpose
of this Convention in the light of experience
gained in its operation and in the operation of
the agreements and arrangements envisaged in
Article 11 of this Convention;
(d) consider and adopt protocols as required:
(e) establish such subsidiary bodies as are deemed
necessary for the implementation of this
Convention; and
(f) make decisions for the peaceful settlement of
disputes arising from the transboundary movement
of hazardous wastes, if need be, according to
international law.
5. Organizations may be represented as observers at
meetings of the Conference of the Parties. Any body or
agency, whether national or international, governmental or
non-governmental qualified in fields relating to hazardous
wastes which informed the Secretariat, may be represented as
an observer at meeting of the Conference of the Parties.
The admission participation of observers shall be subject to





The functions of the Secretariat shall be:
(a) To arrange for, and service, meetings provided for
Article 15 and 17 of this Convention;
(b) To prepare and transmit reports based upon
information received in accordance with Articles
3, 4, 6, 11, and 15 of this Convention as well as
upon information derived from meetings of
subsidiary bodies established under Article 15 of
this Convention as well as upon, appropriate
information provided by relevant inter
governmental and non-governmental entities;
(c) To prepare reports on its activities carried out
in implementation of its functions under this
Convention and present them to the Conference of
the Parties;
(d) To ensure the necessary co-ordination with
relevant international bodies, and in particular
to enter into administrative and contractual
arrangements as may be required for the effective
discharge of its functions;
(e) To communicate with focal points, competent
authorities and Dumpwatch established by the
Parties in accordance with Article 5 of this
Convention as well as appropriate inter
governmental and non-governmental organizations
which may provide assistance in the implementation
of the Convention;
(f) To compile information concerning approved
national size and facilities of Parties to this
Convention available to the disposal and treatment
of their hazardous wastes to circulate this
information;
(g) To receive and convey information from and t
Parties on:
-sources of technical assistance and training;
-available technical and scientific know-how;
-sources of advice and expertise; and
-availability of resources;
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This information will assist them in,
-the management of the notification system of this
Convention;
-the management of hazardous wastes;
-environmentally sound clean production methods
relating to hazardous wastes, such as clean
production technologies;
-the assessment of disposal capabilities and
sites;
-the monitoring of hazardous wastes; and
-emergency responses;
(h) To provide Parties to this Convention with
information on consultants or consulting firms
having the necessary technical competence in the
field, which can assist them with examining a
notification for a transboundary movement, the
concurrence of a shipment of hazardous wastes with
the relevant notification, and/or whether the
proposed disposal facilities for hazardous wastes
are environmentally sound, when they have reason
to believe that the wastes in question will not be
managed in an environmentally sound manner. Any
such examinations would not be at the expense of
the Secretariat;
(i) To assist Parties to this Convention in their
identification of cases of illegal traffic and to
circulate immediately to the Parties concerned any
information it has received regarding illegal
traffic;
(j) To co-operate with Parties to this Convention and
with relevant and competent international
organizations and agencies in the provision of
experts and equipment for the purpose of rapid
assistance to States in the event of an emergency
situation; and
(k) To perform such other functions relevant to the
purposes of this Convention as may be determined
by the Conference of the Parties to this
Convention.
2. The Secretariat’s functions shall be carried out on an
interim basis by the Organization of African Unity (OAU)
jointly with the United Nations Economic Commission for
Africa (ECA) until the completion of the first meeting of
the Conference of the Parties held pursuant to Article 15 of
this Convention. At this meeting, the Conference of the
Parties shall also evaluate the implementation by the
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interim Secretariat of the functions assigned to it, in
particular under paragraph 1 above, and decide upon the
structures appropriate for those functions.
Article 17
Amendment of the Convention and of Protocols
1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Convention and
any Party to a Protocol may propose amendments to that
Protocol. Such amendments shall take due account, inter
alia, of relevant scientific, technical, environmental and
social considerations.
2. Amendments to this Convention shall be adopted at a
meeting of the Conference of the Parties. Amendments to any
Protocol shall be adopted at a meeting of the Parties to the
Protocol in question. The text of any proposed amendment
to this Convention or to any Protocol, except as may
otherwise be provided in such Protocol, shall be
communicated to the Parties by the Secretariat at least six
months before the melting at which it is proposed for
adoption. The Secretariat shall also communicate proposed
amendments to the Signatories to this Convention for their
information.
3. The Parties shall make every effort to reach agreement on
any proposed amendment to this Convention by consensus.
If all efforts at consensus have been exhausted, and no
agreement reached, the amendment shall, as a last resort, be
adopted by a two-thirds majority vote of the Parties present
and voting at the meeting. It shall then be submitted by
the Depository to all Parties for ratification, approval,
formal confirmation or acceptance.
Amendment of Protocols to this Convention
4. The procedure specified in paragraph 3 above shall apply
to amendments to any protocol, except that a two-thirds
majority of the Parties to that Protocol present and voting
at the meeting shall suffice for their adoption.
General Provisions
5. Instruments of ratification, approval, formal
confirmation or acceptance of amendments shall be deposited
with the Depository. Amendments adopted in accordance with
paragraph 3 or 4 above shall enter into force between
Parties having accepted them, on the ninetieth day after the
receipt by the Depository of the instrument of ratification,
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approval, formal confirmation or acceptance by at least two-
thirds of the Parties who accepted the amendments to the
Protocol concerned, except as may otherwise be provided in
such Protocol. The amendments shall enter into force for
any other Party on the nineteenth day after that Party
deposits its instrument of ratification, approval, formal
confirmation or acceptance of the amendments.
6. For the purpose of this Article, “Parties present and
voting” means Parties present and casting an affirmative or
negative vote.
Article 18
Adoption and Amendment of Annexes
1. The annexes to this Convention or to any Protocol shall
form an integral part of this Convention or of such
Protocol, as the case may be and, unless expressly provided
otherwise, a reference to this Convention or its Protocols
constitutes at the same time a reference to any annexes
thereto. Such annexes shall be restricted to scientific,
technical and administrative matters.
2. Except as may be otherwise provided in any Protocol with
respect to its annexes, the following procedures shall apply
to the proposal, adoption and entry into force of additional
annexes to this Convention or of annexes to a protocol:
(a) Annexes to this Convention and its Protocols shall
be proposed and adopted according to the procedure
laid down in Article 17, paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4
of this Convention;
(b) Any Party that is unable to accept an additional
annex to this Convention or an annex to any
Protocol to which it is Party shall 60 notify the
Depository, in writing, within six months from the
date of the communication of the adoption by the
Depository. The Depository shall without delay
notify all Parties of any such notification
received. A Party may at any time substitute an
acceptance for a previous declaration of objection
and the annexes shall thereupon enter into force
for that Party;
(c) Upon the expiration of six months from the date of
the circulation of the communication by the
Depository, the annex shall become effective for
all Parties to this Convention or to any Protocol
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concerned, which have not submitted a notification
in accordance with the provision of sub-paragraph
(b) above.
3. The proposal, adoption and entry into force of amendments
to annexes to this Convention or to any Protocol shall be
subject to the same procedure as for the proposal, adoption
and entry into force of annexes to the Convention or annexes
to a Protocol. Annexes and amendments thereto shall take
due account, inter alia, of relevant scientific and
technical considerations.
4. If an additional annex or an amendment to an annex
involves an amendment to this Convention or to any Protocol,
the additional annex or amended annex shall not enter into
force until such time as the amendment to this Convention or
to the Protocol enters into force.
Article 19
Verification
Any Party which has reason to believe that another Party is
acting or has acted in breach of its obligations under this
Convention must inform the Secretariat thereof, and in such
an event, shall simultaneously and immediately inform,
directly or through the Secretariat, the Party against whom
the allegations are made. The Secretariat shall carry out a
verification of the substance of the allegation and submit a
report thereof to all the Parties to this Convention.
Article 20
Settlement of Disputes
1. In case of dispute between Parties as to the
interpretation or application of, or compliance with, this
Convention or any Protocol thereto, the Parties shall seek
a settlement of the dispute through negotiations or any
other peaceful means of their own choice.
2. If the Parties concerned cannot settle their dispute a8
provided in paragraph 1 of this Article, the dispute shall
be submitted either to an Ad Hoc organ set up by the
Conference for this purpose, or to the International Court
of Justice.
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3. The conduct of arbitration of disputes between Parties
by the Ad Hoc organ provided for in paragraph 2 of this
Article shall be as provided in Annex V of this Convention.
Article 21
Signature
This Convention shall be open for signature by Member States
of the OAU in Bamako and Addis Ababa for a period of six
months from 30 January 1991 to 31 July 1991.
Article 22
Ratification, Acceptance, Formal Confirmation or Approval
1. This Convention shall be subject to ratification,
acceptance, formal confirmation, or approval by Member
States of the OAU. Instruments of ratification, acceptance,
formal confirmation, or approval shall be deposited with the
Depository.




This Convention shall be open for accession by Member States
of the OAU from the day after the date on which the
Convention is closed for signature. The instruments of
accession shall be deposited with the Depository.
Article 24
Right to Vote





1. This Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth
day after the date of deposit of the tenth instrument of
ratification from Parties signatory to this Convention.
2. For each State which ratifies this Convention or
accedes thereto after the date of the deposit of the tenth
instrument of ratification, it shall enter into force on the
ninetieth day after the date of deposit by such State of its
instrument of accession or ratification.
Article 26
Reservations and Declarations
1. No reservations or exception may be made to this
Convention.
2. Paragraph 1 of this Article does not preclude a State
when signing, ratifying, or acceding to this Convention,
from making declarations or statements, however phrased or
named, with a view, inter alia, to the harmonization of
its laws and regulations with the provisions of this
Convention, provided that such declarations or statements do
not purport to exclude or to modify the legal effects of the




1. At any time after three years from the date on which this
Convention has entered into force for a Party, that Party
may withdraw from the Convention by giving written
notification to the Depository.
2. Withdrawal shall be effective one year after receipt of
notification by the Depository, or on such later date as may
be specified in the notification.
3. Withdrawal shall not exempt the withdrawing Party from





The Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity




This Convention, as soon as it enters into force, shall be
registered with the Secretary-General of the United Nations
Organization (UNO) in conformity with Article 102 of the
Charter of the UNO.
Article 30
Authentic Texts
The Arabic, English, French and Portuguese texts of this
Convention are equally authentic.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized to
that effect, have signed this Convention.
Adopted in Bamako, Mali, on 30 January 1991.
CATEGORIES OF WASTES WHICH ARE HAZARDOUS WASTES
Waste Streams:
YO All wastes containing or contaminated by radionuclides,
the concentration or properties of which result from
human activity
Yl Clinical wastes from medical care in hospitals, medical
centers and clinics
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Y2 Wastes from the production and preparation of
pharmaceutical products
Y3 Waste pharmaceuticals, drugs and medicines
Y4 Wastes from the production, formulation and use of
biocides and phytopharmaceuticals
Y5 Wastes from the manufacture, formulation and use of
wood preserving chemicals
Y6 Wastes from the production, formulation and use of
organic solvents
Y7 Wastes from heat treatment and tempering operations
containing cyanides
Y8 Waste mineral oils unfit for their originally intended
use
Y9 Waste oils/water, hydrocarbons/water mixtures,
emulsions
YlO Waste substances and articles containing or
contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs)
and/or polychlorinated terphenyls (PCTs) and/or
polybrominated biphenyls (PBBs)
Yll Waste tarry residues arising from refining,
distillation and any pyrolytic treatment
Yl2 Wastes from production, formulation and use of inks,
dyes, pigments, paints, lacquers, varnish
Y13 Wastes from production, formulation and use of resins,
latex, plasticizers, glues/adhesives
Y14 Waste chemical substances arising from research and
development or teaching activities which are not
identified and/or are new and whose effects on man
and/or the environment are not known
Yl5 Wastes of an explosive nature not subject to other
legislation
Y16 Wastes from production, formulation and use of
photographic chemicals and processing materials
Y17 Wastes resulting from surface treatment of metals and
plastics
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Y18 Residues arising from industrial waste disposal
operations
Y46 Wastes collected from households, including sewage and
sewage sludges
Y47 Residues arisfng from the incineration of household
wastes
Wastes having as constituents:
Y19 Metal carbonyls
Y20 Beryllium; beryllium compounds
Y21 Hexavalent chromium compounds
Y22 Copper compounds
Y23 Zinc compounds
Y24 Arsenic; arsenic compounds
Y25 Selenium; selenium compounds
Y26 Cadmium; cadmium compounds
Y27 Antimony; antimony compounds
Y28 Tellurium; tellurium compounds
Y29 Mercury; mercury compounds
Y30 Thallium; thallium compounds
Y31 Lead; lead compounds
Y32 Inorganic fluorine compounds excluding calcium fluoride
Y33 Inorganic cyanides
Y34 Acidic solutions or acids in solid form
Y35 Basic solutions or bases in solid form
Y36 Asbestos (dust and fibres)
Y37 Organic phosphorous compounds
Y38 Organic cyanides
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Y39 Phenols; phenolcompounds including chlorophenols
Y40 Ethers
Y41 Halogenated organic solvents
Y42 Organic solvents excluding halogenated solvents
Y43 Any congener of polychiorinated dibenzo-furan
Y44 Any congener of polychlorinated dibenzo-p-dioxin
Y45 Organohalogen compounds other than substances referred
to in this Annex (e.g., Y39, Y41, Y42, Y43, Y44)
ANNEX II




An explosive substance or waste is a solid or
liquid substance or waste (or mixture of
substances or wastes) which is in itself
capable by chemical reaction or producing gas
at such a temperature and pressure and at
such a speed as to cause damage to the
surroundings.
3 H3 Flammable liquids
The word flammable” has the same meaning as
“inflammable.” Flammable liquids are
liquids, or mixtures of liquids, or liquids
containing solids in solution or suspension
(for example paints, varnishes, lacquers,
etc., but not including substances or wastes
otherwise classified on account of their
dangerous characteristics) which give off a
flammable vapor at temperatures of not more
than 60.5 degrees C, closed-cup test, or not
more than 65.6 degrees C, open-cup test.
(Since the results of open-cup tests and of
closed cup tests are not strictly comparable
and even individual results by the same test
are often variable, regulations varying from
the above figures to make allowance for such
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difference would be within the spirit of this
definition)
* Corresponds to the hazardous classification system
included in the United Nations Recommendations on the
transport of Dangerous Goods (ST/SG/AC.l0/l/Rev.5,United
Nations, New York, 1988)
4.1 H4.l Flammable solids
Solids, or waste solids, other than those
classed as explosives, which under conditions
encountered in transport are readily
combustible, or may cause or contribute to
fire through friction.
4.2 H4.2 Substances or wastes liable to spontaneous
combustion
Substances or wastes which are liable to
spontaneous heating under normal conditions
encountered in transport, or to heating up on
contact with air, and being then liable to
catch fire.
4.3 H4.3 Substances or wastes which, in contact with
water emit flammable gases
Substances or wastes which, by interaction
with water, are liable to become
spontaneously flammable or to give off
flammable gases in dangerous quantities.
5.1 H5.l Oxidizing
Substances or wastes which, while in
themselves not necessarily combustible, may,
generally by yielding oxygen, cause or
contribute to the combustion of other
materials.
5.2 H5.2 Organic peroxides
Organic substances or wastes which contain
the bivalent-0-0-structure are thermally
unstable substances which may undergo
exothermic self-accelerating decomposition.
6.1 H6.l Poisonous (Acute)
Substances or wastes liable either to cause
death or serious injury or to harm human
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health if swallowed or inhaled or by skin
contact.
H6.2 Infectious substances
Substances or wastes containing viable micro
organisms or their toxins which are known or
suspected to cause disease in animals or
humans.
H8 Corrosives
Substances or wastes which, by chemical
action, will cause severe damage when in
contact with living tissue, or in the case of
leakage, will materially damage, or even
destroy, other goods or the means of
transport; they may also cause other hazards.
10 Liberation of toxic gases in contact with air
or water
Hll Toxic (Delayed or chronic)
Substances or wastes which, if they are
inhaled or ingested or if they penetrate the
skin, may involve delayed or chronic effects,
including carcinogenicity.
H12 Ecotoxic
Substances or wastes which if released
present or may present immediate or delayed
adverse impacts to the environment by means
of bioaccumulation and/or toxic effects upon
biotic systems.
H13 Capable, by any means, after disposal, of
yielding another material, e.g., leachate,




Dl Deposit into or onto land (e.g., landfill, etc.)
D2 Land treatment, (e.g., biodegradation of liquid or
sludgy discards in soils, etc.)
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D3 Deep injection, (e.g., injection of pumpable discards
into wells, salt domes or naturally occurring
repositories, etc.)
D4 Surface impoundment, (e.g., placement of liquid or
sludge discards into pits, ponds, or lagoons, etc.)
D5 Specially engineered landfill, (e.g., placement into
lined discrete cells which are capped and isolated from
one another and the environment, etc.)
D6 Release into a water body except seas/oceans
D7 Release into seas/oceans including sea-bed insertion
D8 Biological treatment not specified elsewhere in this
Annex which results in final compounds or mixtures
which are discarded by means of any of the operations
in Annex III
9 Physico-chemical treatment not specified elsewhere in
this Annex which results in final compounds or mixtures
which are discarded by means of any of the operations
in Annex III, (e.g. evaporation, drying,
calcination, neutralisation, precipitation, etc.)
DlO Incineration on land
Dil Incineration at sea
Dl2 Permanent storage, -(e.g., emplacement of containers in
a mine, etc.)
Dl3 Blending or mixing prior to submission to any of the
operations in Annex III
D14 Repackaging prior to submission to any of the
operations in Annex III
D15 Storage pending any of the operations in Annex III
Dl6 Use as a fuel (other than in direct incineration) or
other means to generate energy
D17 Solvent reclamation/regeneration
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D18 Recycling/reclamation of organic substances which are
not used as solvents
D19 Recycling/reclamation of metals and metal compounds
D20 Recycling/reclamation of other inorganic materials
D21 Regeneration of acids and bases
D22 Recovery of components used for pollution abatement
D23 Recovery of components from catalysts
D24 Used oil re-refining or other reuses of previously used
oil
D25 Land treatment resulting in benefit to agriculture or
ecological improvement
D26 Uses of residual materials obtained from any of the
operations numbered Dl-D25
D27 Exchange of wastes for submission to any of the
operations numbered Dl-D26
D28 Accumulation of material intended for any operation in
Annex III
ANNEX IV
INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED ON NOTIFICATION
1. Reason for waste export.
2. Exporter of the waste 1/
3. Generator(s) of the waste and site of generation 1/
4. Importer and Disposer of the waste and actual site of
disposal 1/
5. Intended carrier(s) of the waste and actual site of
disposal 1/
6. Country of export of the waste.
Competent authority 2/
7. Countries of transit.
Competent authority 2/
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9. Projected date of shipment and period of time over
which waste is to be exported and proposed itinerary
(including point of entry and exit)
10. Means of transport envisaged (road, rail, sea, air,
inland waters)
11. Information relating to insurance 3/
12. Designation and physical description of the waste
including Y number and UN number and its composition
4/ and information on any special handling requirements
including emergency provisions in case of accidents.
13. Type of packaging envisaged (e.g., bulk, drummer,
tanker).
14. Estimated quantity in weight/volume
15. Process by which the waste is generated 5/
16. Waste classification from Annex II: Hazardous charac
teristics, H number, and UN class
17. Method of disposal as per Annex III.
18. Declaration by the generator and exporter that the
information is correct.
19. Information transmitted (including technical
description of the plant) to the exporter or generator
from the disposer of the waste upon which the latter
has based his assessment that there was no reason to
believe that the wastes will not be managed in an
environmentally sound manner in accordance with the
laws and regulations of the country of import.
20. Information concerning the contract between the
exporter and disposer.
Notes
Full name and address, telephone, telex or telefax
number and the name, address, telephone, telex, or
telefax number of the person to be contacted.
Full name and address, telephone, telex or telefax
number.
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Information to be provided on relevant insurance
requirements and how they are met by exporter, carrier,
and disposer.
The nature and the concentration of the most hazardous
components, in terms of toxicity and other dangers
presented by the waste both in handling and in relation
to the proposed disposal method.
Insofar as this is necessary to assess the hazard and
determine the appropriateness of the proposed disposal
operation.
ANNEX IV B
INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED ON THE MOVEMENT DOCUMENT
1. Exporter of the waste 1/
2. Generator(s) of the waste and site of generation 1/
3. Disposer of the waste and actual site of disposal 1/
4. Carrier(s) of the waste 1/ or his agent(s)
5. The date the transboundary movement started and date(s)
and signature on receipt by each person who takes
charge of the waste
Means of transport (road, rail, inland waterway, sea,
air) including countries of export, transit and import,
also point of entry and exit where these have been
designated
General description of the waste (physical state,
proper UN shipping name and class, UN number, Y number
and H number as applicable)
8. Information on special handling requirements including
emergency provisions in case of accidents
9. Type and number of packages
10. Quantity in weight/volume
11. Declaration by the generator or exporter that the
information is correct
12. Declaration by the generator or exporter indicating no
objection from the competent authorities of all States
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concerned
Certification by disposer of receipt at designated
disposal facility and indication of method of disposal
and of the appropriate date of disposal.
Notes
The information required on the movement document shall
where possible be integrated into one document with that
required under transport rules. Where this is not
possible, the information should complement rather than
duplicate that required under the transport rules. The
movement document shall carry instructions as to who is to
provide information and fill-out any form.
1/ Full name and address, telephone, telex or telefax
number and the name, address, telephone, telex or





Unless the agreement referred to in Article 20 of the
Convention provides otherwise, the arbitration procedure
shall be conducted in accordance with Articles 2 to 10
below.
Article 2
The claimant Party shall notify the Secretariat that the
Parties have agreed to submit the di6pute to arbitration
pursuant to paragraph 1 or paragraph 2 of Article 20 of this
Convention and include, in particular, the Articles of the
Convention, and the interpretation or application of which
are at issue. The Secretariat shall forward the information
thus received to all Parties to the Convention.
Article 3
The arbitral tribunal shall consist of three members. Each
of the Parties to the dispute shall appoint an arbitrator,
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and the two arbitrators 80 appointed shall designate by
common agreement the third arbitrator, who shall be the
chairman of the tribunal. The latter shall not be a national
of one of the parties to the dispute, nor have his usual
place of residence in one of the Parties, nor be employed by
any of them, nor have dealt with the case in any other
capacity.
Article 4
1. If the chairman of the arbitral tribunal has not
been designated within two months of the appointment of the
second arbitrator, the Secretary-General of the OAU shall,
at the request of either Party, designate him within a
further two months period.
2. If one of the Parties to the dispute does not appoint an
arbitrator within two months of the receipt of the request,
the other Party may inform the Secretary-General of the OAU
who shall designate the chairman of the arbitral tribunal
within a further two months period. Upon designation, the
chairman of the arbitral tribunal shall request the Party
which has not appointed an arbitrator to do 80 within two
months. After 6uch period, he shall inform the Secretary-
General of the OAU who shall make this appointment within a
further two month’s period.
Article 5
1. The arbitral tribunal shall render its decision in
accordance with international law and in accordance with the
provisions of this Convention.
2. Any arbitral tribunal constituted ufider the provisions of
this Annex shall draw up its own rules of procedure.
Article 6
1. The decisions of the arbitral tribunal both on procedure
and on substance, shall be taken by majority vote of its
members.
2. The tribunal may take all appropriate measures in order
to establish the facts. It may, at the reque6t of one of
the Parties, recommend essential interim measures of
protection.
3. The Parties to the dispute shall provide all
facilities necessary for the effective conduct of the
proceedings.
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4. The absence or default of a Party in the dispute shall
not con6titute an impediment to the proceedings.
Article 7
The tribunal may hear and determine counter-claims arising
directly out of the subject-matter of the dispute.
Article 8
Unless the arbitral tribunal determines otherwise because of
the particular circumstances of the case, the expenses of
the tribunal, including the remuneration of its members,
shall be borne by the Parties to the dispute in equal
shares. The tribunal shall keep a record of all its
expenses, and shall furnish a final statement thereof to the
Parties.
Article 9
Any Party that has an interest of a legal nature in the
subject matter of the dispute which may be affected by the
decision in the case, may intervene in the proceedings with
the consent of the tribunal.
Article 10
1. The tribunal shall render its award within five months
of the date on which it is established unless it finds it
necessary to extend the time-limit for a period which should
not exceed five months.
2. The award of the arbitral tribunal shall be accompanied
by a statement of reasons. It shall be final and binding
upon the Parties to the dispute.
3. Any dispute which may arise between the Parties
concerning the interpretation or execution of the award may
be submitted by either Party to the arbitral tribunal which
made the award or, if the latter cannot be seized thereof,
to another tribunal constituted for this purpose in the same
manner as the first.
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Adopted by the Conference of Environment Ministers at
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